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Abstract 
 
Cybercrime offences know no limits to physical geographic boundaries and have continued to 
create unprecedented issues regarding to the feasibility and legitimacy of applying traditional 
legislations based on geographic boundaries. These offences also come with procedural 
issues of enforcement of the existing legislations and continue to subject nations with 
problems unprecedented to its sovereignty and jurisdictions.  
 
This research is a critical study on the legal aspects of cybercrime in Nigeria, which examines 
how laws and regulations are made and applied in a well-established system to effectively 
answer questions raised by shortcomings on the implementation of cybercrime legislations, 
and critically reviews various laws in Nigeria relating or closely related to cybercrime.  
 
This research will provide insight into current global cybercrime legislations and the 
shortfalls to their procedural enforcement; and further bares the cybercrime issues in Nigeria 
while analysing and proffering a critique to the provisions as provided in the recently enacted 
Nigerian Cybercrime (Prohibition and Prevention) Act 2015, in contradistinction to the 
existing legal framework in the United Kingdom and the other regional enactments like the 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, African Union Convention on Cybersecurity 
and Personal Data Protection 2014, and the ECOWAS Directive on Cybercrime 2011. 
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Chapter One: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Cybercrime has become one of the great legal frontiers. Between 2000 and 2012, the internet 
expanded at an average rate of 566.4% on a global level, while an estimated 2.4 billion 
people are “on the Net.”1 Six trillion web pages are accessible, 2.2 billion Google searches 
per month and 12% of all global trade happens online, with about $240 million lost from 
global cyber-crime.
2
  
 
The rapid growth of computer technology carries with it the evolution of various crimes on 
the internet. In recent years, there has been considerable focus within the criminal justice 
system on computer-related crime, as cybercrime has garnered increased attention because 
computers have become so central to several areas of social activity connected to everyday 
life.
3
 Internet users innovate freely on various platforms, reaching out to more people, aiding 
ubiquity of internet features and with attendant high utility and pecuniary returns.
4
 Although 
the internet has been a double-edged sword providing opportunities for individuals and 
organisations, it brings with it an increased information security risk.
5
 Cybercrime has in 
recent time become a crucial threat to many countries which has necessitated many 
governments from around the world to enact sturdy legislation and also put in place coherent 
procedural measures to tackle cyber-criminals; which involve putting effective task forces, 
                                                 
1
 See World Internet Usage and Population Statistics. <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm> accessed 8 
December 2012 
2
 Mohamed Chawki., ‘Best Practices and Enforcement in Cybersecurity: Legal Institutional and Technical 
Measures’ <http://www.cybercrime-fr.org/> accessed on 8 December 2012 
3
 Toby Finnie, Tom Petee, & John Jarvis, “Future Challenges of Cybercrime” Proceedings of the Futures 
Working Group, (2010) <http://futuresworkinggroup.cos.ucf.edu/publications/FWGV5Cybercrime.pdf> 
accessed 17 November 2012 
4
 David, Ashaolu, ‘Combating Cybercrimes in Nigeria’ (23 December, 2011) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2028154> accessed on 13 November 2012 
5
 T., Magele, ‘E-security in South Africa’, White Paper prepared for the Forge Ahead e-Security event. (2005, 
February 16/17) < http://www.sajim.co.za/index.php/SAJIM/rt/printerFriendly/418/410> accessed on 23 June 
2015. 
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efficient legislation and tough sentencing regimes in place for those convicted of acts 
involving cybercrime. 
 
It is a truism that the cyber world has no definite territorial boundaries.
6
  At just a simple 
click, one is already in another territorial jurisdiction with little or no restraint whatsoever.
7
 It 
is now much easier for an offender to commit a criminal act in one country and quickly 
disappear into the unknown cyberspace from the territorial confines of the country, thereby 
frustrating a country’s ability to apply its criminal laws against the perpetrator.8 It has also 
become possible for someone in ‘Nation A’ to commit a criminal act against a victim 
physically situated within the territory of ‘Nation B’ without the perpetrator’s ever leaving 
his own country.
9
 In 2000, ‘the Love Bug virus’10 spread throughout the world estimated to 
have affected over forty-five million users in over twenty countries, and to have caused 
between two and ten billion dollars in damage.
11
 As at the time, there was no legislation 
dealing specifically with computer-related crimes in the Philippines where the offender was 
located. Thus, following the legal principle of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege 
(there must be no crime or punishment, except in accordance with fixed and predetermined 
                                                 
6
 Charlotte Decker, ‘Cyber Crime: An Argument to Update the United States Criminal Code to Reflect the 
Changing Nature of Cyber Crime’, (2008) South California L.R. Vol. 81:959 at 959. 
7
 David R Johnson and David Post, ‘Law and borders: The rise of law in cyberspace’ (1996) Stanford Law 
Review, 1367-1402. 
8
 Joachim Vogel, ‘Towards a Global Convention against Cybercrime, First World Conference on Penal law in 
Guadalajara, Mexico’, (2007), <http://www.penal.org/sites/default/files/files/Guadalajara-Vogel.pdf> accessed 
on 25 June 2015. 
9
 Susan W. Brenner and Bert-Jaap Koops, 'Approaches to cybercrime jurisdiction' (2004) 4 J. High Tech. L. 1  
10
 The source of the virus was eventually traced in the Philippines; and with the help of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Philippines’ National Bureau of Investigation identified a suspect named Onel de 
Guzman as the person who created the virus and uploaded it in the internet. While there was sufficient evidence 
against Onel de Guzman, the government prosecutors faced a serious obstacle before they could file charges 
against him.  It was observed that at the time of the commission of the crime, the Philippines had no laws 
criminalising computer hacking. He was however charged with fraud and credit card theft (on the premise that 
the virus was meant to harvest user passwords that would be used to obtain internet service and other things of 
value). As there was no cybercrime legislation in the Philippines as at the time, he could not be convicted.  
11
 Marc D. Goodman and Susan W. Brenner, 'The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace', 
(2002) U.C.L.A. Journal of Law & Technology 3, 4-24 
<http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.php> accessed on 26 November 
2012 
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law)
12
 the charge against the offender, Onel de Guzman, was dismissed as legally 
insufficient.
13
 
 
In as much as it is necessary for various countries to have legislation proscribing cybercrime 
and also make provisions for their procedural enforcement, it is also of utmost importance 
and necessity to harmonise these individual jurisdictional provisions. The need for this 
legislative harmonisation of cybercrime laws was highlighted in the case of Yahoo, Inc. v. La 
Ligue Contra Le Racisme et L'Antisemitism,
14
 which also raises two of the most important 
issues in the procedural enforcement of cybercrime legislation: jurisdiction and international 
co-operation. 
 
                                                 
12
 This is an equivalent of Section 36 (8) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, which 
provides that “No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission that 
did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal 
offence heavier than the penalty in force at the time the offence was committed.” 
13
 H. T Tavani, ‘Controversies, Questions, and Strategies for Ethical Computing’ (4th edn, Wiley, 2013) 184. 
14
 Yahoo!, Inc.  v.  La  Ligue  Contre  Le  Racisme  et  L'Antisemitisme,  169  F.  Supp.  2d 
1181, 1192 (N.D.  Cal.  2001). Yahoo! has a website which auctions in France Nazi Memorabilia and Third 
Reich related goods. French law, however, prohibits the display in France of Nazi souvenirs for the purposes of 
sale of any nature.  Moreover, the online sale of Nazi artefacts in France is considered as an offence on the 
memory of France which was severely wounded by the atrocities committed by the Nazis during World War II. 
In  April  of  2000, La Ligue Contre Le Racisme  Et l'Antisemitisme  and  L'Union  Des Etudiants Juifs De 
France (collectively "LICRA") sent a "cease and desist" letter  to Yahoo! at its California headquarters, in which 
LICRA requested that Yahoo! refrain from selling Nazi and Third Reich related items on and through its Web-
based auction site. When Yahoo! failed to comply with LICRA's request, LICRA filed a civil lawsuit against 
Yahoo! in the French court. On the other hand, Yahoo! argued that it is a company incorporated in the United 
States of America and is not bound by French Laws. On May 22, 2000, the French court determined that 
Yahoo!'s yahoo.com web-site, which offered for sale certain items of Nazi propaganda and artefacts, violated a 
French criminal code provision which prohibited the display or sale of such items. Significantly, the French 
court further ordered that Yahoo! “take all necessary measures to dissuade and render impossible any access via 
Yahoo.com to the Nazi artefact auction service and to any other site or service that may be construed as 
constituting an apology for Nazism or a contesting of Nazi crimes.” Accordingly, Yahoo! filed an  action in a 
United States court seeking declaratory  relief from  the  French  court's  order  on the  basis that  the  order  (in  
its  entirety)  was  not enforceable  under  the  U.S. Constitution. Having concluded  that the  French  order 
violated  Yahoo!'s First Amendment rights,  the United States District Court of California stated that such 
violation no matter  how short in duration constituted "irreparable injury.' The court held that although the 
French order could regulate speech occurring in France on the basis of content or viewpoint, the French order 
could not be enforced against the same speech occurring simultaneously in the United States. Enforcement of 
such an order would impermissibly violate the First Amendment-even if such speech was considered highly 
offensive. Accordingly, the court refused to enforce the French order prohibiting Yahoo! from displaying or 
selling Nazi propaganda and artefacts through the use of its web site. 
4 
 
In the UK, the English courts concluded that the existing laws did not accommodate nor 
reflect the changes brought about by computer technology as was held in R v. Gold & 
Schifreen
15
, where the defendants were acquitted because there were no laws to prevent 
unlawful access to a computer. This decision, amongst other factors led to the enactment of 
the Computer Misuse Act (CMA) 1990. The offenders were acquitted by the lower court, and 
the prosecution’s appeal to the House of Lords was also unsuccessful.16 
 
Partly in response to this decision, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 was passed. Some writers 
have criticized the Act on the premise that it was introduced hastily and was poorly thought 
out.
17
 The Act has nevertheless become a model from which so many countries, have drawn 
inspiration when subsequently drafting their municipal cybercrime laws, as it is seen as a 
robust and flexible piece of legislation in terms of dealing with cybercrime.
18
 This could be 
seen from the current Nigeria Cybercrime Act 2015, which has utmost resemblance to the 
                                                 
15
 (1988) AC 1063. The defendants in this case used conventional home computers and modems between 1984 
and 1985 to gain unauthorised access to British Telecom's Prestel interactive view-data service. While at a trade 
show, Schifreen by had observed the password of a Prestel engineer; the username was 22222222 and the 
password was 1234. The duo explored the system with the aid of this information, and even had access to the 
personal message box of Prince Philip. Prestel installed monitors on the suspect accounts and passed 
information thus obtained to the police. The pair were later arraigned and charged under section 1 of the Forgery 
and Counterfeiting Act 1981 with defrauding BT by manufacturing a "false instrument", namely the internal 
condition of BT's equipment after it had processed Gold's eavesdropped password. They were tried at 
Southwark Crown Court, and were convicted of various offences (five against Schifreen, four against Gold) and 
fined, respectively, £750 and £600. Despite the fact that the fines imposed were modest, they decided to appeal 
to the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal challenging their conviction and raising substantial issues for 
determination by the court of appeal. Their counsel cited the lack of evidence showing the two had attempted to 
obtain material gain from their exploits, and claimed the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act had been misapplied to 
their conduct. 
16
 The Lords upheld the acquittal. Lord David Brennan while upholding the acquittal said: 
“We have accordingly come to the conclusion that the language of the Act was not intended to apply to the 
situation which was shown to exist in this case. The submissions at the close of the prosecution case should have 
succeeded. It is a conclusion which we reach without regret. The Procrustean attempt to force these facts into 
the language of an Act not designed to fit them produced grave difficulties for both judge and jury which we 
would not wish to see repeated. The appellants' conduct amounted in essence, as already stated, to dishonestly 
gaining access to the relevant Prestel data bank by a trick. That is not a criminal offence. If it is thought 
desirable to make it so, that is a matter for the legislature rather than the courts.” 
17
 Neil MacEwan, "The Computer Misuse Act 1990: lessons from its past and predictions for its future" (2008), 
Criminal Law Review 955; See also Stefan Fafinski, ‘Computer Misuse: Response, Regulation and the Law’ 
(Cullomption, Willan 2009). 
18
 IISS Global Perspectives, 'Power in Cyberspace: Q&A with Nigel Inkster, Director, Transnational Threats and 
Political Risk' IISS, 18 January 2011, < http://www.lepointinternational.com/it/politica/56-medio-oriente/648-
iiss-global-perspectives-power-in-cyberspace-.html> accessed on 26 November 2012. 
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combined provisions of the United Kingdom’s Computer Misuse Act, and Serious Crime Act 
2015. 
 
This growing rate of cybercrime and the need to have a unified legislation seem to be the 
motivating factor that led the forty-three members of the Council of Europe into drafting the 
first international treaty on cybercrime. Harmonization of global cybercrime laws is very 
essential for both substantive and procedural laws.
19
 There is also need for countries to 
reappraise and revise their individual rules of evidence, search and seizure, electronic 
eavesdropping, and other related provisions to cover digitized information, modern computer 
and communication systems, and the global nature of the internet, as this would facilitate 
cooperation in investigations covering multiple jurisdictions.
20
 The Convention was adopted 
on 8
th
 November 2001 and was opened for signature in Budapest on 23
rd
 November, 2001 
with requirement of ratification by five states to enter into force, including at least 3 member 
States of the Council of Europe; and this condition was satisfied when Lithuania gave notice 
of ratification in July 2004.
21
 
 
As at 23
rd
 June 2015, the Convention had been signed by 54 members and ratified by 46 
members.
22
 Only eight countries have only signed but have not ratified the convention. The 
United Kingdom signed this convention on 23 November 2001 and ratified it on 25 May 
2011, while the United States signed the Convention on 23 November 2001 and ratified it on 
29 September 2006. By ratifying this Convention on cybercrime, the contracting states agree 
                                                 
19
 Jonathan Clough, ‘A world of difference: The Budapest convention on Cybercrime and the challenges of 
Harmonisation’ (2014) Monash University Law Review, 40(3), 698. 
20
 Phil Williams, Organized Crime and Cybercrime: Organized Crime and Cybercrime: Synergies, Trends, and 
Responses: An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State, (August 2001) Volume 6, Number 2 
<http://guangzhou.usembassy-china.org.cn/uploads/images/sqVFYsuZI0LECJTHra1S_A/ijge0801.pdf> 
assessed on 28 November 2012. 
21
  Ian Lloyd, Information technology law (7
th
 Edn, Oxford University Press, 2014) 217 
22
 See, Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG> accessed on 
24 June 2015. 
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to ensure that their domestic laws criminalize conduct described in the substantive criminal 
law section and establish the procedural tools necessary to investigate and prosecute such 
crimes.
23
 
 
An Additional Protocol to the convention on cybercrime, concerning acts of a racist and 
xenophobic nature committed through Computer Systems was opened for signature in 
Strasbourg on 28
th
 January 2003 and came into force on 1
st
 March 2006.
24
 As at 23
rd
 June 
2016, the convention had been signed by 38 members and ratified by 24 members.
25
 Neither 
the United Kingdom nor the United States have not signed or ratified this additional protocol. 
This separate protocol could be interpreted as requiring nations to punish anyone guilty of 
“insulting publicly, through a computer system” certain groups of people based on 
characteristics such as race or ethnic origin, a requirement that could make it a crime to e-
mail jokes about ethnic groups or question whether the Holocaust occurred.
26
 Nigeria has not 
signed, ratified nor adopted any of these Conventions relating to cybercrime although some 
nations outside Europe had been admitted as observers to the council of Europe,
27
 which 
                                                 
23
 Judge Stein Schjolberg and Amanda M. Hubbard, ‘Harmonizing National Legal Approaches on Cybercrime’ 
International Telecommunication Union WSIS Thematic Meeting on Cybersecurity, Document CYB/04, (2005) 
pp 10. 
24
 See, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning acts of a Racist and Xenophobic 
Nature Committed through Computer Systems <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/189.htm> 
assessed on 23 June 2015. 
25
 See, List of Signatories to Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning acts of a Racist 
and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=189&CM=4&DF=&CL=ENG> assessed on 
10 June 2015. 
26
 Clay Wilson, ‘Botnets, cybercrime, and cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and policy issues for congress’ 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, (2008), pp.32 
<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a477642.pdf> assessed 22 December 2013. 
27
 These nations include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Japan, Mexico, 
Panama, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, and United States of America. The United States represented by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), played a very significant role in the drafting stages of the convention, even though 
it was only an observer member to the Council of Europe. 
7 
 
enabled them to be parties to the Conventions and enjoy the benefits therefrom, like 
international co-operation amongst member states.
28
 
 
Encouraged by the standards already set by the Council of Europe, along with the EU 
Framework Decision on Attacks against Computer Systems
29
 and the EU Data Retention 
Directive,
30
 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
31
 adopted the 
ECOWAS Directive on Cybercrime,
32
 with the major objective of adapting the substantive 
criminal law and the procedural enforcement of member states to address the cybercrime 
phenomenon. The Directive seeks to regulate three major areas: substantive criminal law, 
procedural law and judicial cooperation.
33
 Nigeria is a signatory to this Directive, which 
urges signatories to adopt the necessary legislative, regulatory and administrative measures in 
order to comply with the Directive not later that 1
st
 January 2014.
34
 The drafters of this 
Directive seem to lend more focus on substantive criminal Law, and restrict the provisions 
relating the procedural instrument and enforcements solely to ‘search and seizure’.35 It is not 
in any way justifiable that some very essential provisions regarding procedural enforcements 
of the substantive provisions such as expedited preservation of computer data
36
, lawful real-
time interception and preservation of content data
37
 and real-time collection of traffic-data
38
 
                                                 
28
 Sylvia Mercado Kierkegaard, “Cracking Down on Cybercrime Global Response: The Cybercrime 
Convention” (2005), COMMUNICATIONS OF THE IIMA, Volume 5 , Number 1, Page(s) 12 To 14 
29
 Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 22 February 2005 on attacks on information systems. 
30
 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC 
31
 ECOWAS sixty-six ordinary session of the council of member-states ministers held at Abuja, Nigeria from 
17-19 August, 2011. 
32
 Directive C/DIR. 1/08/11 on Fighting Cyber Crime Within ECOWAS. 
33
 ECOWAS Secretariat, C. (2014) Report of the Commonwealth Working Group of Experts on Cybercrime, 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 40(3). 
34
 See Art. 35 of the ECOWAS Directive 
35
 See Art. 33 of the ECOWAS Directive 
36
 See: Sec. 14 ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation; Regarding the importance of the instrument in Cyber-
crime investigations see: Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries, page 177. 
37
 See: Sec. 20 ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation; Regarding the importance of the instrument in Cyber-
crime investigations see: Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries, page 195. 
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that are contained in both the ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation and the Budapest 
Convention, have not been included in this Directive. One wonders the reasons for these 
grave omissions, when the ITU Toolkit and the Council of Europe’s Convention all served as 
the reference instruments to the drafters of the Directive. Also, the Directive’s provision 
regarding judicial cooperation is limited to a single provision.
39
 One would have thought that 
the portentous challenges related to international cooperation in cybercrime cases
40
 which 
explains why both the ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation,
41
 as well as the Budapest 
Convention
42
 contain a large set of provisions dealing with international cooperation, should 
have encouraged the drafters of the Directives to make extensive legislation on these 
contentious procedural issues. 
 
Following the pace already set by ECOWAS, and also due to the fact that the ECOWAS 
Directives on Cybercrime have not been ratified by most of its members, the African Union 
adopted the African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, 
2014.
43
 This Convention embodies the existing commitments of African Union member-
states at sub-regional, regional and international levels to building a healthy and safe 
information society, and also strengthening the existing legislations on information and 
communication technologies of Member States and the regional economic communities. 
 
The UK has so far been a leading proponent for cybersecurity legislations; which is utterly 
different to the Nigerian situation, where cybercrime which has become so prevalent today 
                                                                                                                                                        
38
 See: Sec. 19 ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation; Regarding the importance of the instrument in Cyber-
crime investigations see: Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries, page 194. 
39
 See Art. 35 Draft Directive. 
40
 See: Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries, page 207 
41
 Sec. 23 – 33. 
42
 Art. 23 - 35. 
43
 On 27th June 2014, at its 23rd Ordinary Session in Malabo 
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and is globally known as the ‘Nigerian 419’.44 This is an advance fee fraud cybercrime 
technique which has been recently boosted by the global revolution in information and 
communication technology in Nigeria. This form of cybercrimes also covers romance, lottery 
and charity scams.
45
 
 
Until 15
th
 May 2015, when the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 was signed into law, there was 
no specific adjectival law on cybercrime in Nigeria. The situation was like the Philippines’ in 
2000 when the ‘Love Bug virus’ spread throughout the world, and the suspect could not be 
effectively prosecuted due to the lacunae in the Philippines’ cyber-criminal legislation. The 
only relevant legislation was municipal laws, like the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission Act, the Criminal Code (as applicable in the southern Nigeria) and Penal Code 
(which is operational in the northern Nigeria).
46
 These issues will be fully analysed in 
subsequent chapters. Unfortunately, this traditional legislation had little or less to offer in 
respect of cyber-related offences. This made it almost impossible to secure convictions on 
offences relating to cybercrime in Nigeria,
47
 except in the few situations where confessional 
statements are extracted from the offenders by the investigating officers and/or prosecution.
48
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44
 Harvey Glickman, 'The Nigerian “419” advance fee scams: prank or peril?' (2005) Canadian Journal of 
African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines, 39(3), 460-489; Charles Tive, 419 scam: Exploits of 
the Nigerian con man (first published 2001, iUniverse, 2006). 
45
 Mohamed Chawki, ‘Nigeria Tackles Advance Fee Fraud’ (2009) Journal of Information Law & Technology, 
1 
46
 Criminal Code Act, Chapter 77, Laws of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990; Penal Code Act Chapter 89, Laws 
of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1963. 
47
 Esharenana E. Adomi and Stella E. Igun, 'Combating cybercrime in Nigeria' (2008), The Electronic Library, 
Vol. 26 Iss: 5, pp.716 - 725 
48
 Laura Ani, “Cyber Crime and National Security: The Role of the Penal and Procedural Law”, (2011) NIALS 
<http://nials-nigeria.org/pub/lauraani.pdf> accessed on 4 June 2015. 
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1.1 Defining Cybercrime 
 
 
The terms ‘cybercrime,’49 ‘computer crime’,50 ‘information technology crime’,51 and ‘high-
tech crime’52 are often used inter-changeably,53 although both technically and legally, they do 
not have the same meaning. Literally, cybercrime involves a reference to a crime related to 
the cyberspace, computers, computer networks and the internet. Although the term 
‘cybercrime’ is now commonly used by all, a serious problem that has always been 
encountered by researchers is that there is no unanimously agreed definition of this term.
54
 
This situation seems to have been compounded with the fact that everyone seem to have an 
idea of what the term ‘cybercrime’ means. Although most researchers have found it very 
difficult to identify exactly what demeanors are attributable to this term, some scholars have 
argued that defining the term either too broadly or too narrowly creates unintended problem 
with the risk of creating a threat that never appears, or missing the real problem when it 
comes.
55
 Other legal scholars have argued that a broad definition of the term is necessary 
                                                 
49
 See, for example, Botswana, Cybercrime and Computer Related Crimes Act 2007; Bulgaria, Chapter 9, 
Criminal Code SG No. 92/2002; Jamaica, Cybercrimes Act 2010; Namibia, Computer Misuse and Cybercrime 
Act 2003; Senegal, Law No. 2008-11 on Cybercrime 2008. 
50
 See, for example, Malaysia, Computer Crimes Act 1997; Sri Lanka, Computer Crime Act 2007; Sudan, 
Computer Crimes Act 2007. 
51
 See, for example, India, The Information Technology Act 2000; Saudi Arabia, IT Criminal Act 2007; 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ley Especial contra los Delitos Informáticos 2001; Vietnam, Law on 
Information Technology, 2007. 
52
 See, for example, Serbia, Law on Organization and Competence of Government Authorities for Combating 
High-Tech Crime 2010. 
53
 Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, “The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace” 
(2002) U.C.L.A. Journal of Law & Technology 3, 4-24 
<http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.php> accessed on 26 November 
2012. 
54
 See for example: International Telecommunication Union, “Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for 
Developing Countries” (2011); Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, ETS No. 
185; Fausto Pocar, “New challenges for international rules against cyber-crime” (2004) European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research, 10(1): 27-37; David S. Wall, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the 
Information Age, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007). 
55
 Carl J. Franklin, The Investigator’s Guide to Computer Crime, (Charles C. Thomas-Publisher Ltd. Illinois, 
U.S.A., 2006) 7. 
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because of their diversity and rapid emergence of new technology-specific criminal 
behaviors.
56
 
 
Another issue that has made the global definition of cybercrime so difficult has been the 
constantly changing and evolving scope of computer-related crimes; more so, as definitions 
of cybercrime continue to evolve.
57
 The continuous expanding nature of technology has made 
offenders become more sophisticated in their criminality and broaden their acts toward new 
variations in computer crimes outside the confines of the jurisdictional statutory definition of 
cybercrime, and thereby making it more difficult for the procedural enforcement of 
cybercrime laws.
58
  
 
It is surprising that the Nigerian Cybercrime Act, the Council of Europe Cybercrime 
Convention, and the African Union Convention, contain no definition of cybercrime. The fact 
that prior to the adoption of the African Union Convention and subsequent enactment of the 
Nigerian Act, there had been many conflicting and diverse connotations of what acts or 
conducts amounting to cybercrime, it would have been expected that both legislation include 
a workable definition of cybercrime. In one of the first comprehensive presentations of 
computer crime,
59
 the definition of computer-related crime was defined in the broader 
meaning as any illegal act for which knowledge of computer technology is essential for a 
successful prosecution. In 1983 following a study on the international legal aspects of 
computer crime, computer crime was consequently defined as: ‘encompasses any illegal act 
                                                 
56
 Rizgar Mohammed Kadir, ‘The Scope and the Nature of Computer Crime Statutes: A Comparative Study’ 
(2010) German L.J., Vol. 11 No.06, 614. 
57
 Gordon, S., & Ford, R., ‘On the definition and classification of cybercrime’ (2006) Journal of Computer 
Virology, 2, 13-20. 
58
 Yasin Aslan, ‘Global Nature of Computer Crimes and the Convention on Cybercrime’ (2006) Ankara L.R, 
Vol. III No.2, 3. 
59
 Donn B. Parker, 'Computer Crime: Criminal Justice Resource Manual' (1989) 
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/118214NCJRS.pdf> accessed on 10 January 2015. 
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for which knowledge of computer technology is essential for its perpetration’.60 The 
Committee on Information, Communications and Computer Policy (ICCP)
61
 of the OECD 
recommendation of 1986 tried to give a working definition of cybercrime (computer-related 
crime) as any illegal, unethical or unauthorized behaviour relating to the automatic 
processing and the transmission of data. Following the Proposal for an International 
Convention on Cybercrime and Terrorism by the Stanford University,
62
 cybercrime was 
defined as ‘conduct with respect to cyber systems that is classified as an offence punishable 
by this Convention’; while a cyber-system was defined in the proposal as ‘any computer or 
network of computers used to relay, transmit, coordinate, or control communications of data 
or programs.’  
 
In Australia,
63
 cybercrime has a narrow statutory meaning as used in the Cybercrime Act 
2001
64
 by merely criminalising such activities which includes hacking, virus propagation, 
denial of service attacks, and web site vandalism, and for the purposes of ratifying the 
Council of Europe Convention on cybercrime.
65
 The European Union Council Framework 
Decision on attacks against information systems also tries to give a functional definition to 
cybercrime by defining computer-related crime ‘as including attacks against information 
systems as defined in this Framework Decision’.66 However, the South African Electronic 
Communications Amendment Act 1 of 2014 defines cybercrime as any criminal or other 
                                                 
60
 Stein Schjolberg, 'Computers and Penal Legislation – A Study of the Legal Politics of a new Technology' 
(CompLex 3/86, Universitetsforlaget 1986)   
61
 OECD, Computer-related criminality: Analysis of Legal Politics in the OECD Area, Vol 1, (OECD 1986) 
<http://www.oecd.org/internet/interneteconomy/37328586.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2012. 
62
 Centre for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University: A Proposal for an 
International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism, (August 2000) <http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/11912/sofaergoodman.pdf> accessed on 30 August 2012. 
63
 Australia shares with Nigeria the same unique patterns of legal transplant of the English common law 
tradition under the doctrine of ‘received English laws’. 
64
 <http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r1360> 
accessed on 26 November 2012. 
65
 Australia is a ‘non-member’ signatory to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, It ratified this 
Convention on 30 November 2012. 
66
 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2002:203E:0109:0113:EN:PDF> accessed on 
30 November 2012. 
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offence that is facilitated by or involves the use of electronic communications or information 
systems, including any device or the Internet or any one or more of them.
67
 This seem to be 
an all-encompassing approach from the South African Act, as it tends to class every offence 
as cybercrime as far as it has been committed through the use of a computer devise.
68
 This 
approach could also be attributed to the fact that South Africa is one of the two African 
signatories to the COE Convention.
69
 
 
More recently the United Kingdom Home Office in their Serious and Organised Crime 
Strategy, published in October 2013, tried to give a more functional definition to 
cybercrime,
70
 and resorted to use an umbrella term to describe two distinct but closely related 
criminal activities --- cyber-dependent crime and cyber-enabled crime.
71
 This definition 
appreciates the fact that cybercrimes are not only committed online, but could start online 
while ending up offline. This is rather a very practical definition which, though not very 
encompassing, however tries to illustrate that there might be differences between cybercrimes 
and cyber-enabled crimes. As defined by the UK Home Office,
72
 cyber-enabled crimes are 
traditional crimes, which can be increased in their scale or reach by use of computers, 
computer networks or other forms of information communications technology (ICT). These 
                                                 
67
 <http://www.ellipsis.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Overview-of-the-Electronic-Communications-
Amendment-Act-1-of-2014.pdf> accessed on 4 June 2015. 
68
 Dana, Van der Merwe, ‘A comparative overview of the (sometimes uneasy) relationship between digital 
information and certain legal fields in South Africa and Uganda’ (2014) PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese 
Regsblad 17, No. 1, 289-612. 
69
 The second African signatory to the COE Convention is Senegal. 
70
 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/serious-organised-crime-strategy> accessed on 22 January 
2015 
71
 It stated that “cyber-dependent crimes can only be committed using computers, computer networks or other 
forms of information communication technology. They include the creation and spread of malware for financial 
gain, hacking to steal important personal or industry data and denial of service attacks to cause reputational 
damage”; while defining cyber-enabled crimes as crimes that “(such as fraud, the purchasing of illegal drugs and 
child sexual exploitation) can be conducted on or offline, but online may take place at unprecedented scale and 
speed.” 
72
 Mike McGuire and Samantha Dowling ‘Cybercrime: A review of the evidence’ - Summary of key findings 
and implications (2013) Home Office Research report 75 <http://www.justiceacademy.org/iShare/Library-
UK/horr75-chap1.pdf> accessed on 4 July 2015. 
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acts include the spread of viruses or other malware, hacking and distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks.
73
 
 
The definition of cybercrime as applicable in the United States takes a relatively broader view 
of the behavioural constituents of crime committed through the computer and cyberspace.
74
 
The United States Code criminalises various conducts relating to the use of computers in 
criminal behaviour, including conduct relating to the obtaining and communicating of 
restricted information; the unauthorized accessing of information from financial institutions, 
the United States government, and “protected computers”; the unauthorized accessing of a 
government computer; fraud; the damaging of a protected computer resulting in certain types 
of specified harm; trafficking in passwords; and extortionate threats to cause damage to a 
“protected computer”.75 The United States Department of Justice also defines “computer 
crime” as “any violations of criminal law that involve knowledge of computer technology for 
their perpetration, investigation, or prosecution”.76 This definition seem to have been 
transplanted in the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 which seemed to adopt a broader 
perspective of cybercrime definition in section 3 of the Act by portending that cybercrime 
offences could not only be committed through the substantive means, but could be committed 
even while trying to investigate an already existing offence. 
 
The various definitions above highlight the persistent problems and issues on the notion of 
cybercrime --- more so, when these various diverging definitions are from some countries 
                                                 
73
 Gráinne Kirwan (Ed), ‘The Psychology of Cyber Crime: Concepts and Principles: Concepts and Principles’ 
(IGI Global, 2011). 
74
 Mike Keyser, 'The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime' (2003) J. Transitional Law and Policy, Vol. 
12:2, 290 
75
 Title 18, Section 1030 of the United States Code, (the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1030> accessed on 26 November 2012. 
76
 U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Judicial Program, National Institute of Justice, Computer Crime: 
Criminal Justice Resource Manual (2
nd
 edn Aug. 1989) 
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that have subscribed the council of Europe’s Convention on cybercrime. For all the variable 
definitions and terminologies adopted by various bodies and countries, there seem to be a 
broad consensus as to what these terms encompass. This involves a three-stage classification, 
as summarised by the US Department of Justice: 
1. Crimes in which the computer or computer network is the target of the criminal 
activity. For example, hacking, malware and DoS attack. 
2. Existing offences where the computer is a tool used to commit the crime. For 
example, child pornography, stalking, criminal copyright infringement, fraud and 
forgery offences. 
3. Crimes in which the use of the computer is an incidental aspect of the commission of 
the crime but may afford evidence of the crime. For example, addresses found in the 
computer of a murder suspect, or phone records of conversations between offender 
and victim before a homicide. In such cases the computer is not significantly 
implicated in the commission of the offence, but is more a repository for evidence.
77
 
 
This research adopts the three classifications above from the United States’ Department of 
Justice in order to deduce a working definition, which encapsulates cybercrime as any 
criminal activity involving an information technology infrastructure: including illegal access 
or unauthorized access; illegal interception that involves technical means of non-public 
transmissions of computer data to, from or within a computer system; data interference that 
include unauthorized damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration or suppression of computer 
data; systems interference that is interfering with the functioning of a computer system by 
                                                 
77
 Jonathan Clough, Principles of cybercrime, (1
st
 edn, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 27. 
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inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer 
data; misuse of devices, forgery (ID theft), and electronic fraud.
78
 
 
1.2 The Research Aims 
 
The major reason for this research is that no extensive research (to the knowledge of the 
researcher) has to date been carried out to assess the existing cybercrime legislative structure 
in Nigeria. A comparative study of the regime in the United Kingdom and Nigeria is aimed at 
viewing how laws and regulations are made and applied to effectively answer questions 
raised by the shortcomings on the implementation of cybercrime legislation in a well-
established system in the United Kingdom in contradistinction to Nigeria. This research 
reveals that lack of efficient legislation and the inability to constantly review existing 
legislation account for the inadequacies of the regime in Nigeria in addressing the issues 
relating to cybercrime in Nigeria.  
 
This research seeks to highlight and review the various laws relating or closely related to the 
enforcement of laws on cybercrime and compare them with some of the various laws relating 
to cybercrime in the United Kingdom; and further answer the questions relating to the 
practicability of the existing Nigerian legislation relating to cybercrime and the effects these 
laws have on their enforcement.  
 
It would also seek to answer the question of the possibility of legal strategies for ensuring an 
adequate and effective practicable system of amending current laws in Nigeria related to 
cybercrime and their enforcement. 
                                                 
78
 See also the definition by Paul Taylor, (in ENGLISH) Hackers: Crime in the Digital Sublime (1
st
 edn, 
Routledge, 1999), 200. 
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By way of contribution to knowledge, the recently enacted Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 
partly owes its existence as a result of this research. As at the time of the commencement of 
this research in October 2012, there was no single legislation in Nigeria dealing with 
cybercrime offences. The journey so far has been quite tasking with multiple bottlenecks that 
most often required impromptu trips to Nigeria throughout the legislative process. It however 
gives the researcher utmost fulfilment that a trip to Nigeria in search of research materials has 
effectively contributed to a Nigerian legislation on cybercrime that was finally signed into 
law on 15th May 2015.
79
 
 
1.3 Methodology of the Study and Structure 
 
The researcher has adopted comparative methodology for the study of the laws, doctrines, 
principles and procedural issues of enforcement, relating to the cybercrime legislative 
structures in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. The choice of comparative methodology is 
derived from the fact that the research argues legal principles of ‘harmonisation of laws’, 
‘legal transplants’ and jurisdictional issues.’ Is harmonisation desirable? Is harmonisation 
achievable? Regarding legal transplant: Will imported laws/legal concepts work? Will they 
work as planned? Will they work in the same way as they do in their home jurisdiction? 
These are all questions to which there are no easy answers, and could at best be identified 
using a comparative methodology.
80
  
 
                                                 
79
 The Researcher was actively involved in drafting of the Nigerian Cybercrime Bill(s) (now Act), and also 
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80
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Greatorex [2000], (1) Weekly Law Reports 1976. 
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The major basis for comparative reference to the United Kingdom’s legislative structure is 
due the pre-existing political and legal relationship between the two countries; and involving 
direct transplant of various laws from the United Kingdom to Nigeria. By virtue of being a 
British colony, English Laws became a source of Nigerian criminal law and thus applicable 
in the country through the mechanism of local legislation and judicial decisions.
81
 The 
English laws so received in the country consist of: the Common Law of England, the 
doctrines of Equity, and the statutes of general application in force in England on the 1st of 
January 1890. Also, section 363 of the Nigeria Criminal Procedure Act permits reliance on or 
voyage
82
 to English rules of practice and procedure in any event of a lacuna in the Nigerian 
adjectival law.
83
 
 
This documentary research was concerned with the selection of available literature on the 
main themes examined within this study which are, the substantive provisions for cybercrime 
offences, and their procedural enforcement or regulations thereof.
84
 The bibliographic 
structure explored in the research are comprised of books, journal articles, ‘grey’ literature 
(such as conference proceedings and newspapers),
85
 and government publications.
86
 All the 
subsequent deductions were obtained from thematic analysis of the relevant statutes and case 
laws. 
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 See, for example, Lord Goff’s opinion in White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 at 252ff, which contains extensive 
reference not only to Commonwealth, but also to Continental law. 
82
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85
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86
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In order to streamline a reflective discussion on the literature in context, the findings of the 
literature survey have been embedded throughout the main body of the study rather than 
being summarised in a separate literature review chapter.  
 
The study is presented in eight chapters:  
 
Chapter one introduces the study topic, gives a rationale for the study, states the aims and 
objectives of the study and summarises the methods of approach as well as the structural 
outline of the study. This chapter also critically analyses the available literature to discuss 
current knowledge about the subject research and prompts the lacuna in the literature further 
necessitating the study; and also explains the methodology utilized and justifies the reasons 
for its choice.  
 
Chapter two discusses the concept of legal pluralism and further discusses the problematic 
nature of the plural legal system in the Nigerian cybercriminal jurisprudence. 
 
Chapter three is a critical study of the cybercrime offences against the state. These are 
cybercrime offences that are deemed to have been committed against the state itself and are 
core of its existence; thereby debilitating on the security, national public health and safety of 
the state or any of its members.
87
 This chapter is divided into two sections: offences against 
the critical national infrastructure, and cyber-terrorism offences. This chapter analyses the 
cybercrime legislation in Nigeria and the UK regarding these offences that have the 
                                                 
87
 Susan W. Brenner and Bert-Jaap Koops ‘Approaches to cybercrime jurisdiction’ (2004) Journal of High 
Technology Law 4, no. 1 <http://www.joemoakley.org/documents/jhtl_publications/brenner.pdf> accessed on 4 
July 2015. 
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capability of affecting the core-existence of the state and its members. These offences have 
continued to be the subject of global discussion on daily basis. 
 
Chapter four provides an analysis of cybercrime offences and the substantive legislation 
intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer systems or data 
in the Nigerian and English legal system, and their corresponding regional international 
legislation. This chapter is divided in six discussion segments of: Illegal access; Illegal 
interception; Data interference and Illegal Modification; System interference; Misuse of 
devices. 
 
Chapter five analyses cyber-fraud and other related cyber-offences by comparative analysis 
of the Nigerian and the English legal system. This section of the research is divided into three 
segments for ease of proper analysis: computer-related forgery; computer-related fraud; 
offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights. 
 
Chapter six attempts comparative study of cybercrime offences against the person. This study 
analyses these offences by division into the following categories: offences related to child 
pornography; racist, gender and xenophobic offences; identity theft and impersonation 
offences; and cyberstalking offences. This chapter is so-designated because those 
cybercrimes offences are committed by direct harm applied to another person. 
 
Chapter seven analyses the procedural issues militating against the enforcement of the 
substantive cybercrime laws. This chapter is divided into four segments for ease of 
comparative dissection and analysis, which are: Jurisdictional Issues; Evidential Issues; 
Extradition and International co-operation; and Searches and Seizures. 
21 
 
 
Chapter eight concludes this research and dissects by way of critical analysis the issues and 
areas of law that require urgent attention for the efficacy of cyber-legislation both in the 
Nigerian and the UK jurisdictions. This chapter also makes recommendations for the 
appropriate legislative models to be adopted at both the national and the international levels 
of cyber-legislation; gives the limitations of the research; proffers areas and methodologies 
for future study. 
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Chapter Two: THE NIGERIAN CYBER-PLURALISM EXPERIENCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This concept of legal pluralism had as far back as the 1930s arisen as a topic of serious 
discussion for scholars and legal jurists.
88
 Legal pluralism has often been referred to as a 
situation in which "more than one legal system operate(s) in a single political unit". Griffiths 
in 1986 defined pluralism as, ‘that state of affairs, for any social field, in which behaviour 
pursuant to more than one legal order occurs’.89 Legal pluralism comes in many facades, and 
seems to have found a whole new spirit within the realm of public international law.
90
 An 
underlying presumption is that the international community has moved away from the 
territorial paradigm.
91
  These debates on legal pluralism seem to have originated from the 
field of social-anthropology and law, where pluralism was discussed and likened to its 
association with colonialism.
92
 This situation is mostly seen in a large number of countries in 
the world, mostly in the post-colonial countries in Africa. According to Brian Tamanaha, 
“since there are many competing versions of what is meant by ‘law’, the assertion that law 
exists in plurality leaves us with a plurality of legal pluralisms.”93  
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Various writers and critics have criticised this concept of legal pluralism, mostly suggesting 
that it is merely centred on the empirical or descriptive dimensions of the legal order.
94
 Von 
Benda-Beckmann concludes that a review of the field illustrates how ‘little conceptual 
progress has been made’95 while Melissaris views  legal  pluralism theories as merely 
‘reducing themselves to either a  legal theory that views law from well within a  legal system 
or just a sociological, external recording of  legal phenomena … .’96 Others like Koskenniemi 
and Michaels have rather been more robust in their criticism. Koskenniemi finds that 
legal pluralism ‘ceases to pose demands on the world’,97 while Michaels opines that it 
exhibits a ‘propensity toward essentialized and homogenized concepts of culture and law’, 
and also as an even ‘romantic preference’ for plurality and locality.98 
 
For the purposes of this research, pluralism is likened to existence of various overlapping 
legal orders, but not necessarily conflicting legal regimes in a single political unit.99 Recent 
developments in global jurisprudence seem to have extended legal orders and jurisdictions 
beyond territorial boundaries, and have resulted in an increased level of interaction and 
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interdependence between municipal and international legal systems. What makes this 
pluralism noteworthy is not merely the fact that there are multiple uncoordinated, coexisting 
or overlapping bodies of law, but that there is diversity amongst them.
100
 
 
Nigeria’s legal system is pluralistic because of the existence of various legal systems in the 
same social field, subjecting individuals to different types of rules which provides them with 
alternative causes of action and designated institutions for seeking remedies.
101
 This seem to 
cause legislative and procedural confusion in a country like Nigeria where there are more 
exotic forms of laws, like customary laws, indigenous tribal laws, religious laws, or laws 
idiosyncratic to about 250 various ethnic or cultural groups in the country.
102
 This has 
continued to create complex legal problems such as the need to decide which particular rules 
apply to a particular transaction; how to determine membership of a particular group and how 
an individual can challenge the law applicable to him/her as a member of a group; what 
choice of laws must exist for issues between people of different groups; the determination of 
whether a particular system of law applies in a certain geographical area and what designated 
institutions to be approached for seeking remedies.
103
 This potential conflict of laws can 
generate clear uncertainties or jeopardy for individuals and interest groups in the society, who 
cannot be sure in advance, of which legal regime will be applied to any given circumstance or 
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situation. Should legal pluralism be seen as a problem or as a solution to cybercrime 
jurisprudence in Nigeria?  
 
This chapter will explore the pluralistic nature of the Nigerian cybercriminal law, and will 
seek to highlight and review the conflicting nature and structures of the existing 
cybercriminal laws in Nigeria. It will compare the existing legal structures and their co-
existing co-ordinates, the practicability of these legal structures and the effects on their 
enforcements. 
 
2.2 What is Legal Pluralism? 
 
The comparative legal of studies of the legal and political colonial and post-colonial era have 
been attributed to the recent surge towards researches geared about the concept of legal 
pluralism.
104
 There have been various confusions amongst various writers on what actually 
constitutes the concept of legal pluralism. There have been allusions that this exists primarily 
in situations necessitating the incorporation or recognition of customary law norms or 
institutions within state law,
105
 or to the independent co-existence of indigenous normative 
cultures and institutions alongside the state legislations;
106
 while some socio-legal researchers 
have labelled it “a central theme in the reconceptualization of the law/society relation,”107 and 
the “key concept in a post-modern view of law.”108 
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The major problem causing this difficulty in a universal acceptance of a particular definition 
is stemmed to the fact that there is no universal acceptance on the definition of law.
109
 There 
are many schools of thought on this issue. For instance, Malinowski had while discussing the 
law among the Trobriand of Melanesia, opined that laws are rather found in social relations 
and not in “central authority, codes, courts, and constables,”110 He stated that: “…the binding 
forces of Melanesian civil law are to be found in the concatenation of the obligations, in the 
fact that they are arranged into chains of mutual services, a give and take extending over long 
periods of time and covering wide aspects of interests and activity.”111 Sally Falk Moore, a 
legal anthropologist, had however identified the major flaws susceptible to this definition, 
and stated that, “…the conception of law that Malinowski propounded was so broad that it 
was virtually indistinguishable from the study of the obligatory aspect of all social 
relationships.”112 Max Weber and Adamson Hoebel however seem to follow another 
approach that seems to define the law in terms of public institutionalized enforcement of 
norms.
113
 H.L.A. Hart while invoking another version of this approach had ascribed the 
notion of law as the combination of primary and secondary rules. This involves a primary set 
of rules that apply to conduct, and a secondary set of rules that determine which primary rules 
are valid, and how the rules are created and applied.
114
 Tamanaha
115
 had identified two basic 
problems with this approach; first, many institutions enforce norms and there is no 
uncontroversial way or measuring parameter to distinguish which are “public” and which are 
not, which runs the danger of swallowing all forms of institutionalized norm enforcement 
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under the label law. Secondly, some societies with the existence of customary laws lacked 
institutionalized norm enforcement. Following this definition, could it be said that such 
societies do not have laws?  
 
Griffiths
116
 however seem to have taken this further by arguing that Sally Falk Moore’s 
concept of the “semi-autonomous social field,”117 which involves social fields that have the 
capacity to produce and enforce rules is the best way to identify and delimit laws for the 
purposes of legal pluralism. In another breadth, Galanter had asserted that: “By indigenous 
law I refer not to some diffuse folk consciousness, but to concrete patterns of social ordering 
to be found in a variety of institutional settings - universities, sports leagues, housing 
developments, and hospitals.”118 Sally Engle Merry had identified the problem with this 
approach and noted that “calling all forms of ordering that are not state law by the term law 
confounds the analysis.”119 Merry asked: “Where do we stop speaking of law and find 
ourselves simply describing social life?”120 Galanter had further stated that: “Social life is full 
of regulations. Indeed it is a vast web of overlapping and reinforcing regulation. How then 
can we distinguish ‘indigenous law’ from social life generally?”121 
 
From the foregoing, it is deductible that although the adherents of the various schools try to 
propagate their concepts, each of these approaches has flaws that lead some other scholars to 
reject it, inevitably leading to the fact that the scholars to the concept of legal pluralism have 
so far not been able to agree on these fundamental questions: “What is law? What is legal 
                                                 
116
 John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1, 38.   
117
 Sally Falk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject 
of Study’ (1973) 7 Law & Soc. Rev. 719.   
118
 Marc Galanter, ‘Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law’ (1981) 19 Journal of 
Legal Pluralism 1, 17-18.   
119
 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law & Society Review, 869, at 878.   
120
 id 
121
 Marc Galanter, ‘Justice in Many Rooms’ (supra) 18. 
28 
 
pluralism?” Woodman conceded that legal pluralists are unable to identify a clear line to 
separate legal from non-legal normative orders. “The conclusion,” Woodman observed, 
“must be that law covers a continuum which runs from the clearest form of state law through 
to the vaguest forms of informal social control.”122 Likewise, Griffiths emphasised that “all 
social control is more or less legal.”123 Consistent with this views, Berman had suggested that 
law can be found in “day-to-day human encounters sucinteracting with strangers on a public 
street, waiting in lines, and communicating with subordinates or superiors…”124 This 
observation raises a very important issue that that society, as opposed to ‘written laws’, is 
filled with a multiplicity of normative orders or regulatory orders, which in other words 
should be called ‘legal pluralism’ rather than, ‘normative pluralism’ or ‘regulatory 
pluralism’?  
 
Griffiths had categorically declared that “legal pluralism is the fact.” He further suggests that: 
“Legal pluralism is the name of a social state of affairs and it is a characteristic which can be 
predicated of a social group. It is not the name of a doctrine or a theory or an ideology…”125 
Moore had criticised Griffiths by stating that: “Following Griffiths, some writers now take 
legal pluralism to refer to the whole aggregate of governmental and non-governmental norms 
of social control, without any distinction drawn as to their source.  However, for many 
purposes this agglomeration has to be disaggregated. For reasons of both analysis and policy, 
distinctions must be made that identify the provenance of rules and controls.”126 Moore 
identifies several social phenomena highlighted by legal pluralism, including this: “the way 
in which the state is interdigitated with non-governmental, semi-autonomous social fields 
                                                 
122
 Gordon R. Woodman, ‘Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent Debate about Legal Pluralism’ 
(1998) 42 J. Legal Pluralism 21, 45.   
123
 John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism?’ supra at page 39. 
124
 Paul Schiff Berman, ‘The Globalization of Jurisdiction’ (2002) 151 U. Penn. L. Rev. 311.   
125
 John Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism’ supra at Page 41.   
126
 Sally Falk Moore, ‘Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949-1999’ in Sally 
Falk Moore, ed., Law and Anthropology: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005) 357   
29 
 
which generate their own obligatory norms to which they can induce or coerce 
compliance…”127 As the years evolved, Griffiths asserted that: “In the intervening years, 
further reflection on the concept of law has led me to the conclusion that the word ‘law’ 
could better be abandoned altogether for purposes of theory formation in sociology of law. 
….It also follows from the above considerations that the expression “legal pluralism” can and 
should be reconceptualised as “normative pluralism” or “pluralism in social control.”128 This 
is a stunning assertion from Griffiths.  
 
Tamanaha had following the foregoing, however conceptualised that law is a “folk concept.” 
In other words, law is what people within the same social group have come to see and label 
as “law.”129 He further stated that law could not be formulated in terms of a single scientific 
category because over time and in different places people have seen law in different terms. 
Tamanaha’s views seem to be in sync with this research, taking into cognizance the issues 
surrounding the application of customary law in Nigeria, which co-exists with, but is 
subjected to, the provisions of the common law. These customary laws are not written but 
evolved over time with the community and continued to change with the dynamic needs and 
changes in the community.
130
 For instance, in the Igbo speaking area of southern Nigeria, it is 
against the dictates of the customary law for a woman to acquire personal ownership to any 
land. Although the courts have declared these customs as repugnant to natural justice, equity 
and good conscience;
131
 and have sought to abolish the said customs while re-enforcing the 
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rights of women to the ownership of any land,
132
 whether in the urban or rural area. One of 
the major problems here is the enforcement of these judgements or court orders.
133
 The 
applicant will obtain these court orders, but practice has shown that it is almost impossible to 
enforce; this is because in most cases, the applicant is ostracised by the community.
134
 She 
would not be able to buy or sell any goods from the communal market. She would not be able 
to get water from the community streams or river, and is in fact seen as an outcast.
135
 These 
are unwritten laws, but are only written in the hearts of the people.
136
 This therefore falls in 
line with Tamanaha’s definition of law as a “folk concept”. 
 
It has been very difficult to have a universally acceptable definition of legal pluralism;
137
 and 
there are compelling reasons to think that this situation is incapable of resolution. This 
research have however tried to distil a workable definition for the purposes of this research, 
which likens legal pluralism to existence of various overlapping legal orders, but not 
necessarily conflicting legal regimes in a single political unit. Recent developments in global 
jurisprudence seem to have extended legal orders and jurisdictions beyond territorial 
boundaries, and have resulted in an increased level of interaction and interdependence 
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between municipal and international legal systems.138 This brings it in line with one of the 
procedural handicaps associated with cybercrime offences. What makes legal pluralism 
noteworthy is not merely the fact that there are multiple uncoordinated, coexisting or 
overlapping bodies of law, but that there is diversity amongst them.
139
 Legal pluralism could 
therefore be said to exist whenever the social actors in any jurisdiction seem to identify more 
than one source of “law” within the specified jurisdictional jurisprudence.140 
 
2.3 Pluralisms in the Nigeria Cybercriminal Law 
 
Nigeria’s legal system is pluralistic in nature. Different types of laws are concurrently 
applicable within the Nigeria jurisdiction without spatial separation. This is reflected in the 
existence of customary law and statutory rules, which are sometimes applicable on the same 
subject-matter. Prior to the enactment of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act of 2015 on 15
th
 May 
2015, there was no specific laws for cybercrime offences in Nigeria, although recourse were 
made mostly to other municipal laws that deal with the traditional offences; and charges 
regarding these cybercrime offences were mostly preferred based on these municipal laws. 
 
On the international scale, although Nigeria is not a signatory to the Council of Europe’s 
convention on cybercrime, which at the moment serves as reference point for countries trying 
to make or adopt cybercrime legislations, it is a signatory to the African Union Convention 
on Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection 2014,
141
 and the ECOWAS the Directive on 
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Cybercrime 2010.
142
 Nigeria is a signatory to this Directive, following which the Cybercrime 
Act 2015 was enacted in order to implement the ECOWAS Directive and the AU 
Convention. 
 
This current Nigeria cyber-plural system encapsulates the divisions and the diversity amongst 
the autonomous legal orders within the legal system.
143
 It encompasses problems created by 
both the political and social responsibilities that allow for a wide diversity, exceptions, and 
even contradictions in the interpretation and application of norms, as could be seen from 
various applicable legislations and actors within the legal system.
144
 The federal system of 
government administration in the country has also created some problems of legal pluralism 
in the country. For the purposes of this research, the existing state of the Nigerian 
cybercriminal legal pluralism will be analysed in these taxonomies: statutory pluralism; 
investigative and prosecutorial pluralism; and jurisdictional pluralism. 
 
2.3i Statutory Pluralism 
 
 
Despite the enactment of the Cybercrime Act 2015, there are various laws used in the 
prosecution of cybercrime offences in the country. These include: The Nigeria Criminal Code 
Act 1990; Penal Code Law (Laws of Northern Nigeria 1963); Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission Act 2004; Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011; Advance Fee 
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Fraud and Related Offences Act 2006; and the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences 
Act 2000. 
 
There have continued to be conflicts on which of these statutes should be used in prosecuting 
cyber-related offences, which most often results in different charges being brought against 
the specified defendants, and later struck out on the application of the defendant or Counsel 
for constituting an abuse of court process.
145
 For instance, where an accused person has 
committed online fraud, there are bound to be confusion on which applicable law to use. 
There are conflicting provision in the section 419 of the Criminal Code and section 1 of 
Advance Fee Fraud and Related Offences Act 2006. Section 419 of the Criminal Code 
provides as follows: 
‘Any person who by any false pretence, and with intent to defraud, obtains from any other 
person anything capable of being stolen, or induces any other person to deliver to any person 
anything capable of being stolen, is guilty of a felony, and is liable to imprisonment for three 
years. 
It is immaterial that the thing is obtained or its delivery is induced through the medium of a 
contract induced by the false pretence.’ 
 
The Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud Act 2006, provides also in section 1 of the Act as follows: 
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment or law, any person who 
by any false pretence, and with intent to defraud 
                                                 
145
 In the words of OPUTA JSC (as he then was) in the case of Amaefule & other v. The State (1998) 4SCNJ 69 
at 87, he defined abuse of judicial process as: “A  term  generally  applied  to  a  proceeding  which  is wanting  
in  bona  fides  and  is frivolous vexations and oppressive.” In Agwasim v. Ojichie (2004) 4 SC. (Pt. 11) 160, 
NIKI TOBI JSC observed: “that abuse of court process creates a factual scenario where appellants are pursuing 
the same matter by two court process.” See also Sunday Okoduwa & Ors. v. The State (1988) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 
76) 333 
34 
 
(a) obtains, from any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country for himself or any 
other person; 
(b) induces any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country, to deliver to any person; 
or 
(c) obtains any property, whether or not the property is obtained or its delivery is 
induced through the medium of a contract induced by the false pretence, commits an 
offence under this Act. 
(2) A person who by false pretence, and with the intent to defraud, induces any other 
person, in Nigeria or in any other country, to confer a benefit on him or on any other 
person by doing or permitting a thing to be done on the understanding that the benefit 
has been or will be paid for commits an offence under this Act. 
(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) or (2) of this section is liable 
on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not more than 20 years and not less than 
seven years without the option of a fine.” 
 
One noticeable contradiction created in this legislative pluralism is the specified punishments 
on the stated in the two enactments. While the offence is specified in the Criminal Code Act 
and section 14(1) of the Cybercrime Act, as a misdemeanour punishable with three years’ 
imprisonment, the same offence is classified as a felony on the Advance Fee Fraud and 
Related Offences Act, and punishable for terms of imprisonment between seven (7) to twenty 
(20) years. Although, it is utterly untidy for the prosecution to continue to file charges on acts 
relating to cybercrime offences with municipal laws which have no nexus to the cybercrime 
offences, it would have been expected that the Cybercrime Act would have repealed the 
existing laws, but it did not. The offence of internet fraud is different from the municipal and 
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basic fraud offences.
146
 The crimes related to internet fraud consist of the basic ingredients of 
the municipal fraud offences and also input manipulations, where incorrect data is fed into 
the computer, or by programme manipulations and other interferences with the course of data 
processing,
147
 with financial and personal benefits as the underlying motivation. This is 
however different from the basic fraud offences as could be seen from the definitions 
proffered above in section 419 of the Criminal Code Act 1990 and section 1 of Advance Fee 
Fraud and Related Offences Act 2006.
148
 It is mostly at the discretion of the prosecution or 
the charging Police Officer to choose which legislation under which a charge could be 
preferred, which in other words causes a lot of confusion and creates chaos and further 
problems within the judicial system.
149
 
 
2.3ii Investigative and Prosecutorial Pluralism 
 
 
The position of the law on the powers of investigation and the consequential prosecution 
makes it difficult to choose which agency has the jurisdiction to investigate and which one 
has the powers to prosecute for the specified offence. There are multiple legislations in 
Nigeria at the moment, each empowering different agencies with powers to investigate and 
prosecute offenders, which most often culminate into bottlenecks and clash of investigative 
and prosecutorial interests amongst the agencies.
150
 For instance the powers of Nigerian 
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Police are clearly set out in the Police Act which empowers them to investigate and prosecute 
all offences in Nigeria,
151
 while the Economic and Financial Crime Commissions Act sets up 
the Economic and Financial Crime Commission to investigate and prosecute all financial-
related crime in any court in Nigeria.
152
 Regarding the prosecution of cases, there are 
conflicts between the Police, the Economic and Financial Crime Commissions, the 
Directorate of Public Prosecutions, and the Attorney-General.
153
 All these bodies 
(surprisingly) ‘legitimately’ claim to derive their authorities to prosecute offenders under the 
variant cyber-criminal statutes in Nigeria.  
 
More-so, the fact that Nigeria has 36 states governed in a Federal system of government 
make the situation rather complex. These 36 states all have their independent laws and 
judicial systems, while the Federation (the centre) has its own laws and a separate judicial 
system. There are constant conflicts between the states, and between the states and the 
federation.
154
 The Courts are usually called upon to determine which party has the requisite 
jurisdiction. The legislators also compounded the problem, by designating some offences, 
federal and the others as state offences; and sometime jurisdiction is determined by the court 
first and foremost determining the locus in quo of the offence --- which is always difficult to 
do in cybercrime offences.
155
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In order to have a clearer understanding of the investigative and prosecutorial cyber-plural 
position as applicable in Nigerian laws this research will discuss the organs/parties 
empowered by various statutes to do so. 
 
2.3iia Attorney-General  
 
The Attorney General of the Federation is the chief law officer of the federation while the 
Attorney General of the State is the Chief Law Officer of the State.
156
 The office of the 
Attorney General is created under the provisions of sections 171(1) and 211(1) of the 1999 
Constitution. By these provisions, each Attorney General has the power to institute, take over 
and to discontinue criminal proceedings before a Court in Nigeria in his respective 
jurisdiction, except in a Court Martial.
157
 Section 174(1) of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999 vests in the Attorney-General of the Federation, amongst others, 
the power to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court 
of law in Nigeria, other than a Court Martial, to take over and continue any such criminal 
proceedings or to discontinue same. Such powers vested in the Attorney-General of the 
Federation can be exercised by him in person or through officers in his department. Section 
211 of the same 1999 Constitution vests similar powers in the Attorney-General of a State in 
Nigeria. 
 
2.3iia1 Power to Institute and Undertake Criminal Proceedings 
 
The power of the Attorney General of the Federation or of any State of the federation to 
institute criminal proceedings is an absolute one.
158
 The Supreme Court had described the 
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Attorney-General in Ilori’s case as a ‘master unto himself and under no control whatsoever, 
judicial or otherwise, vis-à-vis his powers of instituting or discontinuing criminal 
proceedings’. This seem to suggest that where two or more persons are alleged to have 
committed an offence, the Attorney General has the power to prosecute one or more of them 
and let one or more of them go.
159
  Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Courts have 
restated the fact that the Attorney General is under no obligation to give reasons for 
exercising his discretion.
160
 In The State v. Okpegboro
161
, a State Counsel filed a charge 
before a Magistrate Court and an objection was taken on the ground that by Section 78(b) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, only a Police Officer could bring and file a charge before a 
Magistrate Court.  The objection was overruled; the Court held that the powers of the 
Attorney General contained in Section 191(1) of the 1999 Constitution supersedes the power 
of the Police as provided in Section 78(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. This provision 
makes it rather difficult for the Nigerian situation with multiple municipal legislations used to 
prosecute cybercrime offenders.
162
 In the case of Muonwe v. Commissioner of Police
163
, 
where the Police (who had been at the forefront of the cybercrime investigation) had filed a 
charge against the suspect for obtaining money by false pretence under section 419 of the 
Criminal Code Laws of Enugu State at the Magistrates Court. The suspects had contacted the 
victim on the internet and fraudulently obtained monies (about fifteen million Naira) from the 
victim. The victim had taken a bold step of travelling to Nigeria in search of the suspects and 
reported the case to the local Police. The police had swooped on the suspects and arrested 
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them along with some other incriminating evidence, and recovered a substantial sum of 
money from them. The Police filed a charge against the offender and his accomplices. 
Midway into their trial the Attorney-General following an official complaint from the 
victim’s country appeared in court asking to take over the proceeding. This did not go down 
with the Police prosecutors who challenged the powers of the Attorney General to take over 
the proceedings midway into trial. The court had taken into consideration the provisions of 
section 191 of the Constitution and held that the Attorney General has unlimited powers to 
take over the entire proceedings at any time, even after judgement. The act of the Attorney 
General in this case, although in good faith, defeated the urgency required in this case, and 
led to unnecessary and avoidable delays. 
 
2.3iia2 Power to Takeover and Continue Proceedings 
 
By Section 174(b) of the Constitution, the Attorney General has the power to take over 
proceedings, which may have been instituted by him or by any other person or authority.
164
  
This power is an absolute one and seems to suggest that that there is no requirement for him 
to give any reason as to why he is taking over the proceedings.
165
 In Amaefule v. The State,
166
 
the accused persons were charged before the Magistrate Court for certain indictable offences. 
After several adjournments, the Magistrate adjourned the case sine die; and the Attorney 
General filed an information in respect of the same charges against some of the accused 
persons in the High Court. The accused persons objected on the ground that it was an abuse 
of process and that the information be declared null and void, and the case at the Magistrates 
Court was still pending when the charges at the High Court were filed. The Supreme Court 
rejected this contention although in its judgment, it acknowledged that it was desirable to 
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have withdrawn the charges before the Magistrate Court. In Edet v. The State
167
, the appellant 
was charged along with three others before a Magistrate Court. Ten months thereafter, 
information was filed at the High Court charging all four of them for the same offence and 
they were convicted. In an ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court against his conviction, the 
appellant contended that the trial was a nullity in that the procedure adopted at the High 
Court, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, was an abuse of process.  The Supreme 
Court held at page 173 per UWAIS, JSC (as he then was) as follows: “No citizen should be 
the subject of persecution by the State. The Courts frown at such action and will not hesitate 
to deprecate it even if the law has provided no remedy”. The learned Justice, however, 
concluded that the trial and conviction of the appellant was in order as nothing affects the 
powers of the Attorney-General to take over proceedings at any stage of the proceedings. 
 
2.3iia3 Power to Discontinue  
 
This is otherwise known as the power of nolle prosequi. In the words of Kayode Eso JSC: “In 
exercise of his powers to discontinue a criminal case or to enter a nolle prosequi, he can 
extend this to cases instituted by any other person or authority. This is a power vested in the 
Attorney-General by the common law and it is not subject to review by any court of law. It no 
doubt a greater ministerial prerogative coupled with greater responsibilities.”168 
 
The phrase nolle prosequi is deciphered from the Latin maxim which means “not to wish to 
prosecute”.169 It is a legal notice that a lawsuit has been abandoned, and a formal entry in the 
record by the office of the Attorney-General stating that he will not prosecute the case 
further, either as to some of the counts in the indictment, or as to some part of the divisible 
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counts, or as to some of the accused persons, or altogether.
170
 It leads a judicial decision 
resulting to a discharge from the court in favour of the accused person; although the accused 
may be subsequently re-arraigned for the same charges or offences.
171
 This Attorney-
General’s power predates the Nigerian Constitution. Since over a century ago, Smith LJ in R 
v. Comptroller of Patents
172
 stated that: “Everybody knows that he (Attorney-General) is the 
head of the English Bar. We know that he has had from earlier times to perform high judicial 
functions which are left to his discretion to decide….another case where the Attorney-
General is pre-eminent is the power to enter a nolle prosequi in a criminal case. I do not say 
that when a case is before a judge a prosecutor may not ask the judge to allow the case to be 
withdrawn, and the judge may do so if he is satisfied that there is no case; but the Attorney-
General alone has the power to enter a nolle prosequi, and that power is not subject to any 
control…”173 
 
As with the two earlier powers discussed, the powers of the Attorney General in this respect 
are equally absolute.  There seem to be a lacuna as regards sections 174 and 211(1) of the 
constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as to how the power of nolle prosequi is to be 
exercised. However, sections 73(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA)
174
 and 253(2) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)
175
 make provisions in that regard.  By their combined 
provisions, the Attorney General is required to come to Court personally and make an oral 
application in that regard or send any officer in his department with a written authority under 
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his hand.
176
 In State v. Chukwura
177
, a State Counsel made an oral application to discontinue 
proceedings. The application was refused. In State v. Ilori (1983)
178
, it was held that the 
nature of nolle prosequi is such that once the plea is entered, the Court does not go behind it 
in order to question the Attorney General as to the reasons for so exercising his powers. It 
held further that the words “shall have regard to the public interest…” used in Section 191(3) 
of the 1979 Constitution, now section 211(3) of 1999 CFRN, is not mandatory but directory.  
The Court concluded that the only check or control on the Attorney-General in the exercise of 
his powers is adverse criticism and possible removal by the person that appointed him. Once 
a nolle prosequi is entered, the person is discharged although it shall not operate as a stay to 
further prosecution on the same facts.
179
 In the case of Attorney General of Kaduna State v. 
Hassan
180
, the court decided that an aggrieved person who maintains a civil action against the 
Attorney General regarding the Attorney-General’s exercise of his nolle prosequi powers has 
no legal or constitutional backing.  The reason is that the issue before the Court was not 
whether an aggrieved person could maintain an action against the Attorney General for 
improper exercise of the power of nolle prosequi, but rather, the issue before the Court was 
whether the power of nolle prosequi was exercisable when there was no incumbent Attorney 
General, it was held that the powers of the Attorney General to enter a nolle prosequi are 
personal to him hence the Solicitor General has no power to enter a nolle prosequi so as to 
discontinue the case. Also, in the case of Obasi v. The State
181
, the court made a distinction 
between the powers of the Attorney General to commence and take over on the one hand and 
the power to discontinue on the other hand.  In Obasi’s case, the accused person was tried on 
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an information and they raised an objection that there being no Attorney General in office at 
the time the criminal prosecution commenced, their arraignment and trial was 
unconstitutional.  In rejecting this contention, the Court held that the power to commence and 
take over can be exercised by any law officer in the Attorney General’s office while the 
power to discontinue, which is nolle prosequi is exercisable by the Attorney General only 
either in person or by his expressed written authority.  
 
There remain some unanswered questions here: Can the Attorney General of a state where the 
offence started (like in most cybercrime cases) take over or discontinue a charge filed in 
another jurisdiction (or even in a federal court) simply because some of the offences were 
committed there? Can an Attorney General or a Law Officer working in the Officer of the 
Attorney General commence a case already discontinued by another Attorney General? What 
happens where multiple Attorney-Generals of various states decide to file different charges 
against the same offence due to the fact that the offences were partially committed in their 
jurisdiction? Can it be said that the Supreme Court decision in Edet v. The State
182
 (as 
discussed above) in the light of the nature of cybercrime offences be said to be correct and 
justifiable in the circumstance?  There are a lot of questions begging to be asked here; more 
especially due to the diverse and the multijurisdictional nature of cybercrime offences. 
 
2.3iib Police 
 
By virtue of the provisions of section 23 to 30 of the Nigerian Police Act 1943, the Police are 
empowered to investigate, and prosecute all offences in Nigeria.
183
 The Nigerian Police Force 
was established in 1930, by amalgamating the two separate Protectorate Forces in the 
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Northern and Southern Nigeria. At inception, the force was saddled with various police duties 
and extra-police functions.
184
 Section 4 declares their specific functions as: “The prevention 
and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the 
protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations and 
perform such military duties within or without Nigeria as may be required by them by, or 
under the authority of, this or any other Act.”  
 
Members of the Nigeria Police Force have statutory powers to investigate crimes, to 
apprehend offenders, to interrogate and prosecute suspects, to grant bail to suspects pending 
completion of investigation or prior to court arraignment, to serve summons, and to regulate 
or disperse processions and assemblies.
185
 They are also empowered to search and seize 
properties suspected to be stolen or associated with crime, and “to take and record for 
purposes of identification, the measurements, photographs and fingerprint impressions of all 
persons...”, in their custody.186 
 
Both the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions provided that there shall be no other police force in the 
nation except the Nigeria Police Force.
187
 Both the powers and duties conferred on a Police 
Officer are complimentary in nature. This has made it difficult to know which one – power or 
duty – takes precedence over the other in the mind of the police officer.188 But it is worthy to 
note that the exercise of his powers within the law entails a response to the call of duty. It is 
very difficult to differentiate police powers from police duties; this is because they are an 
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integral part of a police officer.
189
 The Nigerian constitution however seem to have 
contradicted itself by the joint application of section 4 and section 214 of the same 
Constitution. The express provision of section 4 of the constitution empowers the National 
Assembly to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation;
190
 and 
the Legislature have following this provision in section 4, continued to make additional and 
supplementary legislations which created other bodies and agencies with almost the same 
powers as the Police, thereby creating plural legislations, and conflict towards who 
investigates the offences, and the subsequent prosecutions.
191
 The power of the Police to 
institute criminal proceedings is derived from section 23 of the Police Act,
192
 which provides 
thus: “Subject to the provisions of Sections 160 and 191 of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (which relate to the power of the Attorney-General of the Federation and 
of a State to institute and undertake, take over and continue or discontinue criminal 
proceedings against any person before any court of law in Nigeria), any Police Officer may 
conduct in person all prosecutions before any court whether or not the information or 
complaint is laid in his name”.193 
 
In Olusemo v. Commissioner of Police
194
, it was held that by virtue of section 23 of the Police 
Act, any Police Officer may conduct in person all prosecutions before any court in Nigeria 
subject to the powers of the Attorney General of the Federation and the State. In Osahon v. 
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Federal Republic of Nigeria,
195
 the provisions of Section 56(1) of the Federal High Court Act 
were held by the Court of Appeal to have effectively robbed the Police of the powers to 
prosecute in the Federal High Court. The Court held that a Police Officer does not come 
within the meaning of law officer as used in the Criminal Code or of the Law Officers Act 
and is, therefore, incompetent to prosecute in the Court, that is, in the Federal High Court. On 
further appeal to the Supreme Court in Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Osahon & 7 Ors
196
, the 
Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeal’s decision.  Belgore JSC who read the lead 
judgment of the Court held as follows: “From Colonial period up to date, Police Officers of 
various ranks have taken up prosecution of Criminal cases in Magistrate Courts and other 
Courts of inferior jurisdiction.  They derive their powers under Section 23 of the Police Act 
but when it comes to superior Courts of record, it is desirable though not compulsory that the 
prosecuting Police Officer ought to be legally qualified… For the foregoing reasons, I allow 
this appeal and hold that a police Officer can prosecute by virtue of Section 23 of the Police 
Act, Section 56(1) of the Federal High Court Act and Section 174(1) of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.”197 
 
Thus, it is clear that there is no constitutional or statutory provision prohibiting the Police 
Officer from prosecuting in any particular Court. This decision now makes it very clear that 
Police officers could appear in any court of competent jurisdictions for prosecution of 
criminal cases.
198
 Although this seems to be a welcome development in the Nigerian criminal 
jurisprudence, it rather compounds the already existing prosecutorial pluralism in the system.  
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2.3iic Private Persons 
 
The Supreme Court held in Gani Fawehinmi v. Halilu Akilu & Another
199
 that every Nigerian 
has a right to prosecute anyone for a crime committed. Section 59(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act (CPA) (applicable to the Southern Nigeria), and section 143(e) of Criminal 
Procedure Code (CPC) (applicable to the Northern Nigeria) provides that private persons may 
institute criminal proceedings against a person alleged to have committed an offence by 
laying a complaint before a court. By section 59(1) of CPA, the power of a private person to 
make a complaint against any person is subject only to statutory provisions, which says that 
only a particular person or authority may make a particular complaint (as a matter of 
procedure).
200
 This is also provided in section 342 of CPA. By section 143(e) of CPC, the 
Court may take cognisance of an offence if information
201
 is received from any person other 
than a Police Officer, he has reasons to believe or suspect that an offence has been 
committed.
202
 Unlike the powers of the Attorney General and that of the Police, the powers of 
private persons to institute criminal proceedings are limited.
203
 There are however situations 
and instances which seem to hamper these rights.
204
 The following are instances of statutory 
provisions that may limit the powers of a private person to lay a complaint: 
(a) Section 98(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code (applicable to the Southern Nigeria) provides 
that no proceedings for an offence of official corruption may be commenced against a 
judicial officer save upon a complaint or information signed by or on behalf of the At-
torney General. 
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(b) Section 52(2) of the Criminal Code provides that a person shall not be prosecuted for 
the offence of sedition unless the consent of the Attorney General is obtained.
205
 
(c) Also, by section 142(1) of the CPC, any complaint of offences such as adultery and 
related offences itemised in section 387 and 389 of the Penal Code (applicable to the 
Northern Nigeria) shall only be made by the husband, father, or guardian of the wom-
an or girl involved.
206
 
It should be noted also that with the endorsement of the Attorney General, a private person 
can validly file an information whereupon an application by a private person to prosecute.
207
 
If the Attorney General refuses to either prosecute or endorse, an order of mandamus may lie 
against him.
208
 In the cases of Fawehinmi v. Akilu
209
 and Attorney General of Anambra State 
v. Nwobodo,
210
 private persons successfully obtained order of mandamus compelling the 
Attorney General to endorse and certify their private information. 
 
However, in some States such as Lagos State, the powers of private person to file an 
information in respect of indictable offences have been limited only to the offence of 
perjury.
211
 In practice, private persons usually lay their complaints at the police station, which 
proceeds to prefer the charges against the suspects, while the complainant serves as 
prosecution witnesses.
212
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2.3iid Special Prosecutors 
 
The statute creating a particular offence may specify the person or class of persons who may 
institute proceedings in respect of the same offence.
213
 For instance, section 176(2) of the 
Customs and Excise Management Act
214
 provides that only the Attorney General of the 
Federation can prosecute for offences under the Act after the board must have sanctioned the 
same. This position was restated by the Court of Appeal in the case of Customs and Excise v. 
Senator Barau.
215
 Also, Section 66 of the Factories Act, vests the power of prosecution in 
respect of factory offences on the Inspector of Factories.
216
 More recently the Court of 
Appeal held in Chibuzo Umezinne v. Federal Republic of Nigeria
217
 that any officer of 
National Agency for Foods and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC) can conduct 
criminal prosecution in respect of offences under National Agency for Food Drugs 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC) Decree, 1993 (Now Act) or regulations made under 
the Act; and that both the police and NAFDAC officers can conduct criminal proceedings in 
the High Court. 
 
Also, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act was passed into 
law in June 2004 establishes a Commission for Economic and Financial Crimes (EFCC) with 
the power to investigate all offences relating to financial crimes related terrorism, money 
laundering, drug trafficking, etc.
218
 Sections 14 – 18 of the Act stipulate offences within the 
ambit of the Act, which includes offences in relation to financial malpractices, offences in 
relation to terrorism, offences relating to false information and offences in relation to 
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economic and financial crimes. Section 46 of the Act defines Economic and Financial Crimes 
as: ‘…the non-violent criminal and illicit activity committed with the objectives of earning 
wealth illegally either individually or in a group or organized manner thereby violating 
existing legislation governing the economic activities of government and its administration 
and includes any form of fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement, 
bribery, looting and any form of corrupt malpractices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human 
trafficking and child labour, illegal oil bunkering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign 
exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and 
piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and prohibited goods, etc.’. 
 
Although this definition does not specifically mention cybercrime or other related offences, it 
has be argued that the specific mention and the direct reference to email frauds in the Act is 
superfluous and therefore unnecessary, since the Commission is already charged inter alia, 
with administering the Advance Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act, which directly 
governs advance fee fraud in cyberspace.
219
 The Commission is also responsible for 
identifying, tracing, freezing, confiscating, or seizing proceeds derived from terrorist 
activities; and is also vested with the responsibility of collecting suspicious transactions 
reports from financial and designated non-financial institutions, analyzing and disseminating 
them to all relevant Government agencies and other financial institutions all over the world. 
They have been responsible for prosecuting most of the cybercrime offences prior to the 
enactment of the Cybercrime Act 2015.
220
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2.3iie Military 
 
Under the military regime these constitutionally guaranteed functions of the Police have been 
usurped and regularly discharged by the successive military ruling councils that combine both 
legislative and executive powers; mostly referred to as the Provisional Ruling Council.
221
 
Over the two last decades, during the period of the military regime, the military had created 
numerous internal security forces with police powers. The most notorious of these is the State 
Security Service (SSS), which was created in 1986 by the Major General Babangida’s regime 
through the promulgation of the National Security Agencies Decree No. 19 of 5
th
 June, 
1986.
222
 The SSS was charged with the "prevention and detection within Nigeria of any crime 
against the internal security ...."
223
 The SSS has continued to be in existence and performs 
almost the same function as the Police. It therefore suggests that cybercrime offences (like 
cyber-espionage) against the military will automatically vest the Military with the jurisdiction 
to investigate and prosecute the offence. There are bound to be problems here because of the 
unconventional nature of cybercrime offences, which might have a mixture of civil and 
military components. Another question that is begging to be asked here is whether a civilian 
could be tried by the unconventional military tribunals in cybercrime offences; and whether 
the Attorney General’s power as discussed above be extended to Military Tribunals? 
 
2.4 Jurisdictional Pluralism 
 
The Jurisdiction of a court to hear and determine a case is a very recondite issue of law that is 
donated by the Constitution and the enabling statute.
224
 A court cannot confer in itself 
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jurisdiction not specifically conferred on it by a statute or the constitution.
225
 In Nwankwo v. 
Yar’adua,226 the Nigerian Supreme Court restated the principle of jurisdiction which had 
since been laid down in the case of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim
227
 thus: “The law is indeed trite 
that a court is only competent to exercise jurisdiction        in      respect of any matter where- 
1. It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualification of the members and no 
member is disqualified for one reason or the other. 
2. The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the 
case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction. 
3. The case comes by due process of the law and upon fulfilment of any condition 
precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.” 
 
In the case of Gafar v. Government of Kwara State,
228
 ONNOGHEN JSC restated that: “It is 
settled law that courts are creatures of statute based on the constitution with their 
jurisdiction stated or prescribed therein. That being the case, it is obvious that no court 
assumes jurisdiction except it is statutorily prescribed as jurisdiction cannot be implied nor 
can it be conferred by agreement of parties.”229 
 
There are constant conflicts between courts regarding the venue for instituting criminal trials 
in Nigeria; mostly as a result of duplicity of enactments vesting jurisdictions to various courts 
on the same subject matter.
230
 There have also been conflicting decisions on these issues both 
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from the Appeal and Supreme Court.
231
 The enormous conflict surrounding the trial venue 
seem be laid to rest with enactment of the Cybercrime Act 2015. The legislators had taken the 
pluralism and confusion surrounding the trial venue into account in section 50 of the 
Cybercrime Act by vesting exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to try, determine 
and make ancillary orders in respect of the offences committed under the Act. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has taken an analysis of the pluralist nature of the Nigeria’s legal system while 
considering the different types of laws that are concurrently applicable within the Nigeria 
jurisdiction without spatial separation, which is reflected in the existence of customary law 
and statutory rules, which are sometimes applicable on the same subject-matter offences. 
Although Nigeria is not a signatory to the Council of Europe’s convention on cybercrime, 
which at the moment serves as reference point for countries trying to make or adopt 
cybercrime legislations, it is however a signatory to the African Union Convention on 
Cybersecurity and Personal Data Protection 2014, and the ECOWAS the Directive on 
Cybercrime, 2010; and has ratified these international legislations with the enactment of the 
Cybercrime Act 2015. 
 
The enactment of the Cybercrime Act, however does not remove the existence of cyber-plural 
system in the polity, which encapsulates the divisions and the diversity amongst the 
autonomous legal orders within the legal system. It encompasses problems created by both 
the political and social responsibilities that allow for a wide diversity, exceptions, and even 
contradictions in the interpretation and application of norms, as could be seen from various 
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applicable legislations and actors within the legal system.  This situation is compounded with 
the federal system of government administration in the country, which has created some 
problems of legal pluralism, and compounded with the existence of various customary laws, 
indigenous tribal laws, religious laws, or laws idiosyncratic to about 250 various ethnic or 
cultural groups in the country. The Act seem to have settled only the issue of venue for trial 
of cybercrime offences, amongst other procedural issues, as reflected in the provisions of 
section 50 of the Cybercrime Act that vest exclusive jurisdiction for trial on the Federal High 
Court; although the other issues still remain unabated. The pluralist problems as usually 
encountered in the Nigerian legal system was aptly summarised recently by the Court of 
Appeal per BOLAJI-YUSUFF, J.C.A in the case of Ezea v. The State
232
 as follows: “This kind 
of a show of power and struggle for supremacy does not augur well for the yearnings and 
aspirations of a developing nation like ours. The fall out is loud and clear, a systemic 
manipulation and   failure of criminal justice system. The prosecution in this case has been 
stalled for almost seven (7) years. This is a situation which sadly has become the practice 
rather than an exception in criminal prosecutions in this Country. I need not say more.” 
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Chapter Three: OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
One of the fundamental definitions of ‘crime’ is that a crime is an offense against the society 
as a whole, being that the fundamental composition of a society is its members.
233
 However, 
when an offender’s act would have a debilitating impact on security, national or economic 
security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those matters, it would be 
deemed as an affront to the state, and therefore an offence against the state itself and the core 
of its existence.
234
 
 
It is deemed that the safety of a sovereign nation and of its head is essential to the existence 
of that nation.
235
 These offences are considered serious offences and have been proscribed by 
the states in order to prevent any person or group of persons from committing these offences 
or indulging in the acts threatening any state’s existence. Some cybercrime offences against 
the infrastructures of the state could be seen as treasonable offences.
236
 Criminal 
responsibility for such conduct dates back to the earliest English treason legislation of 
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1351.
237
  Prior to the enactment of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015, these offences were 
prosecuted and punishable as treasonable offences, which is defined by section 37(1) of the 
Criminal Code Act as follows, ‘…any person who levies war against the state, in order to 
intimidate or overawe the president or the governor of a state is guilty of treason and is 
liable to the punishment of death’. Again, by section 38 of the Criminal Code any person who 
by himself or instigates any foreigner to invade Nigeria with an Armed Force is guilty of 
treason and is liable to the punishment of death. Emphasis must be laid here that the use of 
the word ‘war’ in this context does not bear the restricted meaning which it bears in 
international law. In order to constitute the levying of war, it is not necessary that the accused 
persons should be members of a military force or even trained in the use of arms and the type 
of weapons used is not material.
238
 It is also immaterial that the number of persons engaged 
in levying the war is small.
239
 Section 3(1) of the Cybercrime Act 2015 has empowered the 
President of the country to designate certain computer systems, networks, (whether physical 
or virtual) computer programs, and computer data as constituting part of the country’s critical 
national information infrastructure (CNII). These are considered infrastructures that are vital 
to the country, that the incapacity or destruction of or interference with such system and 
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national or economic security, national 
public health and safety.  
 
It is therefore not necessary that the danger should be the danger of personal injury to the 
head of state; a threat to a substantial part of the critical national infrastructure is enough.
240
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This is why crime directed at the health, life, or liberty of any member of society is 
considered by the Nigerian law, to be the one of the most heinous species of criminal activity 
possible.
241
 It is even more difficult and complex when the crime is cyber in nature. For 
instance, in 1999, during the NATO war in Yugoslavia, hackers attacked web sites of some 
NATO countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, using virus-infected 
e-mails and other several hacking methods.
242
 In 1994, a British hacker secured unauthorised 
access into a Liverpool hospital by hacking into the computer system and changing the 
medical prescriptions of several the patients with the intention of knowing ‘what kind of 
chaos could be caused by penetrating the hospital computer’.243 A nine-year-old patient who 
was ‘prescribed’ a highly toxic mixture survived the attack only because one of the 
suspecting nurses decided to cross-check his prescription.
244
 The consequential magnitude of 
an individual act and the intent of the perpetrator will usually determine what offence against 
the state that is committed. One thing which the two offences have in common is threat or 
fear of danger of personal injury to a person or class of the citizenry. 
 
These two offences are very critical to the core existence of a nation and its citizenry, and 
have always been subject of global discussion on a daily basis. For the purposes of this 
research, these offences will be analysed under two headings: offences against the critical 
national infrastructure and cyberterrorism offences.  
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3.2 Offences against the Critical National Infrastructure 
 
Today there are many critical sectors whose operations depend vastly on information and 
computer technology, and therefore it becomes very important to protect these sectors from 
cyber threat.
245
 The critical infrastructures are a complex “system of systems”, and the 
interdependencies amongst these systems are generally not well understood.
246
 Disruptions in 
one infrastructure can propagate into other infrastructures.
247
 Infrastructures which comes 
under the category of critical infrastructure may include systems and networks from several 
major sectors such as; energy, including oil, natural gas, and electric power; banking and 
finance; transportation (including air, surface, and water transportation); information and 
communications technology networks; water systems; government and private emergency 
services. The operational stability and security of critical infrastructure is vital for the 
economic security of the country, and hence its protection has gained paramount importance 
all over the globe.
248
 The purpose of critical infrastructure protection is to establish a real-
time ability for all sectors of the critical infrastructure community to share information on the 
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current status of infrastructure elements.
249
 Ultimately, the goal is to protect the county’s 
critical infrastructure by eliminating known vulnerabilities and cyber-threats which might 
oftentimes exasperate to cyber-terrorism.
250
 The acts culminating in the commission of these 
offences have severe potential for “a massive cyber-attack on civilian infrastructure that 
smacks down power grids for weeks, halts trains, grounds aircraft, explodes pipelines, and 
sets fire to refineries."
251
 The numbers of networks connected to the critical infrastructure 
continue to grow on daily basis, as new components are being connected to the networks that 
make up the infrastructure;
252
 thereby allowing more efficient operation, but also opening 
those components to serious computer network attacks.
253
 
 
The significant rise in these attacks, combined with the vulnerabilities of these infrastructure 
networks have led governments to recognize the enormity of the issue, resulting in a push for 
increasing mandated cybersecurity covering both government and private networks; and 
enacting specific legislation to protect them.
254
 In 2005, the European Council adopted the 
European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) to focus on strengthening 
information systems, and enhancing preparedness for cyber-attacks on the networks and/or 
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computer systems that form part of the critical national infrastructure.
255
 As a result of the 
foregoing, in December 2010, the UK Ministry of Defence noted in its Green Paper titled 
‘Equipment, Support and Technology for UK Defence and Security’ that: "…perhaps the 
over-riding characteristic of cyberspace is the pace of change. Not just technological change, 
but changes in business processes and social interaction that this supports; changes in impacts 
that these in turn engender, and vulnerabilities that these expose; and contingent on all of 
these and on other – non cyberspace – factors the change in threats."256 This document, along 
with some other official documents point out ‘the need to engage closely with key 
stakeholders to strengthen existing crosscutting partnerships, and form new ones where 
required, with industry, civil liberties groups and other stakeholders, internationally and in 
the UK’257 
 
Section 1(b) of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 provides that one of the major objectives 
for the enactment of the Act is to ensure the protection of critical national information 
infrastructure. The component part of this infrastructure includes computers, computer 
systems, and/or networks, whether physical or virtual, and/or the computer programs, 
computer data, content data and/or traffic data so vital to the country that the incapacity or 
destruction of or interference with such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact 
on security, national or economic security, national public health and safety, or any 
combination of those matters.
258
 Part II, specifically section 3 of the Nigerian Act makes 
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express provision for the protection of components of the critical national infrastructure. It 
also provides that the President may on the recommendation of the National Security 
Adviser, designate certain computer systems, networks and information infrastructure vital to 
the national security of Nigeria or the economic and social well-being of its citizens, as 
constituting critical national infrastructure. One of the essential provisions in this section is 
that due to the ever changing and dynamic nature of cybercrime, the legislature has in section 
3 of this Act left it at the discretion of the office of the presidency to keep updating the core 
services that need to be protected as part of the infrastructure from cyber-attacks. 
 
The position in the United Kingdom, in comparative distinction to the Nigerian Act, is also 
an evolving legislative process trying to fill the lacunae created by the Computer Misuse Act 
1990.
259
 The Computer Misuse Act sets out the offences associated with unauthorised access 
to a computer and the associated tools (such as malware and botnets) that enable computer 
systems to be breached. The Act creates four offences by criminalising acts of unauthorised 
access to or modification of computer material without any provision for the protection of the 
critical national infrastructures. The United Kingdom Home Office had recently sponsored 
the Serious Crime Bill in June 2014
260
 as part of the Queen's Speech opening the 2014-15 
session of Parliament. This Bill received royal assent on 3
rd
 March 2015, and is now known 
as the Serious Crime Act 2015. Part two of the Act implements the EU Directive on Attacks 
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against Information Systems
261
, and also amends the Computer Misuse Act 1990 in relation 
to the hacking offences, by creating a new offence of unauthorised acts of causing serious 
damage.
262
 This new Act also criminalises the deliberate act of creating serious risk to 
computers or computer systems, and also amends, by extension, the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United Kingdom for cybercrime offences. The Serious Crime Act also creates a new 
offence of impairing a computer to cause damage, and further prescribes a severe punishment 
of up to 14 years' custodial sentence for cybercrime offences that result in damage to the 
economy or environment. 
 
The EU Directive on attacks against Information Systems was adopted by the European 
Council on 22 July 2013, and requires signatories to amend their municipal criminal laws 
regarding attacks against information systems in order to respond to the evolving global 
cyber threats. The Directive seeks to ensure that there is a consistent and common European 
Union wide penalisation of illegal access, system interference and data interference that will 
strengthen the protection of personal data by reducing the ability of cybercriminals to abuse 
victims' rights without impunity. Although the Serious Crime Act did not use the term 
'critical national infrastructures', the new offence on “unauthorised acts causing, or creating 
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risk of serious damage”263 created under the Act addresses the most serious cyber-attacks, for 
example those on essential systems controlling power supply, communications, food or fuel 
distribution.
264
 An analysis of both comparative legislation suggests that this is rather a mere 
discrepancy in semantics and diction, by the two legislation (the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 
and UK’s Serious Crime Act) because they both seek to make provisions for the same 
offences.
265
 A major cyber-attack of this nature could have a significant impact, resulting in 
loss of life, serious illness or injury, severe social disruption or serious damage to the 
economy, the environment or national security.
266
 This applies where an unauthorised act in 
relation to a computer results, directly or indirectly, in serious damage to the economy, the 
environment, national security or human welfare, or a significant risk of such damage (where 
damage to human welfare encompasses loss of life, illness or injury or serious social 
disruption).
267
 A significant link to the UK is required, so that at least one of the accused or 
the target computer at the time of the offence or the damage must have been in the UK, or the 
accused must be a UK national at the time of the offence and the conduct constitute an 
offence under the law of the country in which it occurred.
268
 The accused must have intended 
to cause the serious damage, or to have been reckless as to whether it was caused. This 
                                                 
263
 Section 41(2) 
264
 Home Office, ‘Serious Crime Act 2015 - Fact sheet: Part 2: Computer misuse’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/415953/Factsheet_-
_Computer_Misuse_-_Act.pdf> accessed on 5 July 2015. 
265
 See Isabelle Abele-Wigert, 'Varying policy responses to Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) 
in selected countries, Cybercrime and Security” (2006), IIB-1; See also Jürgen Bohn, Vlad Coroam˘a, Marc 
Langheinrich, Friedemann Mattern, and Michael Rohs, 'Living in a World of Smart Everyday Objects – Social, 
Economic & Ethical Implications (2004) Journal of Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, Vol. 10, page 763, 
Available at: <www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/res/papers/hera.pdf> accessed on 5 May 2015; Shore Malcolm, Yi Du, and 
Sherali Zeadally 'A Public‐Private Partnership Model for National Cybersecurity' (2011) Policy & Internet 3.2, 
1-23. 
266
 Singer, P. W. & Friedman, Cyber security and cyberwar: What everyone needs to know (1
st
 edn, Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
267
 Guillermo Esteve and Angel Machin, 'Devices to access internet in developing countries' (2007) MobEA, 31, 
<www.2007.org/workshops/paper_106.pdf> accessed on 12 June 2015.  
268
 David Tait, 'Cybercrime: Innovative approaches to an unprecedented challenge' Commonwealth Governance 
Handbook (2015), <http://www.commonwealthgovernance.org/assets/uploads/2015/04/CGH-15-Tait.pdf> 
accessed on 12 June 2015; See also Leena M. Sulbhewar, & Roshani S. Kasture, 'Computer Forensics and 
Computer Crime Investigation' (March 2015) IJREST, Vol. 2, Special Issue 1, 
<http://ijrest.net/downloads/volume-2/special-issue-1/pid-m15ug506.pdf> accessed on 12 June 2015. 
64 
 
offence is more serious than the section 3 offence in the Computer Misuse Act,
269
 and is 
triable only on indictment. Under the provisions of the UK Serious Crime Act, where the 
attack results in loss of life, serious illness or injury or serious damage to national security the 
maximum sentence is life imprisonment.
270
 Where the attack results in serious economic or 
environmental damage or social disruption, the maximum sentence is 14 years imprisonment.  
 
Section 41 of the UK Serious Crime Act defines the essential elements involved in this 
offence. This first element is that the offender does not have authorisation for the said 
computer, and at the time of committing the offence knows that the access he seeks is 
unauthorised.
271
 The second and essential element relates to the eventual magnitude of the 
offence committed by the offender. The Act requires that the act of the offender causes, or 
creates a significant risk of serious damage of a material kind; and that the offender intends 
by doing the act to cause serious damage of a material kind or is reckless as to whether such 
damage is caused.
272
 Damages of a “material kind” were defined in section 41(2)(a)-(d) of the 
Act to include damage to human welfare in any place, damage to the environment of any 
place, damage to the economy of any country, or damage to the national security of any 
country.
273
 In furtherance to the provision regarding damage to human welfare as provided in 
subsection (2)(a) above, the Act goes further in section 41(3) to elaborate on what areas of 
the critical national infrastructure are presaged. These include offences which cause: loss to 
human life, human illness or injury, disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or 
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fuel, disruption of a system of communication, disruption of facilities for transport, or 
disruption of services relating to health. 
 
One significant aspect of the Serious Crime Act in contrast to the Nigerian provision is that it 
did not specifically designate the areas of the national computers, computer systems, and/or 
networks as part of the critical national infrastructure. The UK Act seems to have left this at 
the discretion of the courts for interpretation in the individual cases.
274
 Although it is quite 
arguable that it might create confusion on the areas that are part covered by the Act, this is 
quite understandable as it saves the legislature the inconvenience and legislative bottlenecks 
involved in constant amendment of the Act by adding and/or removing some areas from the 
critical national infrastructure because of the ever changing nature of cybercrime offences.
275
 
The legislative diction in section 41(3) chose to identify the offence using the nature of the 
offences committed instead of the object of the offences. It is one of the findings of this 
research that the maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment
276
 which this offence carries 
does not sufficiently reflect the level of national and economic tribulations that a major 
cyber-attack on critical systems could cause.
277
 In contrast to the UK position, the Nigerian 
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position as contained in section 5 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act provides for three different 
types of offences against the critical national information infrastructure. 
(a) General Offences: Section 5(1) of the Act provides for general offences and states 
that, “Any person who commits any offence punishable under this Act against any 
critical national information infrastructure, designated pursuant to section 3 of this 
Act, is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than fifteen years 
without an option of fine.” This general provision ensures that an offender who could 
not be prosecuted under the other provisions could nevertheless be prosecuted under 
this provision. 
(b) Offences Causing Grievous Bodily Injury: Section 5(2) makes more specific 
provisions to offences committed against the critical national information 
infrastructure, and provides that, where the offence committed under section 5(1) 
results in grievous bodily injury, the offender shall be liable on conviction to 
imprisonment for a minimum term of 15 years without option of fine. This therefore 
makes a mandatory direction to the courts to make an order for custodial sentence 
upon conviction of the offender without an option of fine. The insistence of 
punishment with custodial sentence for the offences under these provision shows the 
seriousness attached to these offences. 
(c) Offences resulting to Homicide: Section 5(3) of the Act provides for a more specific 
situation where death occurs as a direct result of the offender’s act. This section also 
does not leave the court with a discretionary power of making an alternative order for 
fine in the event of the offender’s conviction. This section has instead provided for a 
sentence of life imprisonment for an offence committed under this section. This 
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provision contradicts with the provisions of section 319(1) of the Criminal Code, 
which provides that, ‘…any person who commits the offence of murder shall be 
sentenced to death.’278 Under Nigerian criminal law the offence of murder is 
punishable by death across the federation by the direct provisions of Section 319 of 
the Criminal Code Act, 2004
279
, and section 220 of the Penal Law, 1963.
280
 Where the 
death sentence is specified for an offence in Nigeria, it is a mandatory and not merely 
a permitted punishment upon a finding of guilt;
281
 and therefore, the judge does not 
have discretion in the matter, after an accused has been found guilty of a capital 
offence.
282
 The only sentence open to the court to impose is one of death.
283
 
 
The provisions of section 319 of the Criminal Code therefore do not leave the court 
with any discretion to punish an offender for a lesser offence upon proof of 
homicide.
284
 When a person is convicted of murder, the trial court must sentence him 
to death and direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead.
285
 It is however 
undisputable that section 5(3) of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act has created a head-on 
contradiction with the provisions of Section 319 of the Criminal Code Act 2004 and 
section 220 of the Penal Law of Northern Nigeria 1963, and therefore creates more 
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confusion, as the prosecutors might instead choose to frame the charges using the 
provisions with more severe punishments.
286
  
 
It could however be argued that section 5(3) of the Cybercrime Act might have 
impliedly repealed the provisions of section 319 of the Criminal Code Act and section 
220 of the Penal Code 1963 regarding capital punishment for cyber-offences by virtue 
of the doctrine of implied repeal.
287
 Implied repeal occurs where two statutes are 
mutually inconsistent.
288
 The effect is that the latter statute repeals the earlier statute 
pro tanto.
289
 Although there is however a presumption against implied repeal,
290
 if two 
statutes are in pari materia, then to the extent that their provisions are irreconcilably 
inconsistent and repugnant, the latter enactment repeals or amends the earlier enacted 
statute.
291
 This is because, if a later Act cannot stand with an earlier one, parliament, 
generally, is taken to intend an amendment of the earlier. This is a logical necessity, 
since two inconsistent texts cannot both be valid. If the entirety of the earlier 
enactment is inconsistent, the effect amounts to an implied repeal of it.
292
 Similarly, a 
part of the earlier enactment may be regarded as impliedly repealed where it cannot 
stand with the later. An intention to repeal an Act or enactment may also be inferred 
from the nature of the provision made by the later enactment.
293
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Repeal by implication is however not always favoured by Courts, who are always 
unwilling to imply repeal,
294
 unless there exists clear proof to the contrary.
295
 Such an 
interpretation is adopted only when it is unavoidable.
296
 It is a cardinal principal of 
law that statutes are not repealed by inference or implication but by direct provision of 
the law.
297
 This research, however identifies that a rule of doctrine cannot override 
express provisions of the law.
298
 Section 6(1) of the Interpretation Act provides for the 
survival of pending proceedings where there are no specific provisions for abatement 
of such pending proceedings.
299
 It must be noted that the Interpretation Act is a 
constitutional provision. Section 318(4) of the 1999 Constitution provides that the 
Interpretation Act shall apply for the purposes of interpreting the provisions of the 
constitution. This issue had been settled in the case of University of Ibadan v. 
Adamolekun
300
 where the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd v. Irving
301
 was 
referred to the learned Justices of the Supreme Court in OHMB v. Garba
302
 were of 
the opinion that Decree 107 of 1999 (a constitutional amendment) was not retroactive 
and could not affect existing vested rights before its promulgation. The rationale in 
OHMB v. Garba was that an abatement provision must not be implied unless 
expressly provided for. One of the canons of interpretation is that effect should be 
given to ordinary plain meaning of words when they are unambiguous and clear 
without resulting to external aid or importing words into the statute.
303
 It must be 
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borne in mind that one of the tenets of interpretation of statute is the need not to 
impute an intention to contravene the constitution to lawmakers and to adopt a 
construction which avoids inconsistency with the constitution.
304
  
 
The situation now seem to leave it at the discretion of the Courts to decide if there has 
been implied repeal of the provisions of section 319 of the Criminal Code Act and 
section 220 of the Penal Code 1963 regarding capital punishment by section 5(3) of 
the Cybercrime Act. It is unfathomable that despite the fact that the shortfalls and 
long-term consequences of this provision had been raised to the legislative committee, 
who reconsidered this provisional part of the Bill during the hearing at the 
‘Committee Stage’ of the Bill,305 but still chose to go ahead to ratify the provisions of 
the Act. 
 
3.3 Cyber-Terrorism Offences 
 
The advancement of information technology and the internet has provided us with a lot of 
advantages and benefits. It has also brought significant changes to economic transactions, 
social interactions, military operations and advancement in global terrorism.
306
 The fear and 
uncertainty of the millennium bug at the advent of the year 2000 led to the global fear of a 
possible and imminent cyber-terrorist attack by the use of computer technology,
307
 which 
could also be demonstrated via air traffic control hijacking systems, or corrupting power grids 
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from a remote destination.
308
 The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the United States and 
July 2005 London bombings, and the subsequent investigations also heightened the fear that 
the terrorists had made an organized use of computer information technology networks to 
plan their premeditated acts of terror which they finally unleashed on the unsuspecting 
citizenry and critical infrastructures, thereby causing untold hardship and disruption of the 
global economy.
309
 These acts combined with the level of sophistication in technology and 
the internet has today continued to keep the world in fear.
310
 Research work in the last few 
years analysing Al-Qaida
311
 and ISIS
312
 documents reveals an understanding of economic 
knowledge implemented explicitly towards an “economic Jihad.” Evidence of terrorist’s use 
of computers and the Internet was confirmed with the capture in Pakistan of a high level Al 
Qaeda operative with a laptop which contained a series of high level terrorist information.
313
  
 
Most countries have become increasingly dependent upon information infrastructures to 
support their governmental, military, and economic interests --- the core of national security 
interests.
314
  Global advancement in information technology and the exploitation of 
information have empowered nation-states, opposition groups, ideological radicals, terrorist 
organizations, and individuals, with a large percentage of military traffic moving over civilian 
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telecommunications and computer systems.
315
  In the recent time we have seen threats and 
publications like: “Divide their nation, tear them to shreds, destroy their economy, burn their 
companies, ruin their welfare, sink their ships and kill them on land, sea and air…Your 
dependence on technology makes you weak.  More brothers await orders to attack again.  
They will attack your powerful companies, like Microsoft, from the inside and you will not 
know when or how.  Through these attacks your power will fail, your communications will 
fail, your businesses will starve, your economy will crumble, your people will panic, your 
military and firemen will be immobilized, and God willing, you will one day be incapable of 
sustaining the sinful deployment of your infidel army throughout the land of the two holy 
places.”316 
 
Foltz
317
 in summarizing some potential threats of cyber terrorism suggested that cyber 
terrorist have the capability to attack electrical power systems, gas and oil production, 
transportation, and storage, water supply systems and banking and finance.
318
 The offenders 
could also access a drug manufacturer’s facility and alter its medication formulas to make 
them deadly,
319
 access hospital records and change patient blood types,
320
 report stolen 
information to others (for example, troop movement),
321
 manipulate perception, opinion and 
the political and socio-economic direction;
322
 and facilitate identity theft.
323
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The concept of cyber-terrorism cannot be discussed in isolation without understanding the 
concept of terrorism.
324
 These terms have often been used interchangeably and likened to 
each other, despite their glaring dissimilarities. 
 
3.3i Metamorphosis of Terrorism and Cyberterrorism  
 
The term ‘cyber-terrorism’ is a term that to date lacks a universally accepted definition. Barry 
Collin, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Intelligence in California, was 
the person who purportedly coined the term ‘cyber-terrorism’ in the 1970s.325 His idea of 
cyber-terrorism was one in which attacks conducted through computers mirrored the effects 
of traditional acts of terrorism. According to him: "Like conventional terrorists, 
cyberterrorists are out for blood. They try to do things like break into subway computer 
systems to cause a collision or use computers to tamper with power grids or food processing. 
However, unlike suicide bombers and roof-top snipers, cyberterrorists attack from the 
comfort of home and can be in more than one place at a time through cyberspace."
326
 
 
Cyber-terrorism has been constantly used by different people in recent time to connote 
different meanings. Some writers have used this term to illustrate activities like stealing data 
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and hacking into a computer system
327
, planning terrorist attacks
328
, causing violence
329
, or an 
attack on information systems
330
. The concept of cyber-terrorism does not on itself stand 
alone, without first understanding the meaning of terrorism. The non-universality of the 
concept of cyber-terrorism is however traceable to the fact that there is also no universal 
definition of terrorism. The problem facing a universal definition of cyber-terrorism is the 
difficulty in taking account of special circumstances according to the type of action 
committed (e.g. hijacking), the nature of the victims (e.g. hostage-taking incidents) or the 
type of method of the action used by the terrorists (e.g. explosives, financing).
331
 Turker 
warns that, “…above the gates of hell is the warning that all that enters should abandon 
hope. Less dire but to the same effect is the warning given to those who try to define 
terrorism”,332 while Levitt had opined that a definition is no easier to find than the ‘Holy 
Grail’.333 Schmid and Jongman334 had while making a linguistic survey and analysis of over 
100 global definitions of terrorism contended that: ‘Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method 
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of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, 
for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons….”335 
 
The UN Resolution 1566, 2004 defines terrorism as “criminal acts, including against 
civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of 
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an 
international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences 
within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to 
terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature” 336, and calls 
upon all States to “…prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are 
punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature.”337 Thackrah338 however was of the 
view that terrorism should be defined “by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the 
perpetrators or the nature of their cause.” Section 2656f (d) of the United States Code 
defines the term ‘terrorism’ as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience.”339  
 
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 1999, 
defines terrorism by reference to a list of treaties; or “any other act intended to cause death 
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or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the 
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organisation to do or abstain from doing any act”,340 while the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, defined terrorism as “…the use of violence for political 
ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of 
the public in fear.” 341 Some of these definitions have been criticized for creating a lacuna, 
and also not giving a vivid definition of terrorism, as it excluded the use of threat of violence 
either for religious or non-political ideological end as an element of the offence of 
terrorism.
342
  
 
These shortcomings seem to have been the underlying reason for the redefinition of terrorism 
in the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 to cure the defects in the definition provided in 
the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. Accordingly, section 1 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000, defines ‘terrorism’ as the use or threat of action where the use or threat 
is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public 
and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause; or if it involves serious violence against a person,  involves serious damage to 
property, endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action, 
creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or is 
designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.  
 
                                                 
340
 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999: Available at: 
<http://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm> accessed on 6 May 2015. 
341
 The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989: Available at: 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1989/ukpga_19890004_en_1>  
342
 Lord Carlile of Berriew, (2007). The Definition of Terrorism, 3. Available at: 
<http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/terrorism-act-2000/carlile-terrorism-
definition.pdf> accessed on 6 May 2015. 
77 
 
A comparison of this definition and those proffered by some writers mentioned above will 
show the definition given in this legislation includes an important ingredient and essential 
element of the offence of terrorism: which is ‘threat of violence’. Most of the other 
writers/definitions did not envisage the fact that threat of violence can constitute an act of 
terrorism; and this sets the definition in the Terrorism Act apart from the others. Pollitt 
contends that the actual act of violence is the only consequential result of terrorism.
343
 
Section 1(2)(b)(i) of the Terrorism Act 2006 provides that a terrorism offence is complete if 
an offender publishes a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the 
members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other 
inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.
344
 
There is no doubt that a threat to unleash terrorism is enough to secure conviction for the 
offence of terrorism.
345
  
 
3.3ii Elements of Cyber-Terrorism 
 
Given the nascent definitions of the broader categories, it is no surprise that definitions of 
cyberterrorism have been equally divergent.
346
 Following the postulations of Parks and 
Duggan
347
 who have defined cyberterrorism as an extension of traditional terrorism and a 
new approach adopted by terrorists to attack cyberspace, there is no doubt that the concept of 
cyber-terrorism comprises two different terminologies: cyberspace and terrorism. It is 
arguable that cyber-terrorism involves acts of terrorism committed either wholly or partially 
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through the use of computer systems and/or network.
348
 A writer had observed, “Why 
assassinate a politician or indiscriminately kill people when an electronic switching will 
produce far more dramatic and lasting results.”349 Professor Gabriel Weimann had also 
defined cyber-terrorism as “the use of computer network tools to harm or shut down critical 
national infrastructures (such as energy, transportation, government operations).”350 
Weimann’s definition therefore seems to portray every cyber-attack on the critical 
infrastructure as cyberterrorism. Pollitt had following the definition of terrorism by 
Tackrah
351
 contended that “cyberterrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated attack 
against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in 
violence against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents
.”352
 This 
definition has a close resemblance to the definition of cyberterrorism given by Professor 
Dorothy Denning in statement before the United States Congress’s House Armed Service 
Committee and in most of her articles.
353
 She defined cyberterrorism as the convergence of 
cyberspace and terrorism. She portrays this as the unlawful attacks and threats of attacks 
against computers, networks and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or 
coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to 
qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence against persons or property (or 
threat thereof), or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or 
bodily injury, explosions, or severe economic loss would be examples. Attacks that merely 
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disrupt non-essential services or merely causes costly nuisance would not.
354
 Professor 
Denning had further seemed to liken cyber-terrorism to cybercrimes against the critical 
national infrastructures when she portended that ‘…serious attacks against critical 
infrastructures could be acts of cyber-terrorism, depending on their impact.’  
 
Denning’s definition of cyberterrorism consists of several important components.355 First, it 
portrays the fact that the attack should be unlawful; secondly, the attacks, and threats of 
attacks should be directed against computers, networks and/or the information stored within 
them; thirdly, the purpose of these unlawful attacks is to intimidate or influence a government 
or society to further their political or social objectives;
356
 fourthly, the attacks must result in 
violence against members of the state or their property, or at least cause enough harm to 
generate fear amongst the citizenry;
357
 and finally, that serious attacks against critical 
infrastructure could be construed as acts of cyberterrorism depending on their impact,
358
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although, as Denning warns: “Too much emphasis on cyberterror, especially if it is not a 
serious threat, could detract from other counterterrorist efforts in the cyber domain”.359 
 
Cybercrime offences against the critical national infrastructures that are of a serious nature 
and are capable of having diverse effects on the national economy or that of serious 
magnitude could be termed an act of cyber-terrorism.
360
 Drawing an analogy from the 
definition posited by Denning, it is arguable to postulate that cyberspace + terrorism = 
cyberterrorism.
361
  This research will not be adopting Weimanns’ opinion that “…terrorists’ 
use of computers as a facilitator of their activities, whether by propaganda, recruitment, data 
mining, communication, or other purposes, is simply not terrorism”362 in ascertaining a 
working definition for cyberterrorism, as the views postulated therein goes contrary to the 
provisions of section 1 of the Nigerian Terrorism Act of 2011 (as amended); and does not 
also include as a requirement, the “threat of violence”363 by terrorists to create significant fear 
and in turn accomplishes terroristic goals.
364
 Accordingly, the Nigerian Terrorism Act 
contains 41 sections, arranged into eight parts. Part I defines acts of terrorism and related 
offences. The Act in defining terrorism, attempts to create a dragnet encompassing diverse 
acts that are captured. According to the Act, an “act of terrorism” means “an act which is 
deliberately done with malice, aforethought and which may seriously harm or damage a 
country or an international organization” [or] “is intended or can reasonably be regarded as 
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having been intended to unduly compel a government or international organization to 
perform or abstain from performing any act, seriously intimidate a population, seriously 
destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures 
of a country or an international organization, or otherwise influence such government or 
international organization by intimidation or coercion…”365 This provision includes an 
important element, which is the requirement that the attack be political in nature, seeking to 
influence a government through violent actions.
366
 This is one of the significant differences 
between cyber-terrorism offences and the offences against the critical national 
infrastructure.
367
 The Terrorism Act, 2006, has also provided for criminalization of acts 
which seem to encourage the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism or to 
disseminate terrorist publications directly or indirectly.
368
 This offence includes statements or 
publications that are viewed to “glorify terrorism,” but did not proffer any specific definition 
of cyber-terrorism. 
 
Contrary to the UK which has no official definition of cyberterrorism, section 18 of the 
Nigerian Cybercrime Act has made a specific provision for cyberterrorism and defined it as 
an act of accessing or causing to be accessed any computer or computer system or network 
for purposes of terrorism. However, in consonance with the UK provisions, the Nigerian Act 
has also used the term ‘terrorism’ to define cyberterrorism; and states that cyberterrorism 
involves the act of accessing or causing to be accessed any computer or computer system or 
network for purposes of terrorism.
369
 This seemed a direct transplant of section 83 (1) (b) of 
the Canadian Criminal Code of 2001, which ironically was transplanted from section 1 of the 
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UK Terrorism Act 2000.
370
 Section 18(2) of the Nigerian Act provides that ‘terrorism’ shall 
have the same meaning under the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011, as amended. Section 1(2) 
of the Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 lists acts and activities that constitute acts of 
terrorism. These acts, amongst other acts, include acts which are deliberately done with 
malice, aforethought and which may seriously harm or damage a country or an international 
organization. The punishment of life imprisonment for this offence as specified in section 
18(1) of the Cybercrime Act shows the seriousness and severity of these offences. 
 
The writer has therefore adopted a ‘working definition’ of cyberterrorism as any 
premeditated, ideologically motivated attack, threat, instigation, glorification, preparation or 
encouragement of attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and 
data
371
 directly or indirectly, which result in violence and serious damage against non-
combatant targets, perpetrated by persons acting in the name of any ideology with the 
intention of instilling fear
372
 and/or imposing their existence to the public.
373
 
 
3.3iii Critical Infrastructure offences and Cyberterrorism Differentiated 
 
This research has adopted Denning’s definition374 of cyberterrorism, with the exception of 
her postulation which seem to suggest that all cyber-attacks against the critical national 
infrastructure amount to cyber-terrorism. Section 3 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act provides 
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for the taxonomies of the computer systems and network that are part of the critical national 
infrastructure, while section 18 of the Act makes provisions for the cyber-terrorism offences. 
Although these offences have their similarities, they nevertheless have their diverging 
differences. These differences will be analysed under two sections: the intention and the 
motivation of the offenders. 
 
3.3iiia Intention 
 
 
The statutory intention for the offences against the critical national infrastructure and 
cyberterrorism offences are the same. It is unanimously agreed between the Nigerian and UK 
legislation that the method of attack in both offences requires the use of computer 
technology.
375
 Firstly, the offender must do an unauthorised act to a computer, which he or 
she knows is unauthorised at the time of committing the offence. Secondly, the accused must 
by doing the act in question either intend or be reckless as to whether such damage is 
caused.
376
 It does not matter what the intention of the offender is. Once the offence of 
unauthorised access is proved, it follows that a conviction could be secured for the offences 
against the critical national infrastructure. This is however not the case with cyberterrorism 
offences where other ancillary proofs are required to secure a conviction,
377
 although some 
elements of cyberterrorism, could be proved to exist when unlawful or politically-motivated 
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cyberattacks are perpetrated to intimidate or coerce a government or its citizenry to further a 
political objective,
378
 or to cause grave harm or severe economic damage.
379
 
 
3.3iiib Motivation 
 
 
Motivation is the underlying influence between human beings and the decisions they make.
380
 
In criminal law, it is the cause that moves an offender to the commission of the offence in 
question.
381
 Motivation in itself is not a necessary element of any given crime, but establishes 
the reasons to have induced the offender to commit the offence. This is distinguished from 
‘intention’, which is a necessary element of any given crime, in criminal law is synonymous 
with mens rea that is specific mental purpose of the offender in the commission of the of-
fence.
382
 Unlike intention, motivation can be determined, but its existence does not exactly 
prove a guilty intention. 
 
One of the significant differences between the two offences is derived from the motivation of 
the offenders.
383
 The offences against the critical national infrastructure requires no specific 
motivation’ except for proof that the attack is unlawful and is directed against computers, 
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networks and/or the information stored within the systems that have been classed by an exist-
ing law as constituting part of the critical national information infrastructure.
384
  
 
The motivating factors behind cyberterrorism have underlying political, ideological and 
social influence.
385
 The purpose of cyberterrorism offences is to intimidate or influence a 
government or society to further their political or social objectives.
386
 Conway
387
 has 
suggested that, in order to be labelled as cyberterrorism, the cyber-attacks must have a 
terrorist component, resulting in death and/or large scale destruction, and be politically 
motivated. The attacks must therefore result in violence against members of the state or their 
property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear amongst the citizenry.
388
 Flemming 
and Stohl,
389
 have further argued that cyber-attacks that are carried out to cause grave harm or 
severe economic damage or extreme financial harm that could paralyse world trade and 
economy could be classed as cyberterrorism. It also goes to show that cyber-attacks against 
any component of the critical national infrastructure that causes collateral damage, like death 
and destruction could comfortably be classed as cyberterrorism.
390
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The attacks should have the capacity of intimidating or coercing a government or its 
citizenry
391
 and must result in violence or threat of violence against persons or property,
392
 
and/or also cause enough harm to instil fear on the government or its citizenry
393
 in 
furtherance of political, religious or social ideologies, in order to be categorized as cyber-
terrorism.
394
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
I have from the foregoing, evaluated the applicable legislation to cybercrime offences that are 
committed against the state while analysing the existing positions in the UK and Nigerian 
jurisdictions, along with diverse literatures. The UK National Security Strategy (NSS)
395
 has 
highlighted the need for a broader view on national security, which includes threats to 
individual citizens and to their ways of life, as well as to the integrity and interests of the 
State. The strategy seeks to adopt an ‘all-risks’ approach, which considers natural hazards 
and other civil emergencies alongside malicious threats such as terrorism. It should be the 
core objective of nations to be secure and resilient by protecting its citizenry, economy, 
infrastructure, territory and way of life from all major risks that could have direct effect on 
them. The United Kingdom government had in March 2015 enacted the Serious Crime Act 
2015, and also established the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure to protect 
national security by providing protective security advice to the areas within the national 
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infrastructure, and also provides advice on physical security, personnel security and cyber 
security/information assurance. Most importantly, this centre offer advisories by explaining 
to the relevant departments how these components combine together and reinforce each other 
and their relationship to cyber threats.
396
 This is rather a commendable reaction that is 
necessary to secure the areas covered within the national infrastructure.
397
 The Nigerian 
Cybercrime Act has also made extensive provisions for the protection of the country’s critical 
national infrastructures under sections 3 and 5 of the Act, although the offenders were 
previously prosecuted under the Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011. This anomaly 
has now been corrected by the combined provisions of sections 1, 3 and 5 of the Nigerian 
Act, which provides for the protection of the computers, computer systems, networks, 
programs, and data of the critical national infrastructures specified under section 3. This new 
Nigerian legislation is in-pari-materia with the United Kingdom’s Computer Misuse Act 
1990 and the Serious Crime Act 2015.  
 
Cyber-attacks against the critical national infrastructure of a state, and the survival/prevention 
thereof are very crucial to the existence of every state.
398
 The growing reliance on 
information technology makes cyber-terrorism and attacks against the critical national 
infrastructure more likely. The offenders are constantly trying to avoid detection by hiding 
their identity and masking their anonymity using advanced technology tools, hence the need 
for constant amendment of the existing legislative structures to ensure that they are in 
consonance with the terrorists’ advanced methods in their commission of cybercrime.399 It is 
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however commendable that both Nigeria and the United Kingdom have enacted stringent 
legislation to combat the menaces of offences relating to offences committed against the 
critical national infrastructure. There is no doubt that the security and resilience of the critical 
national infrastructures are vital in achieving long term goals of any Government vision for 
sustainable economic development, and realising a country where people are safer and feel 
safer. 
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Chapter Four: OFFENCES AGAINST CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY AND 
AVAILABILITY OF COMPUTER DATA AND SYSTEMS  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter provides an analysis of cybercrime offences against the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of computer data and systems found in the Nigerian and United Kingdom’s 
national legislation and their corresponding regional international legislation. These offences 
are defined under the provisions of Articles 2-6 of the Council of Europe’s convention on 
cybercrime. These provisions are intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of computer systems or data, and not to criminalise legitimate and common 
activities inherent in the design of networks, or legitimate and common operating or 
commercial practices.
400
 Article 29 of the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and 
Personal Data Protection, 2014 also enjoined signatories to make provisions to criminalise 
offences specific to information and communication technologies, including cyber-attacks on 
computer systems. 
 
The offences discussed under this chapter have been described as the fulcrum of the 
computer-related offences,
401
 because they form the foundation upon which other ancillary 
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cyber-offences are committed.
402
 The ease of accessibility and search-ability of information 
contained in computer systems, combined with the practically unlimited possibilities for its 
exchange and dissemination, regardless of geographical distances, has led to an explosive 
growth in the amount of information available and the knowledge that can be drawn there 
from.
403
 The users’ connectivity to these sophisticated computer systems and super-networks, 
may be the subject of misuse by offenders who commit cybercrime offences against users 
who use these computers or networks for legitimate purposes.
404
 These cybercrime offences 
are so described because they are mostly committed against the integrity, availability, and 
confidentiality of computer data and system.  
 
This chapter will be analysed under the following topics: illegal access, illegal interception, 
data interference, system interference, and misuse of devices. 
 
4.2 Illegal Access 
 
Illegal access
405
 to a computer system or network is one of the most common and oldest 
computer-related crimes.
406
 Ever since the development and continuous evolvement of 
computer networks, their ability to connect computers and offer users access to other 
computer systems have continuously been abused for criminal purposes.
407
 Article 2 of the 
Budapest Convention provides for the offences related to the illegal access or access to a 
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computer system without right or authorisation. Illegal access covers the basic offence of 
dangerous threats to and attacks against the security of computer systems and data.
408
 The 
cybercrime offences of illegal access are likened to hacking, which is one of the oldest 
computer-related crimes,
409
 and involves operations that exploit computer systems in ways 
that are unusual and often illegal without the consent or authorisation of the owner. These 
acts of unlawful access are usually done with the help of special and sophisticated software 
(hacking tools) and contain some serious elements of ‘hacktivism’, which include electronic 
civil disobedience that brings methods of civil disobedience to cyberspace.
410
 Hacking or 
gaining unauthorized access to computer system, programs, or data, open a broad playing 
field for inflicting damage.
411
 The protection need reflects the interests of organisations and 
individuals to manage and control their systems in an undisturbed and uninhibited manner 
that is free of any encumbrance from any cyber-trespasser. Illegal access comes by way of 
intrusions, giving the intruder access to confidential information in the computer without 
authorization, which often leads to computer related fraud and/or forgery.
412
 A report 
published by the ‘Online-Community Hacker Watch’413 revealed the global rising numbers of 
hackers’ attempts to illegally access computer systems, as an average of about 12.5 million 
incidents of attempted hacking are recorded on a monthly basis. 
 
The legislation regarding illegal access in the UK is provided under section 1 of the 
Computer Misuse Act. This makes express provisions against unauthorised access to 
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computer materials, and states that a person is guilty of an offence if he causes a computer to 
perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any 
computer without the requisite authorisation to do so. Section 1(b) of the Act makes further 
provisions stating that the access which the defendant intends to secure must be unauthorised, 
and the offender knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that 
that is the case.
414
 The requisite intent for an offender to commit an offence under this section 
need not be directed at any particular program or data,
415
 a program or data of any particular 
kind,
416
 or a program or data held in any particular computer.
417
 The offence is complete 
upon proof that the offender did not have the required authorisation to access the said 
information. Section 3 of the Act stipulates the punishment for an offender convicted for the 
offence of unauthorised access to computer material to be six months imprisonment. 
 
In contrast to the foregoing, the ECOWAS Directives chose to use the term ‘fraudulent’ in 
most of the provisions instead of using the terms ‘illegal,’418 ‘unlawful,’419 or 
‘unauthorised’420. Although this could be seen as a case of mere choice of legislative diction 
in contrast to a change of terminology, it should be notable that the terms ‘illegal,’ 
‘unlawful,’ ‘unauthorised’ or ‘fraudulent’ do not have the same meanings in criminal law. 
While the terms ‘illegal’, ‘unlawful’ and ‘unauthorised’ have the same resemblance in 
diction; the same could not be said of the term ‘fraudulent’ which is an act of deception 
intended for personal gain or to cause a loss to another party.
421
 While the proofs for the 
terms illegal, unlawful and unauthorised could be established on proof that the offender 
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accessed the computer device without right, a further proof of fraudulent intention will be 
required to establish fraud.
422
 The intention must be to make a gain or cause a loss or the risk 
of a loss to another.
423
 
 
However, the situation is slightly different under section 6 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 
2015, which used a different diction to describe these offences, by describing the offence as 
‘unlawful access to a computer system or network’. This section makes express provisions 
for three different offences. Depending on the act and culpability of the offender, these 
offences could be committed jointly or severally. They include: Unlawful access to a 
computer system or network; Unlawful access to a computer system or network with the 
intent of obtaining computer data, securing access to any program, commercial or industrial 
secrets or confidential information; and Unlawful access to computer program while using a 
device to avoid detection or otherwise prevent identification. 
 
4.2i Hacking 
 
Section 6(1) of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act makes provision for the basic hacking offence. 
It provides that: “Any person, who without authorization or in excess of authorization, 
intentionally accesses in whole or in part, a computer system or network, commits an 
offence….” This offence is the provision for the basic hacking offences. This provision has 
created two scenarios where an offence could be committed under the section 6 of the Act: 
Where the accused did not have any authorisation to access the computer system or network 
ab initio; and where the accused had some form of authorisation but mid-way into the 
execution of a lawful act, exceeded his or her authorisation and continues to commit an 
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offence punishable under the second limb of this section.
424
 It is quite notable that the 
punishment (2 year’s imprisonment) for the offence of illegal access under section 6(1) of the 
Nigerian Act is stricter than the provision of section 3 of the UK’s Computer Misuse Act 
which is six month imprisonment. This provision punishes the basic hacking offences of 
unauthorised access, and forms the foundation of the other offences related to unlawful 
access offences which has existed since the early days of the development of information 
technologies.
425
 
 
There are rare situations with a thin line of difference, where the accused person may have 
been ab-initio authorised to have access to the computer, but thereafter uses it for an 
unauthorised purpose and continues to commit an offence punishable under the second limb 
of this section. A very good example of this was enunciated by the United Kingdom Audit 
Commission in its 1998 report in IT fraud and abuse,
426
 where a nurse at a hospital who had 
authorisation to use the patient administration system further used it to search for medical 
details relating to friends and relatives and further discussed these details with other members 
of her family.
427
 The English case of DPP v Bignell
428
, was also decided under section 1 of 
the UK Computer Misuse Act 1990, which has utmost resemblance to section 6(1) of the 
Nigerian Act. In this case the court held that the defendants had authority to access the police 
computer even though they did not do so for an authorized purpose, and therefore did not 
                                                 
424
 In United States v. Phillips, 477 F3d 215 (5
th
 Cir. 2007), the court affirmed a conviction of a University 
student who was granted access to the University computer system when re enrolled as a freshman. He then 
used a technique called ‘port scanning’ to find other computers on the network that could be easily assessed, and 
gained access to many computers this way and stole information. Although he initially had access to the first 
computer, his accesses to the subsequent ones were held to be unauthorised.  
425
 See Michael E. Kabay, 'A Brief History of Computer Crime: An Introduction for Students', (2008) School of 
graduate studies; Marco Gerckel, ‘Cybercrime, Terrorist Use of the Internet and Cyberwarfare: The Importance 
of a Clear Distinction’ (2012) Trends and Developments in Contemporary Terrorism 103, 17; see also Ulrich 
Sieber, The International Handbook of Computer Crime, (1
st
 edn, John Wiley, 1986), pp.86-90. 
426
 Audit Commission, 'Ghost in the Machine: An Analysis of IT Fraud and Abuse', (Audi Commission 
Publications, 1998), pg.18 
427
 See DPP v Bignell (1998) 1 Cr App R 1 which was reversed by the House of Lords in R v Bow Street 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Government of USA (2000) 2 AC 216 
428
 [1998] 1 Cr. App. R. 1 
95 
 
commit an offence contrary to section 1 of the Act. The court noted in its judgment that the 
1990 Act was enacted to criminalize the act of breaking into computer systems. Thus, once 
the access was authorized, the Act did not look at the purpose for which the computer was 
accessed. The decision in this case is highly questionable. This is because, the fact that 
someone was entitled to access computer material is not the same as being entitled to control 
access to that material at the time.
429
 Although Denco’s case430 was only a case for unfair and 
summary dismissal in an Employment Appeal Tribunal, it nevertheless portrays the clear 
message by the Courts while interpreting the provisions of cases of unauthorised access that 
the intentions of the legislature was to punish acts involving unauthorised access to computer 
material.
431
 
 
The above case of DPP v Bignell, gave rise to the question of whether the offence of 
unauthorized access might be extended to a situation of improper or illegal use by an 
authorized user. This question was considered by the House of Lords in R. v. Bow Street 
Magistrate (ex parte US Government, Allison)
432
 where the appellate court refined 
interpretation of the notion of authorized or unauthorized access and held that access was 
unauthorized under the Computer Misuse Act if (a) the access to the particular data in 
question was intentional; (b) the access in question was unauthorized by a person entitled to 
authorize access to that particular data; (c) knowing the access to that particular data was 
unauthorized. The House of Lords noted that the court of first instance had felt constrained by 
the strict definition of unauthorized access in the Act and the interpretation put upon them by 
                                                 
429
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the court in D.P.P. v. Bignell. The House of Lords doubted the reasoning in Bignell’s case 
but felt that the outcome was probably right. Lord Hobhouse declared that a “possible view of 
the facts” was that the access in this case was necessarily authorised because it was secured 
by the computer operators, who were authorised to access the Police national computer 
system in response to requests from police officer. In his commentary on the Bignells’ case, 
J.C. Smith argued this same point by analogy: “If I give you permission to enter my study for 
the purposes of reading my books, your entering to drink my sherry would surely be 
unauthorised 'access' to the room as well as to the sherry.”433 
 
A critical analysis of the provisions of section 6(1) of the Nigerian Act, suggests that the 
problem caused by the lacuna in section 1 of the English Computer Misuse Act, 1990, and the 
decision in Bignell’s case may have been considered by the legislature who addressed this by 
using the language “accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized 
access”. This is rather in consonance with provisions the United States Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act
434
 which used the same language: “...accessed a computer without authorization or 
exceeding authorized access”. The offences under this provision are strict liability offences 
which do not require that the offender take any further or additional step like, accessing 
system files or other stored data before culpability could be attached.
435
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4.2ii Hacking with the intent of obtaining computer data, securing access to any pro-
gram, commercial or industrial secrets or confidential information 
 
Section 6(2) of the Nigerian Act seems like a unique provision in global cybercrime 
legislative jurisprudence which makes express provision, and criminalises for all acts 
involving unlawful access to a computer system or network with the intention of obtaining 
computer data, securing access to any program, commercial or industrial secrets or 
confidential information.
436
 The punishment for the offences under this section is a custodial 
sentence for a term of 3 years. This provision is not contained in the UK’s Computer Misuse 
Act. However, the Police and Justice Act (PJA) 2006 have now made some amendments to 
the Computer Misuse Act and extended the offence to include an intention to enable access to 
be secured, which previously the intention was only to secure access. However, this section 
has itself been repealed by section 61 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. The Police and Justice 
Act 2006 have also amended the hacking offence in section 1 by making it triable either-way 
and deal with sentencing, where originally it was a summary offence only.
437
 One of the 
findings of this research is that the UK legislature has so far been adapting with ever 
changing and dynamic nature of cybercrime, especially with the latest inventions of 3G, 4G 
and Wi-Fi telecommunication telephones and network system. Section 2(7) of the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 has further extended the concept of transmission so 
as to include a situation where a voicemail message had been initially received by the 
intended recipient and was stored in the communication system where the intended recipient 
might have continued access to it.
438
 In R. v Edmondson
439
 the accused persons who had all 
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worked as editors and journalists were charged with conspiring unlawfully to intercept 
communications in the course of their transmission without lawful authority contrary to the 
Criminal Law Act 1977 and section 1(1) of RIPA. The relevant conduct, or “hacking”, 
involved the remote accessing of a voicemail box by dialling, from another telephone, the 
telephone number relating to it and bypassing any security feature, so as to be able to listen to 
the message contents, without the knowledge or consent of the subscriber, at a time when the 
recorded message was stored there, not yet having been deleted.
440
 The court held that section 
2(7) of RIPA extended the concept of transmission to include the period when the 
transmission system stored the communication in such a manner that enabled the intended 
recipient to have access to it, whether or not it had previously been received or accessed by 
the intended recipient. The issue was whether, on the proper construction of Section 2(7), the 
period of storage referred to came to an end on first access or collection by the intended 
recipient or whether it continued beyond such first access for so long as the system was used 
to store the communication in a manner which enabled the recipient to have subsequent or 
even repeated access to it.
441
 
 
Although organisations would usually have security measures in place to prevent or reduce 
the theft of confidential information, those measures can be woefully inadequate.
442
 The 
significant importance of this provision is that the culpable employee, though may have ab-
initio, been duly authorised to access the computer system or network, but had thereafter 
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continued to use the said authorisation for an unauthorised purpose, and thereby commits an 
offence punishable under this section.
443
 
 
4.2iii Hacking while using a device to avoid detection or identification 
 
 
Section 6(3) of the Act seems to have created a rather unique and novel offence which is 
different from other jurisdictions and countries that previously enacted their individual 
municipal cybercrime laws. This provision, although not contained both in the Budapest 
Convention, and the UK’s Computer Misuse Act, have nevertheless been rectified by the 
provisions of section 42 of the UK Serious Crime Act 2015. This section punishes situations 
where the offender had in trying to secure an illegal access to a computer system or network, 
uses any device to avoid detection or otherwise prevent identification.
444
 It therefore follows 
that for an offender to be culpable for these offences, he/she would have been culpable under 
any of the initial offences or both. The scope of the offences covered by these provisions 
seems entirely broad,
445
 but also clearly articulated and defined, and covers situations where 
the offender has infected the computer system with viruses, Trojan Horses,
446
 Viruses and 
Worms,
447
 time-bombs,
448
 Botnet,
449
 and Logic Bombs
450
 in the process of committing 
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offences under sections 6(1) and 6(2) of the Nigerian Act, with the intention of using the 
device to avoid detection or otherwise prevent identification for the offence of unauthorised 
access being committed by the offender. 
 
These offences covered under section 6(3) of the Nigerian Act present a major threat to 
computer systems, not just because of the damage they themselves can do, but because they 
provide a technique to facilitate more devastating crimes. The section 6(3) provisions could 
be argued to also criminalize the commission of Denial-of-Service attack (DoS attack) type 
acts,
451
 and seems a direct transplant of section 36 of the United Kingdom’s Police and 
                                                                                                                                                        
virus. In other words, the healthy living cell becomes the original program, and the virus affects the way the 
program operates. How? It inserts a copy of itself in the code; thus, when the program runs, it makes various 
copies of the virus. This happens only on a single system. (Viruses don't infect networks in the way worms do, 
as we'll explain below.) However, if a virus infects a program which is copied to a disk and transferred to 
another computer, it could also infect programs on that computer. This is how a computer virus spreads. Unlike 
a virus, a worm is a standalone program in its own right. It exists independently of any other programs. To run, 
it does not need other programs. A worm simply replicates itself on one computer and tries to infect other 
computers that may be attached or closely connected to the same network as the infected computer. 
448
 This is a computer virus which is programmed to be triggered by a specific date. 
449
 Botnets have now risen to be one of the most defining features of today’s cybercrime landscape because of 
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pre-specified event or time to do its damage. Time is not the only criterion used to set off logic bombs. Some 
bombs do their damage after a particular program is run a certain number of times. Others are more creative. In 
several cases we've heard about, a programmer told the logic bomb to destroy data if the company payroll is run 
and his name is not on it; this is a sure-fire way to get back at the company if he is fired! The employee is fired, 
or may leave on his own, but does not remove the logic bomb. The next time the payroll is run and the computer 
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Justice Act 2006
452
 which had amended Section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act (CMA), by 
changing it from an offence of "unauthorized modification of computer material" to 
"unauthorized acts with intent to impair" computer material.
453
  
 
In the case of DPP v Lennon
454
 the accused had after being dismissed from his employment 
with the company, used a "mail-bombing" program that, once activated, automatically sent 
continuous emails to the company's server until the program was manually stopped. The 
server received over 500,000 emails, the vast majority of which purported to come from a 
manager within the company when in reality they did not. He contended that he had no case 
to answer as the purpose of the company's server was to receive emails and that the company 
had consented to the receipt of emails and the modification in data content consequent upon 
receipt of such emails. Although the lower court had erroneously held that section 3 of the 
Act was intended to deal with the sending of malicious material such as viruses
455
 and Trojan 
horses rather than email and that as the company's server was configured to receive emails 
from the company, it was held on appeal that the emails had resulted in the modification of 
the data on the company's computers, so that the key question was whether the accused had 
consented to that modification. Would the owner of a computer able to receive emails be 
taken to have consented to the sending of emails to his computer? It would be erroneous to 
assume that such implied consent was not without limits.
456
 The Court adopted the dictum of 
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Lord Chief Justice Woolf when he stated in the case of Zezev and Yarimaka v Governor of 
HM Prison Brixton and another
457
 as follows: “But if an individual, by misusing or 
bypassing any relevant password, places in the files of the computer a bogus e-mail by 
pretending that the password holder is the author when he is not, then such an addition to 
such data is plainly unauthorised, as defined in section 17(8); intent to modify the contents of 
the computer as defined in section 3(2) is self-evident and, by so doing, the reliability of the 
data in the computer is impaired within the meaning of section 3(2)(c).” 
 
Consent would not in any case cover emails that had been sent not for the purpose of 
communication with the owner but to interrupt the proper operation and use of his system; 
and would therefore amount to illegal access.
458
 The provisions of sections 6(1), (2) and (3) 
of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act expressly make hacking a criminal offence, irrespective of 
whether any harm is intended; and it is not necessary to actually gain access to the computer 
system to be culpable for this offence. An attempted access would suffice to be culpable for 
the offences under section 6(3). Section 42 of the Nigerian Act, also defines computer 
network as a collection of hardware components and computers interconnected by 
communications channels that allow sharing of resources and information. Networks may be 
classified according to a wide variety of characteristics such as the medium used to transport 
the data, communications protocol used, scale, topology, and organizational scope.
459
 This 
definition seem to solve the problems that could emanate from situations where the offender 
while using a computer will also solicit the use of another computer to gain access to the 
computer system. This ensures that an offender may still been culpable irrespective of how 
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many computer systems that are used to gain access to the system.
460
 The position would 
have remained the same where the database or the computer system was accessed not from 
the computer in question but from another computer or computer system or network by 
remote access.
461
 The case of Attorney General’s Reference (No. 1 of 1991),462 has shown 
that the offences of illegal access are not limited to the use of one computer with intent to 
gain access to another computer. The court further held that the offence would be committed 
even if only one computer was used.
463
  
 
Currently the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 seems to have covered enough grounds on the 
offence of illegal access, having been drafted with the latest inventive cyber-tool legislative 
kit. Cybercrimes, unlike the traditional crimes, are very dynamic and continue to change 
every minute of the day and so should also the legislations be. This research postulates that 
both the law and mechanism of legislative amendment should also be dynamic in order to 
effectively curb the menace of cybercrime. 
 
4.3 Illegal Interception 
 
Article 3 of the Budapest Convention urges signatories to adopt their laws to criminalise all 
forms of illegal electronic data transfer, whether by telephone, fax, and e-mail or file transfer, 
without the consent of the authorised owner. The major concern behind prohibition of the 
interception of computer data in transmission is the breach of confidentiality in private 
communications.
464
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This provision aims to protect all forms of violation to right of privacy of data 
communication during the process of its transmission to a network.
465
 The offence represents 
the same violation of the privacy of communications as traditional tapping and recording of 
oral telephone conversations between persons.
466
 Interception may also involve recording.
467
 
The Council of Europe’s report on computer-related crime468 urges signatories to enact laws 
that will criminalize unauthorised interception of data.
469
 This provision was conspicuously 
absent in the Computer Misuse Act but was specifically provided for in section 9 of the 
Nigerian Act. It is quite understandable as the UK Act had preceded the Convention. This 
provision has now been implemented in the UK by section 1 of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000
470
 which criminalises all forms of intentional and unlawful 
interception of data anywhere in the UK, and seemed to have been influenced by Article 3 of 
the Convention; and thereby transplanted into section 9 of the Nigerian Act. The Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was introduced to “make provision for and about the 
interception of communications, the acquisition and disclosure of data relating to 
communications, the carrying out of surveillance, the use of covert intelligence sources
471
 and 
                                                 
465
 Bellovin, Steven Michael, et al., 'Security Implications of Applying the Communications Assistance to Law 
Enforcement Act to Voice over IP' (2006) <www.itaa.org/news/docs/CALEAVOIPreport.pdf > accessed on 9 
June 2015; See also Burt A. Braverman, 'VoIP: The Future of Telephony is now…if regulation doesn’t get in 
the way' (2005) The Indian Journal of Law and Technology, Vol.1, 47, 
<www.nls.ac.in/students/IJLT/resources/1_Indian_JL&Tech_47.pdf> accessed on 9 June 2015. 
466
  Paragraph 51 of the COE Convention Explanatory Note. 
467
 Frank Leprevost, 'Development of surveillance technology and risk of abuse of economic information. 
Encryption and cryptosystems in electronic surveillance: a survey of the technology assessment issues' (1999) 
PE 168.184/Vol 3/5/EN, <http://cryptome.org/stoa-r3-5.htm> accessed on 9 June 2015. 
468
 Council of Europe Computer-Related Crime Recommendation No. R (89) 9 on Computer-Related Crime and 
final report the European Committee on Crime Problems (1990) Strasbourg, 53-55. 
469
 William L. Fishman, 'Introduction to transborder data flows' (1980) Stan. J. Int'l L. 16, 1. 
470
 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, is aavailable at: 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_1 > accessed on 22 June 2015. 
471
 Council of Europe, 'Organised Crime in Europe, Situation Report 2004' (Council of Europe Publishing: 
Strasbourg, 2005) pp. 81-218. 
105 
 
the acquisition of the means by which electronic data protected by encryption or passwords 
may be decrypted or accessed.”472 
 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 comprises two elements: Section 1(1) of 
the Act creates a criminal liability, while section 1(2) details when a person commits the 
offence of intentionally and unlawfully intercepting a communication by means of a private 
telecommunication system.
473
 The only exception for the provision under section 1(1) relates 
only to conduct with "lawful authority," which is detailed in section 1(5). Section 1(2) 
provides that it is an offence for a person intentionally and without lawful authority to 
intercept, at any place within United Kingdom, any communication in the course of its 
transmission by means of a private telecommunication system. The object of this provision 
seem to be limited to illegal interception as ‘non-public’ transmission of computer data; 
which in essence focuses only on ‘private’ transmissions.474  
 
The African Union Convention on its part had in Article 29 (2)(a) urged the state parties to 
take the necessary legislative and/or regulatory measures to make it a criminal offence to 
intercept or attempt to intercept computerized data fraudulently by technical means during 
non-public transmission to, from or within a computer system. This limitation refers to the 
intended nature of the transmission. For example, a communication that has a private nature 
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but is sent via public Wi-Fi network can be protected for the purposes of illegal interception, 
even though the transmission goes through a public network.
475
  
 
The only exception to the provision in section 1(2) is only in a situation where the offender is 
a person with a right to control the operation or the use of the system;
476
 or he has the express 
or implied consent of such a person to make the interception. This provision bears utmost 
resemblance with the provisions of section 39 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act that grants an 
exception for interception in situations where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
content of any electronic communication is reasonably required for the purposes of a criminal 
investigation or proceedings. In drafting section 1(1) of RIPA, it seems the intention of the 
legislators to implement Article 5(1) of the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications.
477
 Article 5(1) of the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 
provides that: “Member States shall ensure the confidentiality of communications and the 
related traffic data by means of a public communications network and publicly available 
electronic communications services... In particular, they shall prohibit listening, tapping, 
storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of communications and the related 
traffic data by persons other than users, without the consent of the users concerned, except 
when legally authorised to do so in accordance with Article 15(1)”478 
 
Section 2 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act provides that an offence will be 
committed by any person who, without obtaining a warrant, intercepts any communication 
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transmitted over a public or private communications system. The provisions of part 2 of the 
Act are very significant, as they make provisions regarding surveillance.
479
 In fact, section 27 
of the Act incriminates all acts of intrusive surveillance unless expressly authorised under the 
Act.  
 
Article 8 of the ECOWAS Directive on cybercrime
480
 also urges the contracting states to 
enact laws that will criminalize unauthorised and unlawful interception of computer data 
during their non-public transmission, to, from and within a computer system using 
technological means.
481
 The provisions of section 9 of the Nigerian Act is quite 
encompassing as it provides that any person, who intentionally and without authorization or 
in excess of authority, intercepts by technical means, transmissions of non-public computer 
data, content data or traffic data, including electromagnetic emissions
482
 or signals from a 
computer, computer system or network carrying or emitting signals, to or from a computer, 
computer system or connected system or network would be deemed to have committed an 
offence. An interesting aspect of this provision is that it carries with it two limbs. The first 
limb of this provision connotes the provisions of both section 1 and 2 of the UK’s Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act, while the second limb is rather an inventive and robust 
legislation which envisages a situation of "lawful authority,"
483
 as provided in section 1(5) of 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, but the offender proceed to go above the 
confines of his authorisation, he will still be punished under this limb of section 9 of the 
Nigerian Act. Also, the Nigerian provision in addition to non-public transmissions, also cover 
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the interception of ‘electromagnetic emissions or signals from a computer’. This could 
arguably cover Bluetooth connections.
484
 These are terms that seem to have been 
intentionally inserted into the provision by the legislature in order to widen the scope of the 
offences here. A similar approach is also enunciated in section 8 of the 2002 Commonwealth 
Model Law.
485
 
 
Another notable disparity between the Nigerian position and the UK’s position is that section 
3(1) of RIPA authorises interception of communications not only where the persons 
concerned have consented to interception but also when the person intercepting the 
communications has ‘reasonable grounds’ for believing that consent to do so has been 
given.
486
 This provision is inconspicuous in the Nigerian Act. This however seem to conflict 
with Article 2(h) of the Data Protection Directive, which defines consent as “freely given, 
specific and inform.” As the data protection issues are not within the purview of this research, 
the researcher can only observe that this is not contained in the Nigerian Act as it tends to 
open floodgates for recklessness and might lead to interception in excess of the ab-initio 
acquired authorisation.  
 
It is noteworthy that the essential ingredients/requirement of mens rea which is contained in 
both the Nigerian and UK provision. This is an area where the two comparative legislation 
                                                 
484
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unanimously agreed that the crime of illegal interception can only be committed 
intentionally.
487
 The Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, for instance, gives the 
contracting member states the option to limit the offence of illegal interception to cases 
committed with dishonest intent; while the African Union Convention urged the member 
states to consider as a requirement to the commission of the offence an intent to defraud, or 
similar dishonest intent, before criminal liability attaches.
488
 The fact remains that any 
interception has to be intentional and without authorization or in excess of the acquired 
authorisation.
489
 
 
This research posits that both the Nigerian and the UK legislation, along with their 
international regional legislation, clearly define the object of illegal interception as ‘non-
public’ transmission of computer data. This now limits the object of the offences to ‘private’ 
transmissions.
490
 Regarding the elements of the offence covered by these legislations, it is 
also a finding of this research that both sets of legislation, despite their use of diverse 
legislative phraseologies, have limited the acts of interception to those committed using 
technical means.
491
 As stated in the explanatory report to the Council of Europe Cybercrime 
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Convention, this requirement represents a restrictive condition in order to avoid over-
criminalization.
492
 
 
Finally, both comparative legislation only criminalise acts if the offender acted with the 
requisite intention. The mental element is therefore an essential element of the provisions 
provided by UK provisions as well as the Nigerian Act, which both contain requirements 
regarding the mental element required for the offence. 
 
4.4 Data Interference 
 
Article 4 of the Council of Europe’s convention provides for the criminalisation of intentional 
damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration, destruction or suppression of computer data. 
The provision is aimed at providing computer data and programs with protection similar to 
that enjoyed by corporeal objects against intentional infliction of damage,
493
 thereby 
protecting computer data the same way as we protect tangible objects.
494
 People mostly 
misunderstand the protection sought to be given to electronic data in this Article because 
electronic information stored in a computer is not usually seen as tangible properties.
495
 The 
interest sought to be protected here is the integrity and the proper functioning or use of stored 
computer data or computer programs.
496
  The value of a computer system normally resides in 
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the information it contains; software and data, rather than the physical hardware.
497
 The 
intention of the legislature here is therefore to punish the unauthorised and intentional 
manipulation of computer data.
498
 
 
The offences sought to be criminalised here usually involve intentional or reckless acts, and 
without lawful excuse or justification by the offender to: destroy or alter data; render data 
meaningless, useless or ineffective; obstruct, interrupt or in any way interfere with the lawful 
use of data; obstruct, interrupt or in any way interfere with any person in the lawful use of 
data, or deny access of the data to any person with the lawful use of it, whether temporarily or 
permanently.
499
 Casey
500
 has further argued that dropping a file to the virtual trash bin does 
not remove the file from the hard disk, and might not come within the confines of this 
provision; while Nolan, et al,
501
 has further posited that “emptying” the trash bin does not 
necessarily remove the file from the hard-disc, and suggested that the ability to recover a 
deleted file does not necessarily hinder the availability of the data and renders the application 
of the provision impotent. It is difficult to substantiate Casey and Nolan’s views with 
provisions of section 3 of the UK Computer Misuse Act which criminalises all forms of 
unauthorised alteration, erasure of computer program or data with the intention of impairing 
the operation of the computer or in any way hindering the use for the legitimate user 
thereof.
502
 The underlying intention of section 3 of the UK Computer Misuse Act, seem to be 
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  Chris Reed and John Angel, Computer Law, (6
th
 edn, Oxford University Press, 2006), 570 
498
 Mohamed Chawki, 'A Critical Look at the Regulation of Cybercrime' (2005) The ICFAI Journal of 
CyberLaw 4(4), Available at <www.crime-research.org/articles/Critical/2> accessed on 10 June 2015. 
499
 Eoghan Casey, Handbook of computer crime investigation: forensic tools and technology (Academic press, 
2001); Computer Evidence Search & Seizure Manual, (2000), New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety, 
Division of Criminal Justice, 18,  <www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/pdfs/cmpmanfi.pdf > accessed on 10 June 2015. 
500
 Eoghan Casey, Handbook of computer crime investigation, ibid. 
501
 See Richard Nolan, Colin O'Sullivan, Jake Branson & Cal Waits, First Responders Guide to Computer 
Forensics, (March 2005) <www.cert.org/archive/pdf/05hb003.pdf > accessed on 10 June 2015. 
502
 In Cox v Riley (1986) 83 Cr App R 54, an employee deleted computer programs from a plastic circuit card 
that was required to operate a computerised saw, the court stated that the plastic circuit card had been damaged 
by the erasure of the programs to the extent that the action impaired the value or usefulness of the card and 
necessitated time and labour and money to be expended to make the card operable again. Also in R v Whiteley 
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also aimed at offenders who introduce viruses and Denial of Service attacks to computer 
systems and networks.
503
 If the physical condition of the computer is impaired by the acts of 
the offender (whether intentionally or recklessly), an offence under the Criminal Damage Act 
1971 may also be committed. 
 
The Nigerian Cybercrime Act used an entirely different nomenclature to describe the 
offences mentioned in the category, described the offence as ‘unauthorised modification of 
computer program and data’. There is a positive change in the legislative language used here 
in order to connote modification of computer program as part of the offence committed under 
this provision. The restrictive approach used in section 3(1) of the UK’s Computer Misuse 
Act seem to suggest faciem in lege that a person is guilty of an offence under the section only 
if ‘he does any act which causes an unauthorised modification of the contents of any 
computer’.504 However, section 17 of the Computer Misuse Act, which deals with 
interpretation proceeded to expound the provision in section 3(1) (a). This provides that ‘… a 
computer is to be regarded as containing any program or data held in any such medium.
505’ 
This definition, on the face of it seems to be correct, but with the variable changes and 
advancement in computer technologies, malicious malwares and viruses could remotely be 
                                                                                                                                                        
(1991) 93 Cr App R 25, the defendant was rightly convicted (under the Criminal Damage Act, 1991) of causing 
damage through gaining unauthorised access into the Joint Academic Network, used by universities, and 
deleting and amending substantial numbers of files. His argument that his activities only affected the 
information contained on a computer disk and not the disk itself was refused by both the trial court and Court of 
Appeal. 
503
 US-CERT, Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks (2001) <www.us-cert.gov/cas/tips/ST04-015.html> 
accessed on 10 June 2015; See also Vern Paxson, 'An analysis of using reflectors for distributed denial-of-
service attacks' (2001) ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 31, 3, 38-47, 
<http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/reflectors.CCR.01.pdf> accessed on 10 June 2015. 
504
 Section 3(1)(a) of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 
505
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used to alter and/or add a program or data, it could not be correct to say that they are covered 
within this provision.
506
 
 
Section 16 of the Nigerian Act creates two different types of offences.  While section 16(1) 
makes provision for unauthorised modification of computer data, section 16(2) criminalises 
acts involving damage, deletion, deteriorating, alteration, restriction or suppression of data 
within computer systems or networks, including data transfer from a computer system by any 
person without authority. The legislature has for clarity purposes, tried to make a working 
definition of the term ‘modification’ in section 16(3) of the Nigerian Act. This encapsulates 
all modification of any data held in any computer system or network, and takes place where, 
by the operation of any function of the computer, computer system or network concerned any 
program or data held in it is altered or erased, program or data is added to or removed from 
any program or data held in it, or act occurs which impairs the normal operation of any 
computer, computer system or network concerned.
507
 
 
The actus reus for the commission of this offence as seem to be shared by both the Nigeria 
and the UK legislature consists the ‘unlawful’508 acts of causing damage against computer 
data, while the mutually agreed mens rea is the ‘intention’ used.509 Mere recklessness by the 
offender is not sufficient. The acts of data interference sought to be criminalised here 
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507
 Marc D Goodman and Susan W Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 
(2002) UCLA Law Journal of Law and Technology, 20, 
<www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.pdf> accessed on 10 June 2015; Alan 
Paller, 'Response, Recovery and Reducing Our Vulnerability to Cyber Attacks: Lessons Learned and 
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Representatives Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research & Development Select Committee on 
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 This could sometime be interpreted as ‘without right’, ‘illegal’, ‘unauthorised’ or ‘in excess of authorisation’ 
509
 Article 4 of the COE Convention requires that the offender is carrying out the offences intentionally. See also 
the Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, No. 39. 
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includes damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing of computer data.
510
 It is a 
finding of this research that to achieve the desired objective, the meaning to be ascribed to the 
term ‘alteration’ should as well connote acts used by offenders in the modification of 
computer data like the input of malicious codes.
511
  
 
4.5 System Interference 
 
Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention provides for offences relating to system 
interference and hindering of the use of computer systems. It criminalises the intentional 
hindering of the lawful use of computer systems including telecommunications facilities by 
using or influencing computer data.
512
 The Computer Misuse Act did not specifically use the 
term ‘system interference’ but makes snippets of provisions, in parts, which cover the offence 
of system interference. It also establishes a category of criminal activity involving either 
direct or covert unauthorized access to a computer by the introduction of malicious software 
with the intention of hindering normal functioning of the system.
513
 Section 2 of the 
Computer Misuse Act 1990, partly ratifies the provisions of Article 5 of the Convention. This 
provision of the Act provides for unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate 
commission of further offences. An offender will be culpable under this section if he commits 
an offence under section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act, which covers the unauthorized 
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 See Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, No. 38. See also Du Pont, 'The 
time has come for limited liability for operators of true Anonymity Remails in Cyberspace: An Examination of 
the possibilities and perils' (2010) Journal of Technology Law and Policy, Vol 6, Issue 2, 
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 Richard Power, “CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey", (2002) Computer Security Journal, XVII, 
2, 29-51, 33. 
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Empirical Evidence From the Stock Market' (2003) Journal of Computer Security, Vol 11, pages 431-448; See 
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access offence with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies;
514
 or to 
facilitate the commission of such an offence (whether by himself or by any other person) and 
the offence he intends to commit or facilitate is referred to below in this section as the further 
offence.
515
 The provisions of this section relate to the offences of hacking “with intent to 
commit or facilitate commission of further offences”.516 It is immaterial for the purposes of 
this section whether the further offence is to be committed on the same occasion as the 
unauthorised access offence or on any future occasion.
517
 The important semantic here is the 
use of the phrase of ‘intent to commit... further offences’. The requisite mens rea for the 
commission of this offence is therefore the intention to commit or facilitate commission of 
further offences.
518
  
 
The ever changing and dynamic nature of cybercrime offences and acts have posed judicial 
questions and seem to create confusion and legislative lacunae where the initial act of access 
had been committed by a third party without the knowledge of the suspect, although the 
accused person may have been the conduit or the final party whose act had culminated or 
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 Also in R. v Lindesay (2001) EWCA Crim. 1720, the accused person challenged a custodial sentence of nine 
months’ imprisonment imposed on him following his guilty pleas to three counts of causing unauthorised 
modification to the contents of a computer contrary to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 s.3(1) and s.3(7). He had 
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policy' in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime, and militancy” 
(Rand Corporation, 2001) 239, <www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/MR1382.ch8.pdf> accessed 
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 See Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, No. 39. See also R v Martin 
(2013) EWCA Crim 1420 
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facilitated the commission of further offence(s). The court in Bignall’s case has rightly 
interpreted that in these situations, all the elements of the offence must be complete; that is: 
(a) The accused must have gained access to the computer system 
(b) The access must be unauthorized 
(c) The intention (mens rea) must be for the purposes of committing or to facilitate the 
committing of an offence.
519
.  
 
The provision of section 18 of the Nigerian Act is quite all encompassing, as it shows that an 
offender can be convicted for this offence if he/she acts in excess of a pre-existing or 
perceived authorisation. The nature of the cyber-world has shown that an offender could 
remotely hinder the functioning of a computer system without being physically present. A 
common example is the malicious creation of viruses or worms and infection of somebody’s 
computer with the said viruses and worms.
520
 This also involves generating malicious 
programmes like Denial of Service (DOS) and Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks 
as tools to bombard a server with network messages to shut down the websites and e-mail 
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 See DPP v Bignall (1998) 1 Cr. App. R. 1. In R. v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p. 
United States (No.2), the accused was arrested at the request of the US government, pursuant to a provisional 
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applications, held that, in order to decide whether the offences were extradition crimes, only the Extradition Act 
1989 Schedule 1 and the relevant Order in Council, (i.e. the United States of America (Extradition) Order 1976), 
which gave effect to the bilateral extradition treaty between the UK and the US, had to be consulted. Whilst 
Schedule 1 to the 1989 Act did not contain any express reference to the offences in question, an amendment to 
the 1990 Act extended the Order to include any offences under s.2 and s.3 or any conspiracy to commit such 
offences. While the Order could not amend the treaty itself, the treaty's reference to “any other offence” brought 
the offences within the scope of extradition crimes. However, in the instant case, the magistrate was correct to 
conclude that the suspect could not be guilty of the first two offences since Mr X was entitled to control access 
to the data and such access was therefore not “unauthorised access” for the purposes of the 1990 Act. 
520
 For example, the “Melissa” virus, which was launched in 1999 and ultimately caused over eighty billion 
dollars in damage.  The virus was said to invade a person’s address book and set up to fifty e-mail messages to 
addresses stored on the computer. 
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servers of the targets,
521
 thereby making it almost impossible for legitimate users to access 
the web page.
522
  A report published by Symantec Internet Security in September, 2006, 
revealed that UK is the third most targeted country in the world for DOS attacks,
523
 and their 
2015 report
524
 did not reveal any significant change either. 
 
The Nigerian legislators have therefore implemented the provisions of Article 6 of the 
ECOWAS Directive on Cybercrime by the direct provisions of section 18 of the Cybercrime 
Act. Article 6 of the ECOWAS Directive on Cybercrime has enjoined member-states to 
criminalise acts interfering with the operation of a computer system. Generally, computer 
operations require access to the relevant data and software as well as proper hardware in 
order to function efficiently.
525
 Any act that hinders or interferes the operation of a computer 
system in any way could arguably be said to come within the confines of this provision.
526
 
The use of the term ‘…to intentionally do an act which causes directly or indirectly the 
serious hindering of the functioning of a computer system’ in section 18 of the Nigeria Act 
seem to be an inventive piece of legislature, as it is in line with the current tide in cybercrime 
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and hacktivism which shows that offenders could hinder the functioning and operation of a 
computer system without being within the locus crimen.
527
 Recent use of botnets by offenders 
has also widened the scope of the offences covered under this provision. A botnet is a 
collection of compromised computers often referred to as “zombies” infected with malware 
that allows an offender to control them.
528
 This advanced and diversified use of botnets by 
offenders in cyber-offences led the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention Committee to 
issue guidance notes
529
 aimed at facilitating the effective use and implementation of the 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, in line with the recent legal, policy and technological 
developments. The required element for culpability for these offences is the intent; and the 
intent must be aimed at causing the modification and thereby to impair the operation of the 
computer, to prevent access to any program or data or to impair the operation of a program or 
the reliability of data.
530
 
 
                                                 
527
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if proved, have constituted an offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 s.1 or s.3, and thus an extraditable 
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the meaning of s. 3(2) (a) and/or (c). 
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The scope of the offences covered by this section seems entirely broad, but also well-
articulated and defined; and covers viruses, Trojans, time-bombs
531
 and logic bombs.
532
 In the 
UK, if the physical condition of the computer is impaired maliciously or recklessly, an 
offence under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 may also be committed, and the accused would 
be culpable despite claim or a defence that the damage or impairment was not foreseen as an 
aftermath effect of the act. Section 3 of the CMA covers non-tangible damage.
533
 
Recklessness is not sufficient. Modifications include altering, erasing or adding to data.
534
 
Tampering becomes an offence when someone who is unauthorised modifies computer 
material, or even if someone who was authorised to the use the computer for a particular 
purpose decides to modify the computer material for purposes above the specified 
authorisation.
535
 
 
Section 36 of the Police and Justice Act 2006
536
 has further amended Section 3 of the 
Computer Misuse Act, by changing it from an offence of "unauthorised modification of 
computer material" to "unauthorised acts with intent to impair" computer material. In 
addition, this section also creates a new offence of "unauthorised acts with recklessness as to 
                                                 
531
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532
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533
 This is now by section 3(6) of the CMA expressly excluded from the Criminal Damage Act, but intention is 
required as defined in sections 3(2)-(4). 
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535
 In R. v Martin (2013) EWCA Crim 1420, the accused had launched denial of service (DOS) attacks on the 
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accessed on 24 March 2013. 
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impairing" computer material and amended section 3 of the CMA therefore criminalises the 
commission of Denial-of-Service attack (DoS attack) type act.
537
  
 
The intent (mens rea) is the recklessness
538
 of the offender, and need not be directed at any 
particular computer, program or data,
539
 or at programs of a particular kind.
540
 A further 
explanation to the 19th draft version of the Convention on Cybercrime highlights that the 
Convention on Cybercrime agreed that the use of the term suppression of data has two 
meanings: the deletion of data so they no longer physically exist; and rendering data 
inaccessible.
541
 The offences under section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act usually result in a 
custodial sentence, unlike offences under section 1 of the Act, which are generally punished 
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accessed on 11 June 2015. 
540
 Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, No. 39. 
541
 Draft Convention on Cybercrime (Draft No. 19), European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC), and 
Committee of Experts on Crime in Cyber-Space (PC-CY), PC-CY (2000), 19, available at: 
<www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/eu/cybercrime.htm> accessed on 12 February 2015. 
121 
 
by the imposition of a fine, as the courts take a very serious view of offences committed 
under section 3, even those which seem less severe.
542
  
 
4.6 Misuse of Devices 
 
Article 6 of the COE Convention establishes offences relating to the misuse of devices for the 
purpose of committing illegal access or interception, or data and system interference. This 
relates to acts that are capable of being used to commit the offences in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of 
the Convention. It criminalises offences like intentional production, sell, import or 
distribution of devices to interfere with systems as mentioned above.
543
 Apart from the 
production of “hacking devices”, the exchange of passwords that are capable of aiding 
hackers to access computer systems is an offence that are criminalised under this provision.
544
 
 
In the United Kingdom, section 37 of the Police and Justice Act 2006 has implemented the 
provisions of Article 6, by the insertion of ‘section 3A’ into the Computer Misuse Act, 1990, 
for ‘making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in computer misuse offences’. This 
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 However in the case of R v Maxwell-King (2001) 2 Cr App R (S) 28,  the appellant pleaded guilty to three 
counts of inciting the commission of an offence contrary to section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, by 
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dishonesty. However a conviction on a plea of guilty for a first offence of this nature committed on a small scale 
did not necessarily cross the threshold of seriousness which required the imposition of a custodial sentence. This 
case did not cross the threshold, and a substantial fine or a community sentence was appropriate. The Court 
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appropriate sentence was a period of community service. The sentence of imprisonment was quashed and a 
community service order of 150 hours substituted. The case has a number of interesting features by highlighting 
the problem of “policing” the internet and also raises questions about what is and is not dishonest (a term which 
is not defined in English law but left to the jury to apply). The accused was aware that his actions could be 
illegal, but had convinced himself that, as long as he was not using the device personally, he was not really 
doing anything wrong. This was unsurprisingly rejected by the court. 
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544
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provision was also further amended by the Serious Crime Act, 2015. Section 42 of the 2015 
Act further amended this requirement by the addition of obtaining articles for purposes 
relating to computer misuse. This provision expands the boundaries of culpability for the 
offences under section 3A of the Act in contrast to limiting the ‘obtained things’ to only 
intangible computer programmes and files. Section 28 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act also 
prohibits unlawfully production, supply, adaptation, manipulation or procurement for use, 
importation, exportation, distribution, or sale of any device or computer password for use in 
computer misuse offences. One significant approach to this legislation is the criminalisation 
for the ‘distribution’ of such cybercrime-enabling devices.545 
 
These provisions identify the fact that the availability of sophisticated tools designed to carry 
out cybercrimes has become a serious challenge in the fight against cybercrime.
546
 Section 28 
of the Nigerian Act ratifies Article 14 of the ECOWAS Directive, and are also similar to the 
provisions of Article 6 of the Council of Europe Convention and the recommendations 
provided by Sections 6 (b) and (c) of the ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation.
547
 One of 
the main differences to the COE Convention and the ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation 
is the fact that the section 28 provisions are quite extensive and seeks to include the conducts 
already criminalised under illegal access and illegal modification offences.
548
 Unfortunately, 
the provisions of section 28 of the Nigerian Act does not define what is meant by a serious 
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offence, and also does not include the qualifying requirement of a special intent that the tool 
or software shall be used for the purpose of committing any of the offences. The missing 
requirements with regard to the qualifying mental element requirement could lead to 
difficulties in the application of the provision as the mental element plays an important role in 
avoiding an over-criminalisation regarding the possession of illegal tools.
549
 
 
Since the enactment of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 it became increasingly apparent, over 
time, that it was struggling to deal with new manifestations of computer misuse that were 
unknown and unforeseen at its inception.
550
 The response to pressure from stake-holders and 
the All-Party Internet Group (APIG)
551
 and the decisions such as DPP v Lennon
552
 have 
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of the Act (among other counts), and was sentenced to four months' imprisonment. He was sentenced to a total 
of 2 years imprisonment, which was reconfirmed by the Court of Appeal, while stating that these offences fall 
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highlighted the problems encountered in ‘making, supplying or obtaining articles for use in 
computer misuse offences,’ and in the particular context of the so-called ‘denial-of-service’ 
attacks where systems are overwhelmed by maliciously sent specious data.
553
 The new 
section 3A of the CMA 1990 despite being beset with problematic drafting
554
, has however, 
been further amended by section 42 of the Serious Crime Act, 2015. This new section 3A 
could arguably be applicable to anyone who produces, buys or supplies things like malware 
or computer viruses even if they are not involved in any other offence; and it could even be 
argued that those using proxies to obtain a UK IP address could be subject to this section as 
could be inferred from the case of R. v Martin above. After the infamous ‘News International 
phone hacking scandal’ in the UK in 2011, and with the emergence of mobile phones with 
3G and 4G networks, there are on-going discussions
555
 about amending the law to define 
"smart" phones (i.e. those with Internet browsers and other connectivity features) as 
computers under the Act. The Standards and Privileges Committee of the Parliament found 
that under section 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) it is only a 
criminal offence to access someone else's voicemail message if they have not already listened 
to it themselves. This means that to prove a criminal offence has taken place it has to be 
proved that the intended recipient had not already listened to the message. Does this suggest 
that the hacking of messages that have already been opened is not a criminal offence?
556
 The 
new amendment under section 42 of the UK Serious Crime Act and the combined provisions 
of sections 28 and 32 of the Nigerian Act prohibits unlawfully production, supply, adaptation, 
                                                 
553
 Stefan Fafinski, 'Computer Misuse: Denial-of-service Attacks’ (ibid); DPP v Lennon (2006) 70 JCL 474. 
554
 The provision of the Act uses broad terms like ‘any article’, which could also potentially include information 
alerting users to known security vulnerabilities in pieces of software. However, most tools used by systems 
administrators and computer forensics investigators are commercially available products used in the course of 
penetration and network auditing or testing purposes. The distinction between the lawful and unlawful use of 
such tools is clear from direct interpretation of the Act, which further might lead to more confusion. 
555
 Parliamentary discussions about amending the law to define "smart" phones are available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmstnprv/628/62805.htm> accessed on 29 
October 2013. 
556
 Ulrich Sieber, 'Legal Aspects of Computer-Related Crime in the Information Society' (1998) COMCRIME-
Study, <www.edc.uoc.gr/~panas/PATRA/sieber.pdf> accessed on 11 June 2015. 
125 
 
manipulation or procurement for use, importation, exportation, distribution, or sale of any 
device or computer password for use in computer misuse offences. This no doubt includes 
publicly disclosing a password for someone's phone or computer so that others can access it 
illegally.
557
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Although different choice of legislative dictions have been adopted in Nigeria and the UK 
provisions (like illegal, unauthorised, or without right) they all connote the same meaning and 
seek to criminalise specific cybercrime activities. The offenders have continued to use 
diversified means in order to avoid detection, so have the laws continued to change. The 
offences under the UK Act are covered under sections 1-3A. Section 3A deals with making, 
supplying or obtaining articles for use in offences under sections 1
558
 or 3.
559
 In order to 
implement the EU Directive and assist in addressing constant advances in technology, the UK 
Government had recently in March 2015 enacted the Serious Crime Act 2015 to extend the 
coverage of the existing offences in the Computer Misuse Act. Article 7 of the EU Directive 
covers the tools used to commit computer offences (e.g. malware). This Article urged 
member states to criminalise act involving the intentional ‘production, sale, procurement for 
use, import, distribution, or otherwise making available’ of tools with the intention that it is 
used to commit any of the further offences in the Directive. 
 
With the increase of the use of malware like botnets to commits cybercrime offence, thereby 
making it almost impossible for the offender to be identified, and in most cases difficult for 
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the UK courts to assume jurisdiction, it was necessary that the UK Computer Misuse Act be 
further amended by the provisions of the Serious Crime Act 2015. Section 3A of the 
Computer Misuse Act met all of the provisions under Article 7 of the EU Directive with the 
exception of the offence of ‘procuring for use’ of such tools. The risk was that that an 
offender acting in isolation and obtaining a tool for personal use to commit a Computer 
Misuse Act offence was not caught by the provisions of section 3A that existed as at the time, 
and the prosecution would need to show that the tool was being obtained with a view to its 
being supplied to commit a Computer Misuse Act offence. Also, individuals can increasingly 
obtain tools such as malware and the knowledge on how to commit a cybercrimes, to commit 
the offence personally and are less likely to need a third party to commit the offence… hence 
the need for the amendment under section 42 of the Serious Crime Act, 2015. 
 
Prior to the enactment of Nigerian Cybercrime Act on 15
th
 May 2015, there was no specific 
legislation for prosecuting cybercrime offences in Nigeria. The other cases/offences against 
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems are now covered 
in the new legislation, which makes extensive provisions for these offences. 
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Chapter Five: CYBERFRAUD AND OTHER RELATED OFFENCES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
With the advancement of technology and the reliance on computers and computer related 
networks there has been a rapid change from the phase of computer crimes to the recent 
phase of cybercrime, which has found in cyberspace an ideal environment for the commission 
of several, varying and modern crimes such as computer related fraud and other related 
offences, like forgery.
560
 New and emerging risks are therefore born with the continuing 
advent of these new technologies.
561
 
 
Legislation on cyber-fraud offences and other related offences has since the evolvement of 
computer technology become intricate areas of the law spanning across differing offences, 
hence the need to enact specific laws providing and protecting people against these 
offences.
562
 As Moitra suggests: “...even though cyber laws have already been and continue 
to be developed, our actual knowledge of cybercrime is still extremely limited. Laws are 
being developed on the basis of presumed technical possibilities of various deviant, harmful 
or dangerous activities over the Internet. These laws also seem to be influenced by individual 
cases and the presumed nature of cybercrime.”563 
 
The protected legal interest in crimes against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
computer data and systems is the integrity of computer information and data itself, while the 
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provisions on computer-related fraud and forgery protect interests in property, financial assets 
and the authenticity of documents.
564
 
 
This chapter discusses cyber-fraud and other related offences in Nigeria and compares them 
with the existing legislative structure in the United Kingdom; and further answers the 
questions relating to the practicability of the existing Nigerian legislation relating to these 
offences. These are analysed under three subheadings: computer-related fraud, computer-
related forgery, and offences related to copyrights and other related rights. 
 
5.2 Computer-related Fraud 
 
Computer fraud are conducts which involve the manipulation of a computer, by whatever 
method, in order dishonestly to obtain money, property or some other advantage of value or 
to cause loss.
565
 Fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation or misstatement involves an act where 
a false statement is made to a person upon whom that person relies on; and as a result or 
consequence of relying on that statement suffers some damages.
566
 Fraud can take the form of 
abuse of position, or false representation, or prejudicing someone's rights for personal gain.
567
 
An estimated £139.6 million of card fraud took place over the internet in 2011; which is an 
increase of 3 per cent from 2010 when e-commerce fraud losses were £135.1 million, which 
now accounts for 63 per cent of card-not-present losses – slightly up from 59 per cent in 
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2010.
568
 Article 8 of the Council of Europe’s Convention on cybercrime enjoins member 
states to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as 
criminal offences under their various domestic law, when committed intentionally and 
without right, the causing of a loss of property to another person by any input, alteration, 
deletion or suppression of computer data; and any interference with the functioning of a 
computer system, with fraudulent or dishonest intent of procuring, without right, and leading 
or resulting to economic benefit for oneself or for another person. The provisions of Article 8 
aim to criminalise any undue manipulation in the course of data processing with the intention 
to affect an illegal transfer of property.
569
 
 
These crimes consist mainly of input manipulations, where incorrect data is fed into the 
computer, or by programme manipulations and other interferences in the course of data 
processing.
570
 A survey of about 160 companies revealed that electronic business fraud is 
twelve times higher than traditional fraud from retailer sales.
571
 This involves deceptive 
behaviors conducted through the Internet in an illegal manner, with financial and personal 
benefits as its major motivations, and includes acts like credit card fraud, fraudulent Internet 
banking sites and advance fee fraud.
572
 The offender must have committed the offence here 
intentionally, and with fraudulent or dishonest intent, without right, and with an economic 
benefit for himself/herself or for another person. 
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In the words of Lord Hardwicke in 1759, “…fraud is infinite, and was a court once to... 
define strictly the species of evidences of it; the jurisdiction would be cramped, and 
perpetually eluded by new schemes which the fertility of man’s invention would contrive.”573 
The general criminal offence of fraud can include the following elements: deception whereby 
someone knowingly makes false representation; or they fail to disclose information; or they 
abuse a position of authority. A civil claim for fraudulent misrepresentation can also lie in 
tort against a defendant under an action for deceit to provide a civil remedy for an individual 
who had relied on a false representation to their detriment.  
 
In the UK, the law governing the ‘traditional fraud’ was governed by The Theft Act 1968. 
Section 15 of the Act provides as follows: “A person who by any deception dishonestly 
obtains property belonging to another, with the intention of permanently depriving the other 
of it? For the purposes of this section 'deception' means any deception (whether deliberate or 
reckless) by words or conduct as to fact or as to law, including a deception as to the present 
intentions of the person using the deception or any other person.” The case of R v 
Sunderland
574
 illustrates the vulnerability of computer systems to criminal activities, and 
shows that the greatest threats of fraud comes from within an organisation; and employees are 
responsible for a great deal of ICT  fraud, or attempted ICT fraud ranging from small 
amounts of money to very large sums indeed.
575
 Another problem faced by the Theft Act 
1968 and the Theft Act 1978 in the UK was the position of offences against intangible 
property which has no physical existence. However, it has been held that confidential 
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information does not constitute property for the purposes of the Theft Act. In Oxford v 
Moss,
576
 the defendant, a student of engineering, took an exam paper with the intention of 
returning the paper having used the information gained in order to cheat in his exam. It was 
held that the information cannot be regarded as property and so cannot be stolen for the 
purposes of the Theft Act 1968. As stated by the Law Commission,
577
 “…computer-enabled 
fraud is not new… it just takes ‘real world’ frauds and uses the Internet as a means of 
reaching the victim. These crimes consist mainly of input manipulations, where incorrect 
data is fed into the computer or by programme manipulations and other interferences with 
the course of data processing”578.  
 
The Fraud Act 2006, took effect in January 2007, and deals with some of the deficiencies, at 
least as far as information and communications technology fraud is concerned, of the Theft 
Act 1968 and the Theft Act 1978. It introduces a completely new general offence of fraud in 
section 1, and other offences which could be committed by false representation,
579
 failure to 
disclose information
580
 and by abuse of position.
581
 Arguably, the key reason for the 
introduction of the Fraud Act was the history of complexity and uncertainty concerning 
offences involving deception, and the introduction of these general offences.
582
 It has also 
been argued that this intended to provide a substantial scope to ensure that cyber-crime can 
be targeted by this provision.
583
 This makes provisions for offences such as phishing and 
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spoofing that were not provided for in of the Theft Act 1968 and the Theft Act 1978. The 
Police and Justice Act 2006 (the “PJA”) was later introduced to make some amendments to 
the CMA.
584
 According to Bainbridge, the prosecution has most often appeared to prefer 
more general legislation, like the Theft Act 1968, when dealing with issues of fraud involving 
computers, as such legislation is regarded as having “inherent flexibility and freedom from 
the technicalities of the Computer Misuse Act.”585  
 
On the other hand, Article 29(d) of the African Union Convention also urged member states 
to take necessary legislative and/or regulatory measures to make it a criminal offence to 
fraudulently procure, for oneself or for another person, any benefit by inputting, altering, 
deleting or suppressing computerized data or any other form of interference with the 
functioning of a computer system. This provision was also restated in Article 10 of the 
ECOWAS Directives on Cybercrime which show similarities to Articles 8 of the Budapest 
Convention and section 8 of the ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation. These regional 
provisions are ratified by section 14 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act, which makes two 
different provisions on computer related fraud. The first provision in section 14(1) provides 
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for fraudulent acts on the computer system,
586
 while the second provision provides for 
computer related fraud by false representation.
587
 
 
Section 14(1) makes it an offence for any person who knowingly and without authority or in 
excess of authority causes any loss of property to another by altering, erasing, inputting or 
suppressing any data held in any computer, whether or not for the purpose of conferring any 
economic benefits for himself or another person.
588
 A very interesting aspect of this 
legislation is the provision regarding the resultant effect of the offence, which states that it is 
immaterial whether the purpose of the criminal act was to confer any economic benefit to the 
offender or another person.
589
 The offence here is completed when the victims suffers a loss a 
result of the offender’s criminal act on the data held on the computer system.590 
 
Section 14(2) of the Act goes further to make it an offence for any person with the intent to 
defraud to send electronic message to a recipient, where such electronic message materially 
misrepresents any fact or set of facts upon which reliance the recipient or another person is 
caused to suffer any damage or loss. This provision, like the preceding provision in section 
14(1), considers the offence completed on the proof that the victim suffered loss upon 
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reliance on the misrepresentation made by the offender.
591
 The provision of section 14(2) of 
the 2015 Act bears utmost resemblance to the provisions of section 1 of the Nigeria Advance 
Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006.
592
 One striking importance of the 
provision of the Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006 is the 
provision of section 1(1) which started with the phrase: ‘Notwithstanding anything contained 
in any other enactment or law’. This phrase is not contained in section 14 of the Cybercrime 
Act, and seems to give a subtle suggestion that the provisions contained in Advance Fee 
Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006, supersedes every other provision related 
to Fraud and other related activities. This suggestions is strengthened by the fact that section 
1(3) which prescribes a harsher punishment of imprisonment for a term of not more than 20 
years and not less than seven years without the option of a fine, for offenders convicted of any 
of the fraud-related offences.
593
 This creates a situation where the prosecution are given 
options to pick and choose which legislation to use, and leaves no room for consistency.
594
 
 
Section 419 of the Criminal Code Act (applicable in the Southern Nigeria) makes it a 
criminal felony punishable by 3 years imprisonment for any person who by any false 
pretence, and with intent to defraud, to obtain from any other person anything capable of 
being stolen, or induces any other person to deliver to any person anything capable of being 
stolen.
595
 A very interesting part of this provision is the use of the clause ‘anything capable of 
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 edn, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012). 
592
 Mohamed Chawki, et al, “419 Scam: An Evaluation of Cybercrime and Criminal Code in Nigeria”, (2015) 
Cybercrime, Digital Forensics and Jurisdiction, 129-144; See also EIgbadon E Gregory and Adejuwon A. 
Grace, 'Psychodemographic Factors Predicting Internet Fraud Tendency among Youths in South-western, 
Nigeria' (2015) Journal of Educational and Social Research 5.2, 159.   
593
 See Abiola Idowu and Kehinde A. Obasan, 'Anti-Money Laundering Policy and Its Effects on Bank 
Performance in Nigeria' (2012) Business Intelligence Journal, 6, 367-373. 
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 E Inyang, Z Peter, and N Ejor, 'The Causes of the Ineffectiveness of Selected Statutory Anti-Corruption 
Establishments in Fraud Prevention and Control in the Nigerian Public Sector' (2014) Research Journal of 
Finance and Accounting, 5(5), 163-170. 
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 Uche Onyebadi and Jiwoo Park, ‘I’m Sister Maria. Please help me’: A lexical study of 4-1-9 international 
advance fee fraud email communications (2012) International Communication Gazette, 74(2), 181-199. 
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being stolen’. This provision except the use of the phrase ‘anything capable of being stolen’ 
bears utmost semblance to the provisions of section 1 of the Advance Fee Fraud and other 
Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006, and section 14 of the Cybercrime Act 2015.
596
 Under the 
Penal Code (as applicable to the Northern Nigeria), the offence is covered by the offences of 
cheating
597
 and cheating by personation.
598
 
 
An offender could alternately be charged under section 421 of the Nigerian Criminal Code 
Act
599
 which provides that: “Any person who by means of any fraudulent trick or device 
obtains from any other person anything capable of being stolen, or induces any other person 
to deliver to any person anything capable of being stolen or to pay or deliver to any person 
any money or goods, or any greater sum of money or greater quantity of goods than he would 
have paid or delivered but for such trick or device, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable 
to imprisonment for two years. A person found committing the offence may be arrested 
without warrant.” 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Maitanmi Olusola, et al, 'Cybercrimes and cyber laws in Nigeria”, (2013) The International Journal of 
Engineering and Science (IJES), 2(4), 19-25. 
596
 The elements of the offence as enunciated in the case of Alake v. The state (1991) 7 NWLR Pt 205 pg. 567 at 
591, and reiterated in Onwudiwe v. FRN (2006) 10 NWLR Pt 988 pg. 382 at 429-430 are as follows: “There is a 
pretence; The pretence emanated from the accused person; The pretence was false; The accused person knew of 
its falsity or did not believe in its truth; There was an intention to defraud; The things is capable of being stolen; 
and the accused person induced the owner to transfer his whole interest in the property” 
597
 Section 320 of the Penal Code. See also Timothy Yerima and Olubayo Oluduro, 'Criminal law protection of 
property: A Comparative Critique of the Offences of Stealing and Theft in Nigeria' (2012) Jorn of Pol & L, 5, 
167; Akeem Olajide Bello, 'United Nations and African Union Conventions on Corruption and Anti-corruption 
Legislations in Nigeria: A Comparative Analysis' (2014) Afr J Int'l & Comp L, 22, 308. 
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Trends and Prospects for the Future' (2013) Acta Universitatis Danubius, Juridica, (1), 15-37. 
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 See Okay Benedict Agu, 'Economic Crimes and National Security: Nigerian Perspective' (2012), Law and 
Security in Nigeria, 3; See also John O Odumesi, 'Combating the Menace of Cybercrime' (2014) IJCSMC, Vol 
3, Issue 6, June 2014, 980–991. 
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5.2i Things Capable of Being Stolen: Computer Data/Document? 
 
The unquantifiable value to be attributed to computer data and information combined with 
problems imposed by techno-legal barriers to the public perception of the value of the 
intellectual property contained therein have since become issues for various discussion.
600
 
Section 382 of the Criminal Code contains several examples of things that are capable of 
being stolen. According to the section, every non-living thing which is the property of 
another and is capable of being made movable is capable of being stolen.
601
 Things capable 
of being stolen include ‘every inanimate thing whatever which is the property of any person 
and which is moveable; capable of being made moveable; tame animal, except pigeons; a 
thing in action; wild animals being property of any person; everything produced or forming 
part of an animal and an ostrich on an enclosed ostrich farm.’602 Under section 286(2) of the 
Penal Code, electricity or electric current is capable of being stolen by being abstracted, 
diverted or consumed. These provisions therefore seem to only make reference to tangibles. 
Tangibles are equivalent to the Roman res corporals, and intangibles equivalent to res 
incorporales. “Res corporales are according to the legal definition physical things that can be 
touched; and res incorporales are things which do not admit of being handled ...”603 It is 
therefore seriously in doubt if computer software, codes and other encrypted information 
could be said to fall within the description of the Act as things capable of being stolen.
604
 
                                                 
600
 Erik Brynjolfsson, 'The productivity paradox of information technology' (1993) Communications of the 
ACM, 36(12), 66-77; Wencke Baesler, 'Technological Protection Measures in the United States, the European 
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Technology, Vol 8, <www.vjolt.net/vol8/issue3/v8i3_a13-Baesler.pdf > accessed on 15 June 2015; Marcela 
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Management, 21(7), 1075-1090. 
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offences of stealing and theft in Nigeria' (2012) J Pol & L, 5, 167; See also Antonio Cassese, et al, International 
criminal law: cases and commentary, (1
st
 edn, Oxford University Press 2011). 
602
 Section 383(1) of the Criminal Code Act 
603
 Per Lord Kinnear in Burghead Harbour Co v George (1906) 8 F 982.   
604
 K. Oloso and Ibrahim O. Uthman, 'The Application of Al-Uqubat (Islamic Criminal Law) In Contemporary 
Nigerian Society: Current Issues and the Way Out' (2011) International Journal of Advanced Legal Studies and 
Governance, 2 (1), 57, 74; In St Albans City and District Council v International Computers Ltd (1997) FSR 
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The traditional offence of fraud carries a wider implication than impugning the truth or 
justification of a document.
605
 At common law, the core foundation of fraud is deceit, which 
on its own requires proof of the intention to mislead and false representation. In other words, 
fraud is proved when it is shown that the offender has made false representation knowingly, 
recklessly or without belief in the truth of the misrepresentation thereof.
606
  
 
It is however evident from both the provisions of the Nigerian Criminal Code Act and 
Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act are ill-suited for cyberspace 
criminal governance and punishments for the offences thereof. Oriola
607
 had argued that: 
“…although section 419 of the Criminal Code Act deems advance fee fraud a felony, the 
provision that an advance fee fraud suspect cannot be arrested without a warrant, unless 
found committing the offence, does not reflect the crime’s presence or perpetration in 
cyberspace.”608 Only in rare circumstances could a suspect be caught in the act because most 
of the scam emails are sent from Internet cafe´s in Nigeria.
609
 Aside from the fact that the 
country lacks the resources to police every known cyber cafe´,
610
 doing so could actually 
                                                                                                                                                        
251, the Court in deciding on whether programs were goods, commented on tangibility. The Court referred to 
the program as the ‘intangible instructions or commands and to the program itself’. There seems to be no other 
UK cases touching on the tangibility of programs. In District of Columbia v Universal Computer Associates 
(1972) 465 F 2d 615 (DC. 1972), one of the earliest cases, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held that programs were intangible, the tangible storage media was not the true object of the transaction, 
and therefore the programs were exempt from sale tax. 
605
 Ojibah v. Ojibah (991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 191) 296, Per NNAEMEKA AGU, J.S.C. (P. 293, paras. A-C) 
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 Afegbai v Attorney General of Edo State & Anor (2001) 11 SCM 42. 
607
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Computer Law & Security Review, 241. 
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 F. Wada and G. O Odulaja, 'Electronic Banking and Cyber Crime in Nigeria-A Theoretical Policy 
Perspective on Causation' (2012), 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.411.2862&rep=rep1&type=pdf> accessed on 24 
June 2015.  
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 Aso Kalu Etea, 'The Legality of Trust Receipts in Nigeria' (2012) 
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610
 Section 7(1) of the Cybercrime Act now requires all cybercafé operators to register all cybercafés and 
maintain a register of users through a sign-in register. 
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raise privacy or other rights issues.
611
 If found guilty, an advance fee fraudster is liable to 
three years imprisonment or seven years if the value of stolen property exceeds 1000 Naira. 
Thirdly, in criminal trials, the State is the complainant, and there is hardly any compensation 
for victims of crime under the Nigerian criminal justice system.
612
 The victims could no 
doubt resort to civil court for remedies. However, the prospects for success for the plaintiff in 
the typical advance fee fraud case scenario are extremely slim.
613
 This clearly illustrates the 
inadequacies of the traditional legislations in combating cybercrime offences. Going by the 
provision of section 382 of the Criminal Code Act, it is quite deductible that it is not every 
property that is capable of being stolen.
614
 As intellectual property is not listed as properties 
capable of being stolen, it is rather questionable if they fall within the remits of sections 418 
or 419 of the Criminal Code Act.
615
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21(3), 237-248; Alex Ozoemelem Obuh and Ihuoma Sandra Babatope 'Cybercrime Regulation: The Nigerian 
Situation' (2010) Frameworks for ICT Policy: Government, Social and Legal Issues: Government, Social and 
Legal Issues, 98. 
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 Edwin Agwu, 'Reputational risk impact of internal frauds on bank customers in Nigeria' (2014) International 
Journal of Development and Management Review, 9(1), 175-192; See also, James O Abiola, 'Anti-Money 
Laundering in Developing Economy: A PEST Analysis of Nigeria Situation' (2014) Lagos State University, 
Lagos Nigeria <http://www.apexjournal.org/jbamsr/archive/2014/Apr/fulltext/Abiola.pdf> accessed on 24 June 
2015.  
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 Mary Imelda Obianuju Nwogu, 'Copyright Law and the Menace of Piracy in Nigeria' (2015) Journal of Law, 
Policy and Globalization, 34, 113-129 <http://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JLPG/article/viewFile/20335/20759> 
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With the enactment of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act, it is unarguable that the combined 
provisions of sections 14 and 20
616
 are all-encompassing, as they have made extensive 
provisions to criminalise various forms of computer-related fraud. For ease of appreciating 
the facets of computer-related fraud offences in the Nigerian jurisprudence, they will be 
analysed in this research under three different headings of: fraud by false representation; 
fraud by failing to disclose information; and fraud by abuse of position.  
 
5.2ii Computer Fraud by false representation 
 
Computer fraud by false representation is the type of fraud offences provided by section 2 of 
the Fraud Act 2006 in the United Kingdom; and under section 14(2) of the Nigerian 
Cybercrime Act. The conducts under these offences were previously prosecuted with the 
provisions of section 1(1) of the Nigeria Advance Fee Fraud Act, 2006. A person could be 
culpable for the commission of this offence when the person dishonestly makes a false 
representation intending to make a gain for himself or another, or to cause loss to another, or 
to expose another to risk of loss.
617
 According to Section 23 of the Nigerian Advance Fee 
Fraud Act,
618
 “False pretence means a representation, whether deliberate or reckless, made 
by word, in writing or by conduct, of a matter of fact or law, either past or present, which 
representation is false in fact or law, and which the person making it knows to be false or 
does not believe to be true.” 
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 Section 20 of the Act makes provisions for fraudulent issuance of E- Instructions by employers of any 
financial institution who issues false electronic or verbal messages with the intent to defraud. 
617
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An example of this offence is phishing, whereby a person attempts through the use of 
electronic communication (emails, text messages, Facebook, Skype or WhatsApp
619
) to 
acquire information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card details (and sometimes, 
indirectly, money) by masquerading as a trustworthy service provider, and without the 
knowledge or consent of the victim.
620
 As aptly decided in National Association of Software 
and Service Companies v Sood,
621
 communications purporting to be from popular social web 
sites, auction sites, online payment processors or IT administrators are usually used to lure 
the unsuspecting public, and therefore comes within the confines of this offence. Phishing 
emails may contain links to websites that are infected with malware.
622
 Phishing is an 
example of social engineering techniques used to deceive users,
623
 and exploits the poor 
usability of current web security technologies.
624
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 Travis C Pratt, Kristy Holtfreter, and Michael D. Reisig, 'Routine online activity and internet fraud targeting: 
Extending the generality of routine activity theory' (2010) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 47 
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 (2005) F.S.R. 38, (High Court India) where the plaintiff (N), an Indian software association, had sought a 
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purportedly originating from N or from using N's trade mark NASSCOM. N alleged that S had masqueraded as 
N to obtain personal information from various addresses, an activity known as "phishing", and had then used the 
data for recruitment purposes. An interim injunction was granted to prevent S from using the name NASSCOM 
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Computer Systems and Industrial Informatics (ICCSII), 2012 International Conference on (pp. 1-5), IEEE. 
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Network World' (January 22, 2008) <http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/012208-drive-by-
pharming.html> accessed on 7 April 2013. 
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 In R v Bryn Wellman (2007) EWCA Crim. 2874, the offender was convicted for a variety computer fraud 
related offences involving the misuse of the internet to obtain unauthorised access to details of individuals’ 
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The mens rea requirements to secure a conviction for an accused person for these offences 
are that the representation made by the accused must be made dishonestly,
625
 in addition to 
proof of the offender’s intention to make a gain or cause loss by making the representation.626 
Also, the false representation must relate to a past or present matter; if it merely relates to the 
future then this will not amount to false representation.
627
 Although a representation may 
relate to the future, if the material part of it relates to the present, this will amount to false 
representation.
628
 
 
5.2iii Computer Fraud by failing to disclose information 
 
This form of computer fraud offences occur when a person dishonestly fails to disclose to 
another person information (material fact) which he is under a legal duty to disclose, and 
intends, by failing to disclose the information, to make a gain for himself or another, or to 
cause loss to another or to expose another person to risk of loss.
629
 A material fact is a fact 
which, if known, would have affected the judgment of one or more of the parties to a 
transaction.
630
 In a case of fraud, a material fact must be of sufficient importance to the matter 
                                                                                                                                                        
computer to read keystrokes and thus to obtain compromising personal information, and then to use that 
compromised financial data. The success of the scheme relied on it being fed by a steady supply of 
compromised credit card details. The Trojan programme was found on a lap-top computer seized from the 
appellant which targeted confidential data and associated personal information. Trojan would invade a remote 
computer, collect the user's name and password and give it back to the person deploying it. He was convicted 
and sentenced to a total of twelve years' imprisonment, but this was reduced to ten years on appeal. The court of 
appeal stated in their judgment that it is hard to imagine a more sophisticated and determined course of criminal 
conduct in this sphere of offending. 
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that a reasonable person would have been likely to rely on it.
631
 This could take the form of 
online transactions involving omissions like electronic submission of tax returns while 
omitting to include material facts that will affect the accruable tax, road tax fund, television 
licence;
632
 and failure to notify the benefits agencies of material changes that will affect the 
amount to benefits being received by a person.
633
 
 
The nature and extent of the legal duty is not defined in the UK legislation, but is likely to 
involve the principles enunciated in R v. Firth.
634
 This type of fraudulent offences could 
occur in the form of confidence fraud, which is, the reliance on another’s discretion and/or a 
breach in a relationship of trust resulting in financial loss.
635
 It also includes a knowing 
misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his 
or her detriment.
636
 The Nigerian letter scam (usually referred to as '419 scam')
637
 is a very 
good example of this type of cyber-fraud.
638
 This can also take the form of the banking and 
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insurance fraud,
639
 and obtaining credit through fraud.
640
 Insurance fraud occurs when any act 
is committed with the requisite intention to fraudulently obtain some benefit or advantage to 
which they are not otherwise entitled or someone knowingly denies some benefit that is due 
and to which someone is entitled.
641
 Banking fraud on the other hand takes the form of 
knowingly executing or attempting to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial 
institution or to obtain property owned by or under the control of a financial institution by 
means of false or fraudulent pretences, representations, or promises.
642
 The case of R v 
Thompson
643
 provides an apt description of a Banking Fraud. This case however portrays one 
                                                                                                                                                        
bank accounts through which approximately £500,000 had passed over a 15 month period. He pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy to defraud and was sentenced of six years' imprisonment, but on appeal, this was reduced to five 
years imprisonment after the Court took into consideration his previous good character and the fact that he was 
not the architect of the conspiracy. 
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found no merit on the appeal, as they held that the offence was committed at the moment when the Kuwaiti 
manager read and acted upon Thompson’s letter, and this had conferred the requisite jurisdiction on the English 
courts to adequately adjudicate on the matter that was properly before it. 
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of the major obstacles that continue to globally affect the procedural enforcements of the laws 
of cybercrime --- Jurisdiction. 
 
5.2iv Computer Fraud by abuse of position 
 
This specie of cyber-fraud occurs when a person who occupies a position in which he is 
expected to safeguard, or not, to acts against the financial interests of another person, 
dishonestly abuses that position, and intends by means of the abuse of that position to make a 
gain for himself or another, or to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of 
loss.
644
 A person may be regarded as having abused his position even though his conduct 
consisted of an omission rather than an act.
645
 This offence can only be committed by 
someone who is entrusted to safeguard or not act against another's financial interests.
646
 This 
form of the offence was deliberately not limited to those in recognised fiduciary positions, 
but it was devised with fiduciaries in mind.
647
 The accused person must have been acting 
dishonestly with the intent of making a gain for himself or anyone else, or inflicting a loss (or 
a risk of loss) on another.
648
 
 
The relationship may arise between employer and employee, trustee and beneficiary, director 
and company, professional person and client, agent and principal, and between two 
                                                 
644
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partners.
649
 From the practical sense, it could be inferred that it was not the intention of the 
legislature that the section should be limited to those situations and there is a presumption 
that it would be a question of fact, in any case, whether an appropriate relationship existed 
between the parties.
650
 The term ‘abuse’ is not defined either in the UK or the Nigerian Act, 
but there is always a rebuttable presumption that it is the legislatures’ intention to include 
situations where someone takes advantage of his position to make a secret profit without full 
disclosure.
651
 
 
5.2v The Elements of Computer-related Fraud 
 
 
The traditional elements/ingredients of committing fraud are still valid on all cases of 
computer fraud that are committed through the cyberspace.
652
 These elements include:  
(a) the defendant had used incorrect or incomplete information;
653
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(b) altered data or programs, or otherwise unlawfully influenced the result of computer 
operations;
654
 
(c) caused a loss of property or a risk of loss to anyone;
655
 
(d) with the intention of procuring an unlawful economic gain for himself or for another 
person (mens rea).
656
 
 
5.3 Computer-related Forgery 
 
Article 7 of the Budapest Convention urges member states to criminalise all forms of 
computer-related forgery and “...international…input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of 
data resulting in inauthentic data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal 
purposes as if it were authentic.”657  
 
Computer-related forgery can be likened to any intentional act of creating or altering of 
stored data in order to give it a different value in legal transactions without the consent of the 
owner.
658
 The protected legal interest is the security and reliability of electronic data which 
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was intentionally or maliciously created and/or deleted.
659
 The problems that are often 
envisaged here is the nature of the document that is being passed off as the real one.
660
 As 
these documents could be in the form of encrypted data, online/computer data, or even 
physical data being suppressed or altered and then passed off as the real document, it 
becomes very difficult to decipher their authenticity.
661
 With the advent of technology and the 
emergence of computers and all other related networks, the act of forgery has taken a new 
dimension into the cyber world.
662
 Computer related forgery can occur when a person creates, 
alters, or deletes any data contained in any computer or computer network with the intent to 
deceive.
663
 
 
Computer-related forgery involves unauthorized creating or altering stored data so that they 
acquire a different evidentiary value in the course of legal transactions, which relies on the 
authenticity of information contained in the data, subject to a deception.
664
 The traditional 
offence of forgery involves the art of passing off a copy of something as the real article.
665
 
Computers (and very recently, smart phones) can be very useful for passing off documents as 
the real document. This makes it so easy to manipulate electronic documents and digital 
information. This is because digital information can be copied, resized and easily 
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manipulated with very little evidence of alteration or replication having taken place, and 
effectively passing it off as the real document.
666
  
 
In the UK, section 1 of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, makes it an offence for a 
person to make a false instrument with the intention of using it to induce somebody to accept 
it as genuine.
667
 The use of the term 'false instrument' in Section 1 of the Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act, could take the form of a floppy disk, USB pen drives, smart phones or 
other device upon which information is recorded,
668
 as well as physical documents, articles 
and images and other documents already scanned and being stored in any electronic storage 
device.
669
  
 
Although its application proved to be somewhat disastrous in the case of R v Gold,
670
 there is 
no doubt that the provisions of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 could be 
successfully applied to most instances of computer-related forgery. In R v Gold, the 
defendants were charged under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, but could not be 
convicted on the grounds that the use of recorded electronic information did not fall under the 
definition of ‘false instrument'. Also as at the material time, the act of hacking had not been 
incriminated by any legislation, and the hacker was relatively free to attempt to break into 
computer systems using his/her skills to bypass various computer security measures. It 
became very clear that there was an urgent need to make laws incriminating hacking, and 
make effective and enforceable the provisions of the said laws. This necessitated the clamour 
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for legislation to make provision for securing computer material against unauthorised access 
or modification and for other related purposes, leading to the later emergence to the 
Computer Misuse Act.
671
 In R v Governor of Brixton Prison and Another Ex parte Levin,
672
 
which involved extradition proceedings, the United States Government sought the extradition 
of the accused person to face trial on 66 charges concerning his alleged unauthorised access 
to a bank's computer in the United States in order to transfer funds into various bank accounts 
controlled by him. The accused had gained access to the U.S. computer using his computer in 
Russia. The charges translated under English criminal law into offences of theft, forgery, 
false accounting and unauthorised modification of computer material. The magistrate 
committed the accused to custody to await the direction of the Secretary of State. By an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus the accused challenged his committal on the grounds 
that, inter alia, the computer printout records were hearsay and could not be admitted under 
section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 since that section did not apply to 
extradition proceedings, which were not criminal proceedings within section 72 of that Act; 
that the accused had not committed offences of forgery and false accounting under English 
law because by entering a computer password and other information he had not created an 
instrument within sections 1 and 8(1)(d) of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981; and 
that, the appropriation having taken place in Russia, where the computer keyboard was 
situated, the English courts had no jurisdiction. The court in dismissing the application 
decided that the ‘disc’ in section 8(1) (d) of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 
embraced the information stored as well as the medium on which it was stored and a 
computer disk was an ‘instrument’ for the purposes of sections 1 and 8(1) (d) of that Act; and 
that by entering false instructions onto the disk it was falsified. The Court further held that 
the applicant had created a false instrument by inserting unauthorised instructions onto the 
                                                 
671
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disk. In the present case it was concluded, unlike in R v Gold where data was held by the 
victim only momentarily, the data, “…were inserted onto the disk with the purpose that they 
should be recorded, stored, and acted upon. The instructions purported to be authorised 
instructions given by the Bank Artha Graha to Citibank. They were not authorised and in our 
view the disk with the instructions recorded and stored on it amounted to a false 
instrument.
673
 The English case of R v. Gold,
674
 clearly depicts the problem that could arise as 
a result of loopholes created in legislative drafting.
675
 
 
Article 10 of the ECOWAS Convention on cybercrime on the other hand, makes specific 
provisions on computer-related forgery. It urges member states to criminalise all acts by 
which a person who produces or manufactures a set of digital data through fraudulent input, 
deletion or suppression of computerized data stored, processed or transmitted by a computer 
system, resulting in counterfeit data, with the intent that it be considered or used for legal 
purposes as if it were genuine. The diction used by the African Union Convention is rather 
different. It urged member states to take the necessary legislative and/or regulatory measures 
to criminalise acts related to “…intentionally input, alter, delete, or suppress computer data, 
resulting in inauthentic data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal 
purposes as if it were authentic, regardless of whether or not the data is directly readable 
and intelligible”.676 Apart from the missing criminalisation of the act of ‘alteration’ as used 
in the Budapest and the African Union Conventions, the provisions of Article 10 of the 
ECOWAS Directive followed a similar approach as defined by Article of the 7 Budapest 
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Convention and Article 29(2)(b) of the African Union Convention, and likewise on section 7 
of the ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation. 
 
Section 13 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act had in trying to adopt these regional legislation, 
prescribed a term of not less than three years or a fine of not less than seven million naira 
upon conviction, against any offender who knowingly accesses any computer or network and 
inputs, alters, deletes or suppresses any data resulting in inauthentic data with the intention 
that such inauthentic data will be considered or acted upon as if it were authentic or genuine. 
It is not a defence that such data is directly unreadable or unintelligible.
677
  
 
In enacting this law and making specific provision for computer related forgery, the Nigerian 
Legislature has taken a very bold step in the right direction for the Nigeria legal system and 
the fight against cybercrime. This is because, ordinarily, cybercrime offences involving 
forgery were prosecuted with the traditional offence of forgery as provided in sections 463 to 
466 of the Criminal Code Act.
678
 The Nigerian Court of Appeal had recently in the case of 
Moore v. Federal Republic of Nigeria
679
 restated that the following elements of the offence 
that must be proved in a case of forgery to secure the conviction of the offender are that; the 
documents in question must be a false document; it must have been made or forged by the 
accused person; with intent to defraud any other person; the other person (the victim) must 
                                                 
677
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have been induced to believe that the document is genuine.
680
 The Court further held that to 
be guilty of the offence of forgery the prosecution must prove these ingredients to establish 
the offence against an accused person. According to the Court, ‘…they are the forgering (sic) 
of a document, writing, and a seal.”681 Surprisingly, section 463 of the Criminal Code Act 
merely defines documents that can be forged as: “a register or register-book... any book, 
paper, parchment or other material whatever, used for writing or printing... capable of 
conveying a definite meaning to persons conversant with them...”682 
 
Section 58 of the Cybercrime Act defines “data” as representations of information or of 
concepts that are being prepared or have been prepared in a form suitable for use in a 
computer. There is no mention of computer data in the Nigerian Criminal Code, and no 
definition of what constitutes a ‘document’ was also proffered in the Cybercrime Act. There 
is no doubt that this is a very big legislative lacuna, and the legal principle of ‘expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius’ could easily be arguable to the fact that the express mention of one or 
more things of a particular class may be regarded as impliedly excluding others.
683
 An 
implied exclusion argument lies whenever there is reason to believe that if the legislature had 
meant to include a particular thing within the ambit of its legislation, it would have referred 
to that thing expressly.
684
 Because of this expectation, the legislature’s failure to mention the 
thing becomes grounds for inferring that it was deliberately excluded.
685
 Although there is no 
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express exclusion, it may be arguable in the circumstance.
686
 Forgery would therefore only be 
deemed to have occurred only after the information has been processed and printed out or 
passed over to a third party. It does not envisage documents altered and shared in any 
information/data storage, like a hard disk, floppy drive or cloud drive. This explains the 
common practice where the law enforcement officers in Nigeria, while arresting offenders 
purported to have committed computer related forgeries, would print the pages out and ask 
the offenders to sign.
687
 While this is also an issue of admissibility and the weight to be 
adduced to such evidence, it nevertheless exposes the lacunae in the Nigeria adjectival law of 
computer related forgery as well, especially where the provisions of section 463 of the 
Criminal Code Act made no mention of computer data as ‘document’ capable of being 
forged. Section 36(12) of the 1999 Constitution re-iterates the fact that an offence must be 
capable of precise definition, and expressly provides that “…a person shall not be convicted 
of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined and the penalty thereof prescribed in a 
written law; and a written law refers to an Act of the National Assembly or a law of a State.” 
 
5.4 Offences related to the Infringement of Copyrights and other related Rights 
 
5.4i Internet and Copyright 
 
The dawn of information age and the advancement of technology in the reproduction of 
information and intellectual goods
688
 seem to have created a favourable tool for infringement 
of protected rights to copyright, and selling of another’s intellectual works have become easy 
and less expensive. Copyright infringement, production of fake, sub-standard and unlicensed 
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products have also sky-rocketed.
689
 Infringements of intellectual property rights, in particular 
of copyright, are among the most commonly committed offences on the Internet, which cause 
concern both to copyright holders and those who work professionally with computer 
networks.
690
 The reproduction and dissemination on the internet of protected works, without 
the approval of the copyright holder have become extremely frequent.
691
  Article 10 of the 
Council of Europe Convention urges member states to adopt such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish the infringement of copyright as criminal offences 
under their domestic law. This provision is however pursuant to the obligations the member-
state has undertaken under the Paris Act of 24 July 1971 revising the Bern Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights
692
 and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
693
 This undertaken is 
however limited to any moral rights conferred by such conventions, where such acts are 
committed wilfully, on a commercial scale and by means of a computer system.
694
 Paragraph 
1 of Article 10 of Council of Europe Convention provides for criminal sanctions against 
infringements of copyright by means of a computer system while Paragraph 2 deals with the 
infringement of related rights by means of a computer system. The major actors and key 
reference instruments used by the Council of Europe Convention are the World Trade 
Organization and the TRIPS Agreement, as well as the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
695
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The EU Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC also contain provisions similar to Article 6 of the 
Council of Europe Convention, in that it declares unlawful misuse of devices primarily 
targeted at circumventing copyright-protection measures of copyrighted works.
696
 More 
recently, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) aimed to consolidate criminal 
provisions on wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or related intellectual property 
rights on a commercial scale.
697
 The most common computer related copyright offences in 
the UK are: exchange of copyright-protected music albums, files and software in file-sharing 
systems;
698
 and the circumvention of digital rights management systems.
699
 Copyright is 
always perceived as intangible, incorporeal property.
700
 It nevertheless guarantees the owner 
the exclusive right to deal with his/her work within a stipulated time as provided under the 
law. Copyright and related rights are today perceived as instruments for development,
701
 as 
well as providing a secured and stable environment for developmental activities.
702
 Civil 
remedies can be sought by way of compensation and/or an order for perpetual injunction in 
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respect of any breach of intellectual property rights.
703
 Copyright law originated in the United 
Kingdom from a concept of common law, and the Statute of Anne 1710. The law became 
statutory with the passing of the Copyright Act 1911. This Act introduced for the first time 
the concept of the author of a work being the owner of its copyright, and laid out fixed terms 
of protection. Following this Act, copyrighted works were required to be deposited at specific 
copyright libraries, and registered at Stationers’ Hall. There was no automatic copyright 
protection for unpublished works. Copyright legislation remained uncoordinated at an 
international level until the late 19th century. In 1886, the Berne Convention was introduced 
to provide mutual recognition of copyright between nation states, and to promote the 
development of international standards for copyright protection. The Berne Convention 
remains in force to this day, and continues to provide the basis for international copyright law 
(as could be seen from the provisions of Article 10 of the Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime). 
 
In the UK legislation, the protection of copyright material from devices and services designed 
to circumvent technological measures (implementing the EC Copyright Directive 
2001/29/EC) comes under the realm of the traditional criminal laws of copyrights.
704
 The 
current act is the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988 (as amended),
705
 which 
criminalises all intentional acts of making, distribution, importation, sale or hire of the 
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purported goods or things sought to be copyrighted.
706
 The law gives the creators of literary, 
dramatic, musical, artistic works, sound recordings, broadcasts, films and typographical 
arrangement of published editions, rights to control the ways in which their material may be 
used.
707
 The rights cover broadcast and public performance, copying, adapting, issuing, 
renting and lending copies to the public. The length of time, term, for which a copyright work 
may enjoy protection in the UK has varied considerably over time. 
 
The tensions between the current copyright regime and new patterns of consumption and 
unauthorised use of intellectual property have engendered a lot of debate in academia, 
amongst legal scholars and corporate actors.
708
 As the internet was precisely designed to be 
versatile in adapting to and bypassing disruptions, new loopholes have continued to emerge, 
making it near impossible for the content industries to keep up with innovations in terms of 
content distribution among peers and new ways of circumventing copyrights protections. 
Currently in the UK, online copyright infringement,
709
 is only punishable by a maximum of 2 
years By comparison, the maximum sentence for infringement of physical goods is 10 
years.
710
 Gowers Review of Intellectual Property offences and the applicable sanctions
711
 as 
applicable to the United Kingdom drew attention to the discrepancy between the maximum 
penalties for physical and online offences and recommended that this be addressed. In the 
course of debating the Intellectual Property Bill (now the Intellectual Property Act 2014), the 
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UK Government agreed to look again at this area, since industry stakeholders remain in no 
doubt that online infringement is a substantial problem that continues to evolve and grow, 
and that the discrepancy in penalties prevents it from being adequately addressed. The central 
argument for change was summarised by Mike Weatherley MP,
712
 who wrote recently: 
"There is currently a disparity in sentencing between online and offline crime that needs to be 
harmonised. This sends out all the wrong messages. Until this is changed, online crime will 
be seen as less significant than traditional theft."
713
 In line with the above, the UK 
government launched a consultation in July 2015 to increase the maximum sentence for 
commercial-scale online copyright infringement from 2 to 10 years imprisonment. The 
proposals seeks to bring penalties for online offences in consonance with the equivalent 
offline offences relating to the copyright infringement of physical goods.
714
 
 
In the European Community there is a requirement for harmonisation. This is provided for by 
the Directive 2006/116 (the Directive) and of the Council on the Term of Protection or 
Copyright and Certain Related Rights. The Directive came into force on 16 January 2007. 
Directive 93/98 (which has been repealed and replaced by the Directive) was implemented in 
UK law by the Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995/3297 
(the 1995 Regulations), which, in turn, amended the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 (the CDPA).The effect of the Directive is a retrospective one in that it not only extends 
the term of copyright for works in which copyright existed on the introduction date, but 
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revives copyright in those works that had expired.
715
 Following the Directive and section12 
of the CDPA, the standard term for copyright in literary, dramatic and artistic works is the 
author's life and 70 years thereafter. Therefore copyright in such works will expire 70 years 
from the end of the calendar year in which the author dies.
716
 In the case of joint authorship, 
the term is measured from the death of the last qualifying author.
717
 The Copyright and 
Related Right Regulations 2003
718
 however further amended the CDPA to provide for the 
requirement of consent of performers before copies of their performance can be made 
available to the public by electronic transmission. In June 2014 three new statutory 
instruments came into force in the UK, amending the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988.
719
 Implementing EU Directive 2001/29, these statutory instruments updated the 
exceptions and limitations to the rights of performers and copyright around research, 
education, libraries and archives; disability; and public administration. 
 
5.4ia Copyright for Computer Data and Software 
 
Computer programs have been subject to copyright protection in the UK as literary works at 
least since the Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act 1985 came into force.
720
 The 
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1988 Act made specific provision for protection, and was later amended by the Copyright 
(Computer Programs) Regulations 1992 which extended the rules covering literary works to 
include computer programs. These Regulations implemented the EU Software Directive 
(Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer 
programs, now replaced by European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/24/EC of 23 
April 2009). If the work is computer-generated, the copyright expires at the end of the period 
of 50 years from the end of the calendar year in which the work was made.
721
  
 
Article 7 of The Software Directives
722
 provides that the term “computer program” means 
“programs in any form, including those which are incorporated into hardware... preparatory 
design work leading to the development of a computer program provided that the nature of 
the preparatory work is such that a computer program can result from it at a later stage.” 
Also, the Digital Economy Act 2010 makes some provisions for the prevention and 
monitoring of copyright in the cyberspace. The provisions it contain impose new 
responsibilities on Ofcom for implementing measures aimed at significantly reducing online 
copyright infringement.
723
 This Act imposes new duties for Ofcom to report, every three 
years, on the UK’s communications infrastructure, internet domain name registration and 
how media content contributes to the public service objectives.
724
 It also gives new powers 
for the Secretary of State to obtain a court order to block an internet location that is being 
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used in connection with copyright infringement.
725
 Section 42 of this Act however amended 
sections 107 and 198 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, by increasing the 
penalties relating to infringing articles or illicit recordings. 
 
The cases of Navitaire Inc. v EasyJet Airline Company
726
 and Nova Productions Limited v 
Mazooma Games Limited
727
 restate that copyright protection does not extend to the 
functionality, interfaces or programming language of computer program. It can therefore be 
inferred that developing a computer program which has the same or similar functionality and 
interfaces of another computer program would not amount to copyright infringement, but 
copying the programming language which was used to write the said computer program (e.g. 
the source or object code) would amount to copyright infringement.
728
 However in Infopaq 
International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08)
729
 this principle was extended by 
the court as to whether a substantial part of a computer program had been reproduced, the 
functionality, programming language and data file formats were to be disregarded, as they 
were not protected by copyright,
730
 and the court held that a data capture process culminating 
in the act of printing out an extract of 11 words did not fulfil the condition of being 
"transient" for the purposes of Article 5 of Directive 2001/29. Accordingly, the court further 
restated that if the elements reproduced were the expression of the intellectual creation of 
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their author, the process could not be carried out without the consent of the relevant right 
holders.
731
 
 
This same issue was also reconsidered by the High Court in the case of SAS Institute Inc. v 
World Programming Ltd
732
 and followed the decisions in Navitaire Inc. v EasyJet Airline 
Company and Nova Productions Limited v Mazooma Games Limited. In the case of SAS 
Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd, the claimant claimed that the defendant (W) had 
infringed copyright and acted in breach of a licence in creating a computer program. S had 
developed software programs (SAS) for data processing and analysis. The programs were 
written in SAS language, and S's customers had many application programs written in that 
language. They therefore had to license the necessary components in the SAS system in order 
to run their application programs and create new ones. The defendant wrote its own program 
(WPS) to execute application programs written in SAS language. It wrote the program by 
studying the SAS system, but had not copied the SAS source code. The claimant alleged that 
the defendant had copied SAS manuals, indirectly copied the SAS components, used SAS in 
contravention of its licence terms, and infringed copyright in the claimant's manuals. In SAS 
Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd, it should be notable the court found that the 
defendant had infringed the copyright of the SAS manuals. A number of questions were 
referred to the European Court of Justice. In SAS Institute Inc. v World Programming Ltd (C-
406/10) the ECJ concluded that the source code and object code were forms of expression 
which were entitled to protection by copyright. However, the functionality of the program, its 
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programming language and the format of data files were held not to constitute a form of 
expression
733
 and were not protected by copyright.
734
 It also held that copyright could not be 
infringed where the lawful acquirer of a licence merely studied, observed and tested the 
program in order to reproduce its functionality in a second program.
735
 The Claimant had 
alleged that this still amounted to copyright and based their claim on the interpretation and 
application of the Software Directive under English law, as was implemented by the 
Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 1992 which amended the Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 1988. Article 1(2) of the Directive provides that the expression in any form 
of a computer program is protected, but that: "…ideas and principles which underlie any 
element of a computer program, including those which underlie its interfaces, are not 
protected by copyright under this Directive." 
 
Article 13 of the COE Directive states that: “only the expression of a computer program is 
protected and ... ideas and principles which underlie any element of a program, including 
those which underlie its interfaces are not protected by copyright under this Directive.” 
Recital 14 provides that, in accordance with the principle set out in recital 13, “to the extent 
that logic, algorithms and programming languages comprise ideas and principles, those ideas 
and principles are not protected”. Recital`s 13 and 14 have not been incorporated into English 
law under the Copyright (Computer Programs) Regulations 1992.  
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The case of Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v Meltwater Holding BV
736
, restated the 
position that lawful use of the Meltwater media monitoring service requires a licence from 
the owners of copyright in the contents of the websites it monitors.
737
 Recently in Neij v 
Sweden
738
 the European Court of Human Rights upheld the convictions against the 
applicant’s for running a website allowing users to infringe copyright and restated that their 
conviction did not violate Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
739
 The 
applicant had set up a web-site ‘The Pirate Bay’ which is considered to be the world's largest 
and most frequented file-sharing website, available in 34 languages, with an estimated 22 
million simultaneous users worldwide who freely download a huge volume of copyright 
films, music, books, computer games, television programmes, software and other contents. In 
May 2006 the website's offices were raided by the police investigating various allegations of 
copyright violations. The website was up and running again a few days after the raid. In 
January 2008 the prosecutor filed criminal charges followed by civil claims for damages from 
right holders in the entertainment industry. The prosecution concerned approximately 33 
works, including albums, films and computer games, which, according to the  prosecutors, 
together were downloaded a total of 435,000 times during the period from July 1, 2005, until 
May 31, 2006. The prosecution argued that by organising, administrating, systemising, 
programming, financing and running ‘The Pirate Bay’, the defendants had participated in the 
communication to the public of copyrighted media. A Swedish district court convicted them 
of complicity to commit crimes in violation of the Copyright Act (Sweden) and sentenced 
them to one year's imprisonment each. They were also held jointly liable for damages of 
approximately €3.3 million, together with other defendants convicted for their involvement in 
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the website. A court of appeal reduced their prison sentences but increased their joint liability 
for damages to approximately €5 million. The Swedish Supreme Court refused them leave to 
appeal, and they further applied to the European Court of Human rights stating that the 
Article 10 of European Convention on Human Rights 1950 protected the right to arrange a 
service on the internet which could be used for both legal and illegal purposes, without the 
persons responsible for the service being convicted for acts committed by the people using 
the service. In dismissing their application, the Court notably stated that their convictions 
were based on the Copyright Act and the Penal Code (Sweden). They were only convicted in 
respect of material shared through their website which was protected by copyright in 
accordance with the Copyright Act. It followed that the interference was prescribed by law, 
as the interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting plaintiffs' copyright to the 
material.
740
 Thus, the convictions and damages awarded pursued the legitimate aim of 
protecting the rights of others and preventing crime, within the meaning of Article 10(2).
741
 
The fact that the defendants' participation in the copyright infringements were considered to 
be extensive in this case was an important factor for the outcome of the case.
742
 Who knows 
what would have been the situation where participation in the crime is less? Would a 
different judgment have been expected? This decision may not yet be construed as a locus 
classicus just yet, as the dynamic nature of cyber-copyright offences continue to expand. 
 
The situation in the UK is similar to the Nigerian situation in respect of the traditional 
copyright infringement provisions, but is completely different regarding the provisions on 
computer programmes and software, for which no extensive provisions exist (except the mere 
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mention of the term ‘computer software’ in section 51 of the Nigeria Copyright Act) in any 
law in Nigeria, even in the Cybercrime Act, 2015. This is rather an unfortunate situation, and 
it would have been thought that the legislature would have utilised this opportunity to set the 
records straight by establishing an advanced model legal framework for copyright issues 
regarding computer programmes and software. 
 
In Nigeria under the Copyright Act,
743
 the term ‘copyright’ is not expressly defined, but on a 
broader perspective, the meaning of the term can be inferred from the provisions of section 6 
of the Copyright Act, which provides that, ‘…copyright in Nigeria of an eligible work is the 
exclusive right to control, to do or authorise the doing of any of the acts restricted to the 
copyright owner.’ Thus, copyright is a form of protection provided by the laws of a state or 
international instruments, to the creators of original works.
744
 Section 1(1) of the Nigerian 
Copyright Act has listed out works eligible for copyright protection in Nigeria to include 
literary works, musical works, artistic works, cinematograph, sound recordings and 
broadcast. It is however very interesting to note that the Copyright Act in section 51 may 
have by implication classified digital computer software as literary works for the purpose of 
eligibility for protection under the Act. According to section 51, “literary work” includes, 
irrespective of literary quality, any of the following works or similar works: novels, stories 
and poetical works; plays, stage directions, film scenarios and broadcasting scripts; 
choreographic works; computer programmes; textbooks, treaties, histories, biographies, 
essays and articles; encyclopaedias, dictionaries, directories and anthologies; letters, reports 
and memoranda; lectures, addresses and sermons; law reports, excluding decisions of courts; 
written tablets or compilations. 
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The Act provides that to be eligible for copyright protection it must be demonstrated or 
proved that sufficient effort has been expended on the making of the work to give it an 
original character.
745
 The work must be marked by its individuality – that distinctiveness 
which results from the author’s or creator’s intellect.746 In adopting Lord Peterson’s 
definition of the scope of originality in University of London Press v. University Tutorial 
Press Ltd,
747
 “…the word ‘original’ does not in this context mean that the work must be the 
expression of original or inventive thought. Copyright Acts are not concerned with originality 
of idea but with the expression of thought and in the case of literary work with expression of 
thought in print or writing. The originality which is required relate to the expression of 
thought.”748 
 
In relation to computer programmes or software, it is therefore the expression of the ideas of 
the programmer or the software developer in its definite form that constitutes the work 
original. In the words of Lord Pearce on originality, in the case of Ladbroke Ltd. v. William 
Hill the programme “should not be copied but should originate from the author.”749 The 
computer device is basically divided into two simple components, which are; the computer 
hardware and computer software.
750
 The computer hardware, which are the physical 
interconnections and devices of a computer set are mostly protected by the law of patent, 
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while computer software is a subject for protection by the Nigerian law of copyright.
751
 And 
according to Brennan J in the Australian case of Computer Edge Pty Ltd v. Apple Computer 
Inc.:
752
 “A literary work need not have literary merit…The words ‘literary work’, as 
Peterson J pointed out in University of London Ltd v. University Tutorial Ltd, ‘cover work 
which is expressed in print or writing, irrespective of the question whether the quality or style 
is high’. A ‘literary work’, according to Davey LJ in Hollinrake v. Truswell, is a work 
‘intended to afford either information and instruction, or pleasure, in the form of literary 
enjoyment’…The observation is not unduly restrictive. If the print or writing in which the 
work is expressed is conveys information of instruction, albeit to a limited group with a 
special knowledge, it is immaterial that the information or instruction is not expressed in the 
form of words, phrases or sentences.” 
 
Section 51(1) of the Nigerian Copyright Act despite defining computer software as an aspect 
of literary works, goes further to define ‘computer software or programmes’ as ‘…a set of 
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a 
certain result.’ Section 25 of the Act has listed infringements which constitute copyright 
offences, and are also actionable in civil suit for intellectual property by the owner of the 
copyright, although no specific mention was made for computer programmes or software; 
while section 27 of the Act goes ahead to provide for punishments for the offences committed 
under section 25 of the Act. A critical examination at the punishment for criminal conducts 
committed in respect of this offence includes a fine of N10, 000 (equivalent of £34). A fine of 
N10, 000 for an offender who had illegally enriched himself through the copyright’s owner’s 
intellectual property could be seen as a jurisprudential snag in preventing intellectual property 
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cybercrime.
753
 The only defence provided under section 27 is proof to the satisfaction of the 
court that the offender did not know that his or her conduct was an infringement of the 
performer’s right.754 This is still an untested area of the Nigerian criminal law 
jurisprudence,
755
 and there is no doubt that there are bound to be confusion when this is 
eventually tested in the future as it will no doubt expose the lacuna in the copyright offences 
related to computer software.
756
 
 
The Nigerian Copyrights Commission had since March 2012 in pursuance to its 
responsibilities under the Copyright Act,
757
 and in response to the demands of stakeholders to 
bring the Copyright Act
758
 in line with current challenges, (particularly in the digital 
environment) issued a notice to revise the provisions of the Copyright Act. Surprisingly, this 
step to revise the provisions of the Act had only remained at the issuance of the said notice, 
and nothing has come out of it since then.
759
 The legislature ought to have used the provisions 
in the Cybercrime Act 2015 to correct these anomalies and the obvious lacunas in the 
Nigerian Copyrights Act regarding offences and acts committed through the cyberspace. This 
is another area of the Nigeria cybercrime law where there is a lacuna, which no doubt will 
require to be visited by the legislature. It is arguable that an interim transplant of the UK 
provisions might be possible in this instant, following the provisions of section 363 of the 
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Nigeria Criminal Procedure Act which permits reliance on English rules of practice and 
procedure, in any event of a lacuna in the Nigerian adjectival law.
760
 
 
5.4ib Elements of Computer-Related Copyright Offences 
 
The case of R v Gilham
761
 has enunciated that in order to substantiate a conviction for 
copyrights offences, the prosecution must prove: 
(1) That the computer software is or includes copyright works within the meaning of 
section 1 of the Copyrights Act;
762
 
(2) That the copyright work was copied by the offender; 
(3) That such copying is of the whole or a substantial part of a copyright work;
763
 
(4)  That the copies of the copyright work or works created by or with the licence of the 
owner of the copyright include effective technological measures within the designed 
to protect those copyright works.
764
 
(5)  That in the course of a business the defendant sold or let for hire a device, product or 
component which was primarily designed, produced, or adapted for the purpose of 
                                                 
760
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enabling or facilitating the circumvention of those technological measures.
765
 It is to 
be noted that this issue does not depend on the intention of a defendant who is not 
responsible for the design, production or adaptation of the device, product or 
component: his intention is irrelevant.
766
  
 
The five requirements set above by the Court of Appeal seem to have laid to rest the basic 
components/requirements the prosecution is required to prove in order to secure the 
conviction of the offender for computer related copyrights offences.
767
 In R. v Gilham above, 
the Court further emphasized that the trial of cases involving recondite issues of copyright 
law as this case should not be before a jury.
768
 They advised that cases which, for example, 
involve determination of difficult questions whether a copy is of a substantial part of a 
copyright work, can and should be tried in the Chancery Division before specialist judges. 
They can be so tried much more efficiently in terms of cost and time than before a jury, and 
questions of law can if necessary be determined on appeal on the basis of clear findings of 
fact.
769
 This obita dicta looks harmless on the face of it, but if applied, may cause even more 
problems as it seem to juxtapose criminal trials on Courts specialised in handling civil claims 
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and other ancillary applications.
770
 These are two different taxonomies of jurisprudence that 
are not interchangeable in any way. 
 
5.4ii Internet and Trademarks 
 
 
Trademark violations, a well-known aspect of global trade, are similar to copyright 
infringements,
771
 already discussed above. Trademark infringement is a violation of the 
exclusive rights attached to a trademark without the authorization of the trademark owner or 
any licensees.
772
 Infringements related to trademarks have transferred to cyberspace, with 
varying degrees of criminalization under different national trademark laws.
773
 Article 15 of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) defines a 
trademark as: “any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the goods or 
services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings, shall be capable of constituting 
a trademark. Such signs, in particular words including personal names, letters, numerals, 
figurative elements and combinations of colours as well as any combination of such signs, 
shall be eligible for registration as trademarks...”774 Article 10(2) of the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on cybercrime urged contracting member-states to adopt such legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under their domestic 
laws the infringement of related rights, as defined under the law of that Party. This provision 
is however pursuant to the member’s obligations it has undertaken under the International 
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Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations (Rome Convention), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
775
 The 
Council of Europe’s Convention did not make express use of the term ‘trademarks’. While 
Article 10(1) made express provision for copyrights, the Convention’s proviso in Article 
10(2) for the infringement of other ‘related rights’776 should not be mistaken to be for 
trademark infringement. Trademark violations are not governed by the Budapest Convention, 
and the drafters of the Convention did not consider it appropriate to deal with the issue of 
criminalisation of such conduct.
777
  
 
The current legislation in the United Kingdom on Trade Mark is the Trade Marks Act 1994, 
which implemented the European Trade Marks Directive into national law.
778
 The Directive 
is intended to approximate national Trade Mark laws of the Member States of the European 
Union and to harmonize various disparities in their respective trade mark laws that had the 
potential to impede the free movement of goods and provision of services and distort 
competition within the European Union.
779
 The owner of a trademark can legally defend his 
mark against infringements. In order to do so, the trademark must either be registered, or 
have been used for a period of time so that it has acquired local distinctiveness (Prior Rights). 
Sections 9 - 12 of the Trade Mark Act 1994 provides that a registered trade mark could be 
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infringed by a defendant in situations: in the course of trade a sign which is identical with the 
trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which it is 
registered; he uses in the course of trade a sign where because the sign is identical with the 
trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services similar to those for which the trade 
mark is registered, or the sign is similar to the trade mark and is used in relation to goods or 
services identical with or similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, there exists a 
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association 
with the trade mark.
780
 
 
In addition to the above offences, section 92 of the UK Trademarks Act has created a number 
of criminal offences as regards unauthorised use of a trade mark in relation to goods if the 
offender, without the permission of the trade mark owner: applies to goods or their packaging 
a sign identical to, or likely to be mistaken for, a registered trade mark; or sells or lets for 
hire, offers or exposes for sale or hire or distributes goods which bear, or the packaging of 
which bears, such a sign; or has in his possession, custody or control in the course of a 
business any such goods with a view to the doing of anything, by himself or another.
781
 
 
In comparison to Nigeria, the applicable legislation currently governing the internet, 
trademarks and cybersquatting are the Trade Marks Act,
782
 and the Merchandise Marks 
Act.
783
 The legal principles governing the claim and award of trademark as applicable to 
United Kingdom as discussed above, are almost the same in Nigeria, and are provided for in 
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the Nigerian Trade Marks Act.
784
 The punishment for the Trademark offences is provided in 
section 61 of the Trade Marks Act as a fine not exceeding Two Hundred Naira. Criminal 
sanctions are also imposed for dealing in the forgery of trademarked goods by the 
Merchandise Marks Act
785
, the Trade Malpractices (Miscellaneous Offences) Act 1992 and 
the Counterfeit and Fake Drugs and Unwholesome Processed Foods (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Decree 1999. 
 
Section 3 of the Merchandise Marks Act, makes express provision for offences as to 
trademarks and trade descriptions. Section 3(1) of the Act makes it an offence for any person 
to: forge any trade mark; falsely apply to goods any trade mark or any marks so nearly 
resembling a trade mark as to be calculated to deceive; make, dispose of, or have in his 
possession any die, block, machine or other instrument for the purpose of forging, or of being 
used for forging, a trade mark; apply any false trade description to goods. The only defence 
provided in the second limb of this provision is proof by the offender that he acted without 
any intention to defraud.
786
 
 
On the other hand, the Trade Malpractices (Miscellaneous Offences) Act 1992 makes it a 
criminal offence under section 1(a) of the Act for an offender to any person label, package, 
sell, offer for sale or advertise any product in a manner that is false or misleading or is likely 
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to create a wrong impression as to its quality, character, brand name, value, composition, 
merit or safety.
787
 The Act further makes additional provision under section 1(h) for an 
offender to advertise or invite subscription for any product or project which does not exist.
788
 
This provision seems to be all encompassing, especially the introduction clause which stated 
as follows: ‘Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law’.789 Adopting the literary 
interpretation, one can assume that charges could still be brought against an offender under 
this Act, despite the fact that an offence might have been committed under a different 
legislation.
790
 The Counterfeit, Fake Drugs and Unwholesome Processed Foods 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree of 1999
791
 also makes resembling provisions in sections 1 
and 2 of the Degree, but only applicable to  sale, displays or distribution of drugs.
792
 These 
scenarios often occur in the cyber space where criminals who in trying to commit other 
offences masquerade the product or services they offer to the victim using a registered 
trademark or sign of the ‘real’ company.793 
  
The penalties for trademark offences vary depending on the court in which the criminal 
proceedings are commenced.
794
 In R. v Guest,
795
 the defendant (who deals in computers and 
                                                 
787
 Dennis Campbell and Christian T. Campbell, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Africa (Yorkhill Law 
publishing, 2009) NIG 9. 
788
 Edwin Ifeanyichuwu Nwogugu, The legal problems of foreign investment in developing countries (1
st
 edn, 
Manchester University Press, 1965). 
789
 Omnia Nigeria Limited v. Dyktrade Limited, (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt.1058) 576. 2, (2007)7 S.C. 44 
790
 Abimbola O Salu, “Online Crimes and Advance Fee Fraud in Nigeria - Are Available Legal Remedies 
Adequate?” (2005) Journal of Money Laundering Control, 8(2), 159-167; T. I. Akomolede, “Contemporary 
Legal Issues in Electronic Commerce in Nigeria”, (2008) PER: Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad, 11(3), 
0-0. 
791
 Chapter C34 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 
792
 Ebenezer Olatunji Olugbenga, “Juxtaposing Regulation Theory with Agency Behaviour: Understanding the 
Role of the Regulator in the Developing World with Evidences from Nigeria”, (2013) Journal of Law, Policy 
and Globalization, 18, 33-44. 
793
 Sally M Abel, “Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The Brave New Frontier”, (1998) Mich Telecomm & Tech 
L/Rev, 5, 91; David D Clark, John Wroclawski, Karen R. Sollins and Robert Braden, “Tussle in Cyberspace: 
Defining Tomorrow's Internet”, (2002) In ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Vol 32, No 4, 
347-356 <http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~minlanyu/teach/ALL/Clark02a.pdf> accessed on 10 May 2015. 
794
 Ijeoma Opara, “Nigerian Ant-Corruption Initiatives”, (2007) J/Int'l Bus & L, 6, 65 
<http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1137&context=jibl> accessed on 10 May 
2015. 
177 
 
software) sold some computers to a company which, unbeknownst to the company, did not 
have genuine Microsoft software on them. The software cost the company over £3,000. The 
company complained directly to Microsoft about the defective software and to its local 
authority. Trading standards made a test purchase and were told that the Microsoft software 
on the computer was not genuine and that they needed a disk to authorise the software. The 
defendant had deliberately and persistently sold the computers over a prolonged period, 
passed off the software as genuine, removed genuine certificates from other devices and fixed 
them to non-licensed devices. Trading standards seized all of defendant’s computers and 
software, and he was later charged with offences under the Fraud Act 2006 as well as the 
Trade Marks Act 1994. He pleaded guilty to 10 counts under the Trade Marks Act 1994 and 
the Crown decided not to pursue the offences under the Fraud Act 2003. On appeal, the Court 
considered the pre-sentence report which noted that the defendant had been frank about his 
guilt; had one previous conviction for obtaining property by deception and was now 
bankrupt, and reduced the custodial sentence from six months to four months imprisonment. 
 
Also in R. v Gareth Lee,
796
 the defendant had over a period of time between August 2005 and 
August 2007 been importing goods from China and selling them through eBay. At the end of 
August 2007 information was received from a trademark representative of the golfing 
company ‘Titleist’ about concerns of sales of counterfeiting goods bearing that name. Test 
purchases were made by Trading Standards Officers in relation to golfing accessories which 
were found to be counterfeit, and all the goods were found to have emanated from the 
defendant. A search warrant was executed at his home address and officers seized 854 items 
of counterfeit golfing accessories involving six different trademarks, all of which were 
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counterfeit. During the search they also seized paperwork including pro-forma invoices from 
China and computer equipment; and email traffic showed that he had purchased golfing 
accessories, bags, hats, towels and the like, from businesses operating in China, imported 
them to his home address and then sold them on via the internet. Accounting records from 
eBay and PayPal were obtained and these showed that from July 2005 to December 2007 a 
substantial number of these items were sold to customers. The trademarks that were copied 
were of well-known brands. He had used a large number of different email addresses to 
conceal his identity as the supplier. He was charged for 7 counts of unauthorised use of 
trademark, and the court, during sentencing, noted that offences of this nature were becoming 
more prevalent and any sentence had to contain an element of deterrence. He was on all 
counts sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment. 
 
There have been confusion on what really amounts to a trademark infringement,
797
 or acts 
which could constitute an offence under section 92 of the Act,
798
 but this seem to have been 
laid to rest since the decision in Crown Prosecution Service v Morgan
799
, where the Court of 
Appeal decided that, in order to contravene section 92 of the Act, the trademark or sign in 
question had to be identical to, or likely to be mistaken for, a registered trade mark not only 
in the sense that the words used were those of a registered trade mark but also in the sense 
that the words used were indicative of trade origin. Section 92(1)(b) identified certain types 
of dealings, including: selling goods, letting them for hire, offering or exposing them for sale, 
and distributing them. Whether a sign was used as an indication of trade origin was a 
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question of fact in each case, and the test was how the use of the sign was perceived by the 
average consumer of the type of goods in question.
800
 The essential function of a trade mark 
was to guarantee the identity of origin of the marked goods or services to the consumer or 
end user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish goods or 
services from others which had another origin.
801
 The words “or end user” as used in both 
legislations potentially applies to any person encountering the marked goods or services.
802
 
The Court of Appeal had in the Morgan’s stated that counterfeiting was fraudulent trading 
and a serious contemporary problem having adverse economic effects on genuine trade.
803
 It 
also had adverse effects on consumers, in terms of quality of goods and, sometimes, on the 
health or safety of consumers.
804
 Those considerations led overwhelmingly to the conclusion 
that section 92(1)(b) was not limited to those cases where the other party to the immediate 
transaction would regard the sign as indicative of trade origin.
805
 This implies meant that in 
appropriate cases the court had to be willing to look further than the circumstances of the 
initial transactions in question. It is however notable that a defence of non-infringement is 
available if the defendant could show that he had reasonable grounds to believe that use of 
the sign did not constitute trade mark infringement, or showed that his actions would not have 
amounted to civil infringement of the trade mark,
806
 but the burden of proof shifts to the 
defendant to prove the relevant facts and, this proof could as well be an arduous task given 
the public interest in maintaining trade mark protection.
807
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5.4iii New Era of Cybersquatting 
 
Cybersquatting
808
 is an illegal act of registering, trafficking in, or using an internet domain 
name with bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a trademark or company belonging 
to someone else.
809
 Cybersquatting involves an offender registering a domain name that 
contains common words, an existing business name, trademark, or is similar to an existing 
domain.
810
 The offender thereafter uses this domain to either redirect business to themselves 
or will try to sell the domain at an over inflated price,
811
 or to use it to sell products or 
services misleading users through their supposed connection to the existing trademark or 
company.
812
 
 
Currently, there are no specific criminal legislation against cybersquatting in the UK, 
although aggrieved parties could resort to ICANN for resolution respective domain names. 
Non-cybersquatting categories of domain name dispute are further resolved on a relatively 
piecemeal basis
813
 with some guidelines developed and promulgated periodically through the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) domain name arbitration system.
814
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However, these guidelines do not have legal or precedential force either within the UDRP
815
 
system or at the domestic court level; and at most, can only lead to civil liabilities.
816
 
 
 The Nigerian Legislature has ingeniously inserted in section 25 of the Cybercrime Act, a 
specific provision which makes it an offence for any person to take or make use of a name, 
business name, trademark, domain name or other word or phrase registered, owned or in use 
by any individual, body corporate, or belonging to either the Federal, State or Local 
Governments in Nigeria, on the internet or any other computer network, without authority or 
right, or for the purpose of interfering with their use by the owner, registrant or legitimate 
prior user. In elucidating the seriousness attached to this offence, the offender is liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than two years or a fine of not less than 
Five Million Naira. It is the finding of this research that the provision in section 25 of the 
Nigerian Act may have settled any pre-existing confusion or lacuna in this area of law.
817
 
 
The fact that the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015, is only a few weeks old, and in the absence 
of any legislation on this issue in the UK, this research will make further references to the 
position in the United States, because the provisions of section 25 of the Nigerian Act bears 
utmost resemblance with Anti-cyber-squatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) 1999. The 
United States congress enacted the Anti-cyber-squatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) in 
1999 to amend the Trademark Act 1946 and created specific federal remedies and offences 
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for cybersquatting.
818
 In the case of Sporty's Farm v Sportsman's Market,
819
 the second 
circuit court outlined a five-step process for the ACPA analysis. The first issue before the 
court was the applicability of the ACPA to the case in question and whether the court can 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant or if an in rem jurisdiction
820
 over the 
domain name itself can be obtained. Secondly, the court must decide whether the plaintiff’s 
trademark is famous or distinctive and thus entitled to the protection under ACPA. Thirdly, 
the court must determine whether the defendant's domain name is identical or confusingly 
similar to the plaintiff’s trademark. The fourth step is to identify whether the defendant has 
acted with bad faith intent to profit at the time of registration; and finally, the court must 
determine a proper remedy.
821
 
 
In the United States case of Hasbro v. Internet Entertainment Group
822
 where the court 
issued an injunction under the then Federal Trade Mark Dilution Act. The case concerned the 
defendant's use of candyland.com as a domain name for an adult entertainment website. 
Hasbro owned the registered trade mark CANDYLAND covering children's games and 
alleged that the defendant's use would dilute its trade mark rights, especially as in US 
parlance "Candy" can have sexual connotations. Hasbro submitted evidence to show that 60 
per cent of US families with children under five owned the CANDYLAND board game. This 
evidence was deemed persuasive of the reputation of Hasbro's CANDYIAND trade mark. 
Also in Panavision International LP v. Toeppen Panavision,
823
 which was the owner of the 
well-known trademarks PANAFLEX and PANAVISION, registered for theatrical motion 
                                                 
818
 See 15 U.S.C. §1125 (d) (2) (a); Mairead Moore, “Cybersquatting: Prevention better than cure?” (2009) 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 17(2), 220-231. 
819
 202 F.3d 489 (2nd. Cir. 2000) 
820
 In rem jurisdiction is the power a federal court may exercise over large items of immoveable property, or real 
property, located within the court's jurisdiction, and over whom the court does not have in persona jurisdiction. 
821
 Alanna C Rutherford, “Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Market: A Case Study in Internet Regulation Gone 
Awry”’ (2000) Brook L/Rev, 66, 421; See also Hale P. Wayne, “Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act & 
(and) Sporty's Farm LLC v. Sportman's Market, Inc.”, (2001) The Berk Tech LJ, 16, 205. 
822
 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626 (W.D.Wa. 1996). 
823
 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 20, 1996) 
183 
 
pictures, television cameras and photographic equipment, sought to prevent Toeppen 
registering the domain names "panaflex.com" and "panavision.com". Toeppen, who did not 
use either domain name in commerce, tried to sell the names back to Panavision. The court 
held that Toeppen's practice of registering the domain names and then seeking to sell or 
license them back to the true owners constituted dilution of Panavision's marks. The 
defendant was ordered to transfer the domain names back to Panavision.  
 
This same result was achieved in an equivalent situation but by a very different route by the 
English court in the One-in-a-Million cases.
824
 The “One in a Million Case”,825 as it was 
referred to, involved a claim by British Telecommunications, Marks and Spencer, and others, 
against One in a Million Limited, and was ultimately heard by the British Court of Appeal. 
The defendants were dealers in internet domain names, which back in 1998 was still an 
unharnessed area of the economy, and was more of a novelty. According to the Court, the 
defendants, who lost at the Court of first instance and then appealed the decision to the Court 
of Appeal, “…have made a speciality of registering domain names for use on the Internet 
comprising well-known names and trademarks without the consent of the person or company 
owning the goodwill in the name or trade mark. Examples are the registration and 
subsequent offer for sale to Burger King by the second defendant of the domain name 
burgerking.co.uk for £25,000 plus VAT and of bt.org to British Telecommunications for 
£4,700 plus VAT.” 
 
Section 10(1) of the Trade Marks Act states that; “…trademark infringement occurs if a 
person uses in the course of trade a sign that is identical with the trademark in relation to 
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goods or services which are identical with those for which it is registered”. Invariable, this 
suggests that there is no likelihood of ‘confusion requirement’ needed under this section.826 
All that is required is proof that the trademark is identical with an existing trademark.
827
 
However, the courts have three important questions to answer in order to determine the 
relevant issues in the case: 
(a)  Whether the domain name in question is identical to the registered trademark;  
(b) Whether the domain name is used in the course of trade; and  
(c) Whether such use is in relation to identical goods or services for which the trademark 
is registered. 
 
These three issues on the face of them look so simple, but they could be very difficult to 
prove. In other words, the domain name in question has to be identical to the trademark for 
the later one to be struck down, and charges proffered against the offender, if applicable.
828
 
However, it should be noted that there is already an established principle that the word 
‘identical’ does not necessarily mean ‘absolutely identical’.  In the case of Avnet v. Isoact 
Ltd
829
 where the plaintiffs argued that the defendant's activities of using the word “Avnet” in 
the domain name in relation to identical services amounted to trademark infringement under 
section 10(1) of the Trade Mark Act, and applied for summary judgment. It was decided that 
since the services provided by the defendants were quite different from those of the plaintiffs, 
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there was no infringement of the trademark established under the Act.
830
 In Virtual Works, 
Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.
831
 (a dispute over the domain vw.net), the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals created a common law requirement that the cyber-squatter must exhibit bad 
faith intent in order to confer liability.
832
 
 
Most of the decisions relating to this area of law have been on civil cases that have been filed 
and settled (mostly in the United States). Only very few courts have actually ruled on the 
matter of infringement of trade mark rights regarding cybersquatting.
833
 The British adjectival 
laws does not have any direct or specific legislation on cybersquatting, and the courts have 
always assessed the conduct of the defendants in deciding whether the unauthorized 
registration of domain names by the defendants may or may not have been “trademark 
infringement”834 per se; and unsurprisingly, most of the courts have relied on the doctrine of 
“passing off”, to justify if a cause of action has been established in cases of cybersquatting 
involving trademark infringements.
835
 The trial court judge in the “One in a Million Case” 
made the following observation to underscore his conclusion: “In the case of Marks & 
Spencer, it is in my judgment beyond dispute that what is going on is calculated to infringe 
the plaintiff's rights in future. The name marksandspencer could not have been chosen for 
any other reason than that it was associated with the well-known retailing group. There is 
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only one possible reason why anyone who was not part of the Marks & Spencer Plc group 
should wish to use such a domain address, and that is to pass himself off as part of that group 
or his products off as theirs.” 
 
The Court of Appeals Panel reached a similar conclusion, stating: "It is accepted that the 
name Marks & Spencer denotes Marks & Spencer Plc and nobody else. Thus anybody seeing 
or hearing the name realises that what is being referred to is the business of Marks & 
Spencer Plc. It follows that registration by the appellants of a domain name including the 
name Marks & Spencer makes a false representation that they are associated or connected 
with Marks & Spencer Plc. This can be demonstrated by considering the reaction of a person 
who taps into his computer the domain name marksandspencer.co.uk and presses a button to 
execute a “whois” search. He will be told that the registrant is One In A Million Limited. A 
substantial number of persons will conclude that One In A Million Limited must be connected 
or associated with Marks & Spencer Plc. That amounts to a false representation which 
constitutes passing-off." 
 
The defendants' counsel had argued that just like non-use of a domain name could not 
possibly be considered an ‘infringement’, mere registration and non-use of a domain name 
could not be considered passing off, since there had been no ‘passing off’ nor could there 
have been, without any use of the domain name itself. Well, the Court of Appeals came up 
with an ingenious solution to solve this problem occasioned by an apparent lacuna in the law. 
The Court held that the ‘passing off’ occurred not as a result of use of the domain name, since 
that had never occurred, but rather from the mere recording of the defendants' names in the 
associated ‘Whois directory’: “The placing on a register of a distinctive name such as 
marksandspencer makes a representation to persons who consult the register that the 
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registrant is connected or associated with the name registered and thus the owner of the 
goodwill in the name. Such persons would not know of One In A Million Limited and would 
believe that they were connected or associated with the owner of the goodwill in the domain 
name they had registered. Further, registration of the domain name including the words 
Marks & Spencer is an erosion of the exclusive goodwill in the name which damages or is 
likely to damage Marks & Spencer Plc.” 
 
This case is a depiction of the urgent need for the United Kingdom to review its laws and 
criminalise the offences related to cybersquatting,
836
 as the courts in the United Kingdom 
seem to be attempting to hitch the old-fashioned legislations on trademark (more especially 
on passing off) in order to address this new phenomenon of cybersquatting.
837
 Cyberquatting 
and passing off are two unparallel concepts. This research has from the foregoing identified 
cybersquatting as the practice of securing a domain name with the sole intention of offering it 
to another individual or organisation, often at an inflated price, passing off  is another matter 
altogether! A claim for passing off requires the plaintiff to show that a company is misleading 
others into thinking they are dealing with the plaintiff’s when they are not. Even in such cases 
where there is blatant passing off, the plaintiff is still required to prove that he has suffered a 
loss as a result of the defendant’s actions. Passing off, being a common law of tort that can be 
used to enforce unregistered trade mark rights, only results to civil liabilities against the 
defendant. The plaintiff could on proof of passing off ask for cancellation or transfer of the 
disputed domain names, but there is no criminal punishment for the offender(s) who may 
have enriched himself with the use of the domain name. As a method of social control, 
criminal law sets a framework specifying the standards and limitations of acceptable 
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behaviour in society.
838
 The essence of criminal legislation is of utmost importance in 
combating intellectual property offences. The criminal law sets boundaries both to our 
behaviour and to the power of the state to coerce and punish us.
839
 This research identifies 
with the postulations of Ashworth, when he argued that the fundamental reason for having 
criminal law backed by sanctions is its deterrent or preventive effects.
840
 
 
The United States has so far enacted the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 
trying to implement the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, while the United 
Kingdom has not; and there is no Bill as such to solve this problem and existing lacuna. 
Nigeria has so far enacted the Cybercrime Act which make express provisions in section 25 
criminalising these offences. It is time that the United Kingdom make legislative 
arrangements to solve these enduring problems, because the internet and the associated vice 
and virtues are here to stay. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The analysis in the foregoing has shown that both the Nigerian jurisdiction and their 
counterparts in the United have existing legislation which criminalises computer-related fraud 
and forgery, including the alteration, deletion, transmission and other manipulation of 
computer data, resulting in inauthentic date that is intended to be acted upon or used as if it 
were authentic.
841
 The Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 has made extensive provisions of 
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computer-related fraud and forgery, and has no doubt cured the inadequacies of the 
application of traditional legislations in a ‘cyber’ environment.  
 
The cyber-fraud offences, the provisions of section 14(2) of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act, 
seem to be a replication of the provisions of section 1 of the Nigeria Advance Fee Fraud and 
other Fraud Related Offences Act 2006.  One striking importance of the provision of the 
Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act 2006 is the provision of section 
1(1) which started with the phrase: ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in any other 
enactment or law’. This phrase is not contained in section 14 of the Cybercrime Act, and 
seems to give a subtle suggestion that the provisions contained in Advance Fee Fraud and 
other Fraud Related Offences Act 2006, supersedes every other provision related to Fraud 
and other related activities. This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that section 1(3) which 
prescribes a more firmer punishment of imprisonment for a term of not more than 20 years 
and not less than seven years without the option of a fine, for offenders convicted for any of 
the fraud-related offences.  This creates a situation where the prosecution are given options to 
pick and choose which legislation to use, and leaves no room for consistency.  
 
Although section 58 of the Cybercrime Act defines “data” as representations of information 
or of concepts that are being prepared or have been prepared in a form suitable for use in a 
computer, there is however no definition of what constitutes a ‘document’ was also proffered 
in the Act. There is no doubt that this will pose legislative lacuna, and the legal principle of 
‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ could easily be arguable to the fact that the express 
mention of one or more things of a particular class may be regarded as impliedly excluding 
others. The Nigerian situation in respect of copyrights and trademarks offences is still the use 
of the traditional trademarks and copyright infringement provisions. There is no specific 
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provisions existing (except the mere mention of the term ‘computer software’ in section 51 of 
the Nigeria Copyright Act) in any law in Nigeria, even in the Cybercrime Act 2015. This is 
rather an unfortunate situation, and it would have been thought that the legislatures would 
have utilised this opportunity to set the records straight by establishing a legal framework 
upon for copyright issues regarding computer programmes and software. The Nigerian 
Copyrights Commission had since March 2012 pursuance of its responsibilities under the 
Copyright Act, and in response to the demands of stakeholders to bring the Copyright Act in 
line with current challenges, particularly in the digital environment, issued a notice to revise 
the provisions of the Copyright Act. Surprisingly, this step to revise the provisions of the Act 
had only remained at the issuance of the said notice, and nothing have come out of it since 
then. There is however an additional need to inculcate copyrights’ and other related offences 
into the provisions of the Cybercrime Act. The Legislatures ought to have used the provisions 
in the Cybercrime Act 2015 to correct these anomalies and the obvious lacunas in the 
Nigerian Copyrights Act regarding offences and acts committed through the cyberspace. It is 
the hypothesis of this research that an interim transplant of the UK provisions might be 
possible in the cyber-related offences of copyrights and trademarks, following the provisions 
of section 363 of the Nigeria Criminal Procedure Act which permits reliance on English rules 
of practice and procedure, in any event of a lacuna in the Nigerian adjectival law. 
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Chapter Six:  OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
An offence against the person usually refers to a crime which is committed by direct physical 
harm or force being applied to another person.
842
 Strictly speaking there is no criminal 
activity which does not victimize a person, either directly or indirectly.
843
 These crimes are 
usually considered serious offences by the state because of their gravity of inflicting injuries 
against another person.
844
 There are variant provisions on cybercrime offences against the 
person in the two comparative jurisdictions
845
 regarding the level of injury or harm sustained 
by the victim, as well as any harm that the offence was intended to cause or might 
foreseeably have caused. These are issues which the states take into account and which are 
also reflected in the sentence imposed by their different courts in respect of the various 
cybercrime offences. 
 
In forthcoming paragraphs, this research will set out to critically analyse the provisions 
regarding cyber-offences against the person in the UK and Nigeria, while also comparing 
their regional Conventions and Directives. These offences will be analysed by division into 
the following categories: Offences related to child pornography; Racist, gender and 
xenophobic offences; Identity theft and impersonation Offences; and Cyberstalking Offences. 
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6.2 Offences Related to Child Pornography 
 
Almost all images containing child pornography are transmitted electronically, through 
bilateral and multilateral exchanges.
846
 Many types of paedophilic activity-viewing images, 
discussing activities, arranging tourism, or enticing a child to a meeting are carried out over 
the Internet.
847
 The nature of cyberspace gives paedophiles the advantages of a wider scope 
of communications and the likelihood of eluding the law,
848
 given the jurisdictional problems 
which arise in prosecuting cases that transcend borders.
849
 The continuous dynamism in 
cyberspace has enlarged the avenues that offenders  use to access, create or distribute child 
pornography
850
 include websites, blogs, discussion forums, chat rooms, instant MMS 
messaging (like ‘WhatsApp’) or text messages and social network sites such as Facebook, 
Mxit, Twitter, Myspace, and LinkedIn.
851
 A report had stated: “Child sexual abusers are 
rapidly turning the Internet and commercial online services into red-light districts, where 
they can distribute vast quantities of pornography — often depicting bondage and other 
forms of violence, including murder — and organize with like-minded individuals. The 
Internet gives child molesters and pornographers unprecedented opportunities to target and 
recruit new victims. It allows sexual predators to stalk juvenile victims anonymously from the 
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comfort of their homes.”852 A research into the behaviour of child pornography offenders 
shows that 15% of arrested people with internet-related child pornography in their possession 
had more than 1,000 pictures on their computer; 80% had pictures of children between 6-12 
years on their computer; 19% had pictures of children younger than the age of 3; and 21% 
had pictures depicting violence.
853
   
 
Online Social Networks or Social Networking Sites (SNSs) are one of the most remarkable 
technological phenomena of the 21st century, with several SNSs now among the most visited 
websites globally.
854
  These SNSs, although they usually appear to be informal way of 
communication are nevertheless associated with all-embracing identity management tools, 
defining access to user-created content through social relationships.
855
 These SNSs mostly 
have private meeting rooms which make monitoring of paedophilic activities difficult.
856
 The 
popularity of these Social Networking Sites has spectacularly increased over the past five 
years, attracting an extraordinary number of users, of which significant proportions are 
teenagers.
857
 However, the fact that SNS’s allow users to communicate through status 
updates, through messages on ‘walls’ or through instant messaging, to share photo or video 
fragments, and to connect with old or new ‘friends’, also entails a number of risks, the most 
important of which include child pornography, internet grooming, stalking and bullying.
858
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The Internet offers potential abusers ample opportunity to enter into digital contact with 
children in relative anonymity, which can lead to offline and/or online sexual abuse.
859
 
 
The technological advancement, appearance of new solutions in many aspects of social life 
and the requirement of EU law harmonization as well as uniform legal regulations in different 
countries, make it necessary to find new legislative solutions through new laws in hitherto 
unregulated areas,
860
 or by amendments of laws which until recently remained sufficiently 
normative legislation.
861
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child entered into force on 2
nd
 
September 1990. States parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child thereby 
committed to respect and ensure the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of 
children. The Convention provides for the realization of these rights by setting standards for 
health, education, legal, civil, and social services for children. The Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography was adopted on 
25
th
 May 2000 and came into force on 18
th
 January 2002, and requires States parties to 
prohibit the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. The United Nations 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution and Child Pornography was signed by the United Kingdom on 7 September 2000 
and ratified on 20 February 2009. This Protocol requires member states to criminalise in their 
individual national legislations, all acts involving the "producing, distributing, disseminating, 
importing, exporting, offering, selling or possessing for the above purposes" of child 
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pornography.
862
 Regulations of the Council of Europe concerning child pornography are 
primarily included in the Convention on Cybercrimes and Convention on the Protection of 
Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.
863
 Title 3 (“Content-related 
offences”) of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes makes specific provisions for child 
pornography.
864
 The Convention
865
 criminalizes acts to produce child pornography for the 
purpose of its distribution through a computer system', as well as offering, making available, 
distributing and transmitting child pornography with the use of computer system.
866
 In 
Nigeria, the offences related to child pornography committed through the cyberspace or 
through a computer network/system is provided for in section 23 of the Cybercrime Act, 
2015. 
 
6.2i Definition of a Child 
 
The definition of a minor is provided in the COE Convention
867
 as every person under the age 
of 18 years; although the Convention agree that a member state may require a lower age-limit 
in their individual national laws, but this limit cannot be lower than 16 years.
868
 The Council 
of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
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Abuse
869
 also places a ban to offer, make available, distribute, transmit, procure child 
pornography for oneself or for another person,
870
 and defines child pornography as any 
material visually depicting a child engaged in real or simulated sexually explicit conduct or 
any depiction of a child's sexual organs for primarily sexual purposes.
871
 One of the reasons 
for criminalization is the fear that demand for such material could result in their production
872
 
and online supply
873
 on a geometric progression and ongoing basis. This reasoning is also 
based on the fact that possession
874
 of such material could encourage the sexual abuse of 
children,
875
 leading the legislature to criminalize acts of possession,
876
 offering,
877
 making 
available, production,
878
 distributing,
879
 transmitting,
880
 procuring child pornography for 
oneself or for another person.
881
 The degree of criminalization of possession of child 
pornography differs between the United Kingdom and the Nigerian legal systems. In the 
United Kingdom, the offences relating to child pornography were addressed initially by the 
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Indecency with Children Act 1960. This legislation criminalises acts involving any person 
who commits an act of gross indecency with or towards a child under the age of sixteen, or 
who incites a child under that age to such an act with him or another.
882
 This legislation was 
repealed by the Protection of Children Act (POCA) 1978, which makes it illegal to take, 
make, distribute, show or possess an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child. In 
2003, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 amended the Protection of Children Act 1978, and 
increased the age of a child from sixteen to eighteen to meet international standards, and also 
included defences regarding marriage and other relationships in cases where the photograph 
was of the child aged 16 or over.   
 
In Nigeria, the exact definition of a child to be adopted by the Nigerian courts has been one 
of the notable issues leading to pluralism of definitions both by the Courts and various 
Nigerian legislations. The Nigerian constitution of 1999 did not make any definition of a 
child. The Child’s Right Act 2003 defines a child as person who has not attained the age of 
eighteen years. However, according to the Children and Young Person Act,
883
 a “child” 
means a person under the age of fourteen years, while “young person” was defined under the 
same Act as a person who has attained the age of fourteen years and is under the age of 
seventeen years. Furthermore, the Immigration Act in trying to make a workable definition of 
a child describes a ‘young person’ as a person under the age of sixteen years.  The 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1970 used the term infant in place of a child and puts the age of 
maturity at 21years.  The Nigerian Labour Act
884
 defines a child as a young person under the 
age of twelve years and a young person as one under the age of fourteen years, while the 
National Child Welfare Policy, 1989 also defines a child as anybody who is twelve years of 
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age and below. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
885
 defined a child 
as “every human being below the age of eighteen years.” 
 
The federal structure of Nigeria has also compounded to the pluralism of the definition of a 
child in Nigeria,
886
 as it provides regional states and local authorities with great legislative 
powers, thereby causing a lot of confusion in determination of the application of different 
interpretations of the law, (which also includes Common Law, Sharia, and Customary 
Law).
887
 These states have their individual laws with varieties in the minimum age limit 
which often pose a lot of problem in the process of interpretation.
888
 Most States of the 
Federation like Abia, Anambra, Bayelsa, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Imo, Jigawa, Kwara, Lagos, 
Nassarawa, Ogun, Ondo, Rivers, Taraba, have adopted the definition of eighteen years as 
provided in the Child Rights Act.
889
 However, some states have their diverse definitions, and 
have defined a child as a young person under the age of thirteen years;
890
 although in other 
States like Akwa-Ibom State, a child is a young person under the age of sixteen years.
891
 
These definitions of a child are only some snippets of different ages enshrined in a horde of 
legal texts and customary laws all over the country.  
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There is no doubt that this can cause discrimination between children of same age in different 
parts of the country. There was therefore the need for the government to review this aspect 
with a view to making a particular age workable for the purpose of implementing the Child 
Rights Act, 2003 which defines a child as a person who has not attained the age of eighteen 
years. This is in line with the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child both to which Nigeria is a 
signatory.
892
 Section 1 of the Convention defines a 'child' as a person below the age of 18, 
unless the laws of a particular country set the legal age for adulthood younger. The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the monitoring body for the Convention, has 
encouraged States to review the age of majority if it is set below 18 and to increase the level 
of protection for all children under 18. The provisions of section 23(5) of the Nigerian 
Cybercrime Act complements the current position in the United Kingdom, and seem to have 
amalgamated the various UK provision of the subject-matter offences into one provision in 
the Act; and lays to rest the longstanding issues of the actual definition of a child by defining 
the term “child” or “minor” as a person below eighteen years of age. 
 
6.2ii Elements of Child Pornography 
 
The COE convention defines child pornography to include all kind of pornographic material 
which visually depicts a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
893
 The act of saving an 
indecent image of a child to any digital storage device is considered to be “making” the 
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image, as it causes a copy to exist which did not exist before.
894
 Section 7 of the Protection of 
Children Act 1978 provides that ‘a photograph, film (including any form of video-recording), 
a copy of a photograph or of a film, a photograph comprised in a film. The references to a 
photograph including the negative as well as the positive version’ are enough media able to 
contain an indecent photograph of a child.
895
 This legislation seemed to concentrate more on 
the definition of indecent photographs and indecent pseudo-photographs of children without 
proffering any definition of child pornography.
896
 Adler
897
 had re-iterated that, ‘the law is 
always a step behind the problem, racing to keep pace with a burgeoning social crisis.” There 
is need for a clear and succinct definition of what constitutes child pornography to ensure that 
offenders are brought to justice.
898
 The European Framework Decision on combating the 
sexual exploitation of children and child photography
899
 required member states to take 
necessary measures to comply with the Framework Decision of 20/01/2016.
900
 The Council 
Framework Decision defined child pornography in Article 1(b) as pornographic material 
which visually depicts or represents: 
(i) A real child involved or engaged in sexually explicit conduct, including lascivious 
exhibition of genitals or the pubic area of a child; or 
(ii) A real person appearing to be a child involved or engaged in the conduct mentioned in 
(i); or 
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(iii) A realistic images of a non-existent child involved or engaged in the conduct 
mentioned in (i). 
These provisions also bear the same resemblance with the definition of child pornography in 
Article 9(2) of the Council of Europe’s Convention. The provisions of section 23(4) of the 
Nigerian Cybercrime Act, is a wholesome transplant of the provisions of Article 9(2) of the 
Council of Europe’s Convention, which defined the term “child pornography” to include 
pornographic material that “visually depicts: 
(a) a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; 
(b) a person appearing to be a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and 
(c) realistic images representing a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” 
The inclusion of the term ‘realistic images representing a minor’ widens the scope of the 
offences here as it aims to protect the children from sexual exploitation and abuse.
901
 It is also 
arguable that these provisions, by extension include computer simulated images, drawings, 
sculptures and cartoons depicting a minor.
902
 After a consultation process, the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 criminalised the possession of ‘prohibited images of children’. This 
extended the definition of child pornography under the 1978 Act and criminalised non-
photographic content such as cartoons, drawings and tracings under the new legislation.
903
 
This means not only that the scope of material associated with child pornography was 
expanding but that a causal connection between the material and the abuse of real children 
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(i.e. the evidence of harm) was no longer necessary to justify the criminal sanction.
904
 The 
2009 Act established that an image included moving or still images produced by any means, 
or any data stored by any means which is capable of being converted into an image.
905
 It 
excluded however both indecent photographs and pseudo-photographs of a child, which were 
to be construed in accordance with the Protection of Children Act 1978.
906
 The 2009 Act 
reconfirmed that a child is a person under the age of 18 and ‘where an image showed a person 
the image was to be treated as an image of a child if: (a) the impression conveyed by the 
image is that the person shown is a child, or (b) the predominant impression conveyed is that 
the person shown is a child despite the fact that some of the physical characteristics shown 
are not those of a child. 
 
In R v Fellows,
907
 the accused person appealed against conviction and against a sentence of 
three years' imprisonment under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 of 
possessing indecent photographs of a child and of having an obscene article for publication 
for gain. He contended that his actions in storing obscene images on a computer to create a 
data archive which could be accessed and displayed over the internet did not amount to an 
offence under section 1 of the Act. In dismissing his appeal the Court observed that, although 
the 1978 Act and the Obscene Publications Acts of 1959 and 1964 pre-dated the development 
of internet and computer technology, the legislature could be inferred to have intended such 
activities to be covered by the statutory provisions, as shown by the decision in Attorney 
General's Reference (No.5 of 1980)
908
 where video tape image displays were held to be a 
                                                 
904
 Lillian Edwards, ‘Pornography, censorship and the Internet.’ LAW AND THE INTERNET, L. Edwards & C. 
Waelde, Eds, (Hart Publishing, 2009). 
905
 Abhilash Nair and James Griffin, “The regulation of online extreme pornography: purposive teleology (in) 
action” (2013) International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 7. 
906
 Alex Antoniou, “Possession of prohibited images of children: Three years on”, (2013) The Journal of 
Criminal Law, 77(4), 337-353. 
907
 (1997) 2 All ER 548 
908
 (1980) 72 Cr. App. R. 71; [1980] C.L.Y. 538 
203 
 
“publication” under s.2 of the 1959 Act. Whilst the computer disk was not a photograph 
itself, for the purposes of the 1978 Act, it was a copy of an indecent photograph, by virtue of 
the data it contained, which could be converted by a technical process into a screen image or 
a print which was an exact reproduction of the original photograph. There was no restriction 
placed by section 7(2) of the 1978 Act on the form such a copy could take and the data 
reproduced in the instant case merely represented the original photograph in a different form. 
The wordings of sections 1 and section 7 are wide enough to apply to both contemporary and 
later forms of photographs, and to include copies taken from them by computer generated 
means. Also in R. v Bowden
909
 the Court of Appeal extended the scope of the provisions of 
this law by confirming that downloading indecent internet images of children amounted to 
“making” photographs and was caught by s.1(1)(a).910 The words “to make” were to be given 
their ordinary meaning, which included the storing of images on negatives and computer 
disks by virtue of section 7 of the 1978 Act. The 1978 Act was concerned to control the 
spread of child pornography and therefore went beyond those who were responsible for the 
creation of the original image.
911
 As such images could have their origins beyond the 
jurisdiction, downloading or printing them within the jurisdiction gave rise to the “making” 
of new material and the carrying out of such acts for a defendant's own use was an offence 
under the Act.
912
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430-443; Ian A Elliott and Anthony R. Beech, 'Understanding online child pornography use: Applying sexual 
offense theory to internet offenders' (2009) Aggression and Violent Behaviour, 14(3), 180-193. 
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6.2iii Child Pornography Offences and Liabilities 
 
 
In the UK, section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 criminalised the possession of an 
indecent photograph of child, making it an offence for a person to have any indecent 
photograph of a child in his possession.
913
 The offence was made triable either way. This was 
a change from the earlier position in relation to child pornography, because the 
criminalisation of production and distribution offences (i.e. take, distribute, and have in 
possession with a view to distribution) were tackling only the intentional possession for 
future distribution.
914
 More importantly, this seems a major step toward departure from the 
liberal stance employed,
915
 which provided that the consumption of pornography in the 
private sphere should not be regulated by the state because it only harmed the viewer.
916
  
 
The English decision in R v Fellows,
917
 led to the amendment of the Protection of Children 
Act (POCA) 1978, through section 84 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
which considered that references to a photograph included ‘data stored on a computer disc or 
by other electronic means which is capable of conversion into a photograph.
918
 The Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act amended the Protection of Children Act 1978 and criminalised 
the ‘indecent pseudo-photographs of children’, meaning ‘an image, whether made by 
computer-graphics or otherwise howsoever, which appears to be a photograph.
919
 It also 
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Deviant Behaviour, 23(4), 331-361. 
915
 Michael C. Seto and Angela W. Eke, 'The criminal histories and later offending of child pornography 
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916
 John Carr, Child abuse, child pornography and the internet (London: NCH, 2003) 8 <http://make-it-
safe.net/esp/pdf/Child_pornography_internet_Carr2004.pdf> accessed on 18 May 2014. 
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 (1997) 2 All ER 548 
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 Alisdair A Gillespie, “Indecent images of children: the ever‐changing law”, (2005) Child abuse review, 
14(6), 430-443; See also, Susan SM Edwards, “Prosecuting 'child pornography': Possession and taking of 
indecent photographs of children”, (2000) The Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law, 22(1), 1-21. 
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 Section 84, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (c.33) 1994; See also Yamas Akdeniz, “Governance of 
pornography and child pornography on the global Internet: a multi-layered approach” (1997) Law and the 
205 
 
criminalised the act of ‘making’ which had harsher penalties than the mere possession.920 The 
ECOWAS Directive also made a very interesting provision in Article 17 which criminalises 
the import and export of child pornography through a computer system.
921
 Although this 
provision, on the face of it, seems to be a robust provision, this research questions if this 
provision amounts to a staid legislative repetition, as the Directive had in the preceding 
provision in Article 16 criminalised the transmission of child pornography or pornographic 
representations transmitted through a computer system. Therefore, making the act of 
exporting child pornography through a computer system a ‘stand-alone’ offence in Article 17 
will no doubt limit the application of Article 16 of the Directive. 
 
In the UK, sections 47, 48, 49 and 50 Sexual Offences Act 2003 deal with paying for sexual 
services of a child; causing or inciting child prostitution or pornography; controlling a child 
prostitute or a child involved in pornography; and arranging or facilitating child prostitution 
or pornography respectively. These offences seem to have been specifically designed to 
tackle the use of children in the sex industry, where a child is less than 18 years old.
922
 In 
Scotland, the Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act, 
2005,
923
 makes it an offence for anybody to arrange a meeting with a child, either for himself 
or for someone else, with the intent of sexually abusing the child.
924
 The ECOWAS Directive 
on cybercrime also made specific provisions on child pornography offences in Articles 16 
                                                                                                                                                        
Internet: regulating Cyberspace, 223-241; Andrew D Murray, ‘The reclassification of extreme pornographic 
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<http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/33431/3/CriminalisingFabricatedImages.LSfinal31March2010.pdf> accessed on 12 
April 2014. 
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exploitation of children (Springer publishers, 2014) 
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to19. Articles 16 to 19 of the Directive were drafted similar to the requirements of Article 9, 
paragraph 1 (a) – (c) of the Council of Europe’s Convention. One of the major differences to 
the Council of Europe’s Convention and the ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation is the 
fact that the Directive omitted the criminalisation of grooming a minor through the 
cyberspace. Although Article 19 of the ECOWAS Directives made provisions criminalising 
the facilitation of access of a minor to pornography documents, sounds or pornography 
representation, this does not reflect the intention of the legislature to criminalise grooming of 
minors through the cyberspace.  
 
On 20 November 1989, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). Following the adoption of this Convention, in July 1990, the 
African Union Assembly of Heads of States and Governments adopted the African Union 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (CRWC). Nigeria signed both international 
legislations and ratified them in 1991 and 2000, respectively. Both comparative legislation 
contain a universal set of standards and principles for survival, development, protection and 
participation of children and recognize children as human beings; and therefore subjects of 
rights. 
 
6.2iv Child Pornography Offences under the Nigerian Act 
 
 
Section 23 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2014 purports to create four classes of offenses 
under this category. The first category involves the use of a computer network or system in or 
for producing child pornography for the purpose of its distribution; offering or making 
available child pornography; distributing or transmitting child pornography.
925
 This provision 
                                                 
925
 Section 23(1)(a) – (c) of the Cybercrime Act 2015 
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in other words seeks to criminalise all acts of producing or distributing child pornographic 
material over the computer system or network.
926
 The Act provides the punishment for this 
category of offence as imprisonment for a term of ten years or a fine of not less than Twenty 
Million Naira, or to both fine and imprisonment.
927
 The magnitude of the punishment 
prescribed here by this legislation shows the severity of these offences. 
 
The second category involves the use of a computer network or system for procuring child 
pornography for oneself or for another person; or possessing child pornography in a computer 
system or on a computer-data storage medium by the offender.
928
 An interesting part of this 
provision is the fact that the legislation acknowledged the fact that there are various data 
storage mediums through which data and information can now be stored. The advancement in 
information technology shows that data can now be compressed in the minutest of appliance, 
and which could also involve the cloud data storage.
929
 An offender could therefore be 
susceptible to criminal prosecution under this provision upon proof that he has the required 
access
930
 to the cloud data system. This in other words means that an offender need not have 
the physical data storage system in his possession to be liable for conviction under the 
                                                 
926
 Okunola Rashidi Akanji, and OJO Matthias Olufemi Dada, ‘Finding the Causal Relationship between Child 
Abuse and Teenage Pregnancy: Perspectives of the Crawford University Students in Nigeria’ (2012) 
International Journal of Prevention and Treatment, 1(4), 67-77 
<http://article.sapub.org/10.5923.j.ijpt.20120104.03.html> accessed on 12 March 2014. 
927
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 Section 14(1) (d) & (e); Mu’azu Abdullahi Saulawa and M. K. Abubakar, ‘Cybercrime in Nigeria: An 
Overview of Cybercrime Act 2013’ (2014) Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, 32, 23-33 
<http://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JLPG/article/download/18571/18708> accessed on 15 May 2015. 
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7(31), 3078-3089. 
930
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provision.
931
 The punishment for this category of offence is imprisonment for a term of Five 
years or a fine of not less than Ten Million Naira, or to both fine and imprisonment.
932
 
 
The third category involves two different offences. This first limb involves where the 
offender for intentionally proposes, grooms or solicits, through information and 
communication technologies, to meet a child, followed by material acts leading to such a 
meeting, for the purpose of engaging in sexual activities with a child.
933
 This second limb 
involves where the offender for intentionally proposes, grooms or solicits, through 
information and communication technologies,
934
 to meet a child, followed by material acts 
leading to such a meeting, for the purpose of engaging in sexual activities with a child where: 
“(i) use is made of coercion, inducement, force or threats; 
(ii) abuse is made of a recognised position of trust, authority or influence over the child, 
including within the family; or 
(iii)  abuse is made of a particularly vulnerable situation of the child, mental or physical 
disability or a situation of dependence.”935  
The Act provides the punishment for this category of offences as imprisonment for a term of 
ten years or a fine of not less than Fifteen Million Naira, or to both fine and imprisonment. 
 
The forth category involves where the offender intentionally proposes, grooms or solicits, 
through information and communication technologies, to meet a child, followed by material 
acts leading to such a meeting for the purpose of recruiting, inducing, coercing, or causing a 
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Known and Unknown’ (2014) <http://waprogramming.com/papers/531568c43c0a67.02114720.pdf> accessed 
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 Abdullahi Y. Shehu, ‘Emerging Issues in Cyber-Crime: Causes, Implications and Effects for the Legal 
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935
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child to participate in pornographic performances or profiting from or otherwise exploiting a 
child for such purposes.
936
 The Act provides the punishment for this category of offence as 
imprisonment for a term of five years or a fine of not less than ten million Naira, or to both 
fine and imprisonment.
937
 
 
An interesting legislative diction used in the third and fourth categories offence above is the 
non-usage of the clause ‘computer system or on a computer-data storage medium’. The Act 
in exchange used ‘information and communication technologies’.938 This therefore 
acknowledges the fact that it does not matter whether the offender used a computer devise or 
any devise capable of data storage to contact the victim.
939
 It therefore does not restrict this 
provision only to the use of internet. It is however arguable that text messages may fall into 
this category, and an offender could be prosecuted within these provisions.
940
 
 
6.3 Racist, Gender and Xenophobic Offences 
 
The use of the internet to promote hatred, or cyber-hate, has since become a matter of 
international concern with the continuous advancement of technology and the vast and 
dynamic nature of the cyber-world.
941
 The fact that with a simple click, an offender could 
escape into another jurisdiction makes it even more difficult to effectively punish offenders in 
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respect of these offences.
942
 There have been concerted efforts to establish set norms and 
sanctions to ensure that the Internet ensures free speech while protecting potential victims, 
and setting the standards required of internet users.
943
 
 
Racism is a form of discrimination, violence or verbal attacks against people, because of their 
colour of skin, religion, culture, nationality or origin.
944
 This does not only include the 
“biological characteristics” such as skin colour, but also include cultural characteristics such 
as religion, because modern racism, for example in the form of anti-Islamic racism works on 
the same principle.
945
 This could, in other words, be any form of hate crime, which the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Crown Prosecution Service (in England 
and Wales) has defined as: “Any criminal offence which is perceived by the victim or any 
other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person’s race or 
perceived race; religion or perceived religion; sexual orientation or perceived sexual  
orientation; disability or perceived disability and any crime motivated by a hostility or 
prejudice against a person who is transgender or perceived to be transgender.”946 According 
to Article 3 of the Proposal of 28 November 2001 for a Council Framework Decision on 
combating racism and xenophobia, ‘racism and xenophobia’ shall mean ‘the belief in race, 
colour, descent, religion or belief, national or ethnic origin as a factor determining aversion to 
individuals or groups’.947 The notion of racism as such is not defined in the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which only provides a 
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definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in its Article 1, paragraph 1.948 Certain elements of a 
definition of the notion of racism could however be found in Article 4 (a) CERD which 
imposes to States Parties to: “…declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of 
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all 
acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another 
colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including 
the financing thereof”.949 
 
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) of the Council of Europe, 
in its General Policy Recommendation No. 7 of 13 December 2002 on National Legislation 
to Combat Racism and Discrimination defines ‘racism’ as ‘the belief that a ground such as 
race, colour, language, religion, nationality or national or ethnic origin justifies contempt for 
a person or a group of persons, or the notion of superiority of a person or a group of 
persons.’950 The Explanatory Memorandum of ECRI General Policy951 underlines that the 
term ‘racism’ should be understood in a broad sense, ‘including phenomena such as 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance’ and the use of the expression ‘grounds such as’ 
in the definition of racism aims at establishing an open-ended list of grounds, ‘thereby 
allowing it to evolve with society’.952 However, the ECRI Explanatory Memorandum 
expressly provides that unlike the definition of racial discrimination (which should be 
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included in the law) States Parties may or may not decide to define racism within their 
criminal legislation.
953
 The Explanatory Memorandum adds that, if the parties choose to 
resort to such a definition, an exhaustive list of grounds, rather than an open-ended list of 
grounds, could be established in order to respect the principle of foreseeability which governs 
this branch of the law.
954
 An offence will be racially aggravated where ‘the offender 
demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s membership 
(or presumed membership) of a racial group’955 or the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) 
by hostility towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that group.
956
 
 
In R v Rogers,
957
 the defendant was involved in an altercation with three young Spanish 
women during the course of which he called them ‘bloody foreigners’ and told them to ‘go 
back to your own country’. He argued that he had not called the victims “bloody Spaniards” 
but “bloody foreigners”, and as such, he had not shown hostility towards a particular group, 
but to foreigners as a whole and that this amounted to xenophobia which was not the same as 
hostility to a racial group. The House of Lords, in upholding the defendant’s conviction, held 
that the definition of a ‘racial group’ in section 28(4) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
clearly goes beyond groups defined by their colour, race, or ethnic origin. It encompassed 
both nationality (including citizenship) and national origins. The Court decided that the 
statute intended a broad non-technical approach; and therefore could as well be applied to 
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scenarios where the incident took place on the internet.
958
 Also in Director of Public 
Prosecutions v M
959
 the Divisional Court held that, depending on the context, the term 
“bloody foreigners” could demonstrate hostility to a racial group. In Attorney General’s 
Reference No 4 of 2004
960
 the Court of Appeal held that the term “someone who is an 
immigrant to this country and therefore non-British” could be a member of a racial group for 
the purpose of the 1998 Act. Again, in R v White (Anthony),
961
 it was held that the word 
“African” could demonstrate hostility to a racial group, because it would generally be taken 
to mean black African. In Rogers’ case, the Court emphasised that the law does not simply 
require the avoidance of particular words or phrases widely recognised as derogatory or 
offensive.
962
 Therefore, the test whether racist or xenophobic hostility was demonstrated, or 
indeed formed the motivation of the crime, does not depend on the particular words used by 
the offender,
963
 but on the context within which the offender’s criminal conduct occurred.964 
 
An Additional Protocol to the convention on cybercrime, concerning acts of a racist and 
xenophobic nature committed through Computer Systems was opened for signature in 
                                                 
958
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Strasbourg on 28
th
 January, 2003 and came into force on 1
st
 March, 2006.
965
 As at 22
nd
 June, 
2015, the convention had been signed by 38 members and ratified by 24 members.
966
 The 
Protocol requires member States to criminalize the dissemination of racist and xenophobic 
material through computer systems, as well as of racist and xenophobic-motivated threats and 
insults.
 
Both countries (Nigeria and the United Kingdom) have not signed or ratified this 
additional protocol. Although Nigeria is not a member of the Council of Europe, it would 
have been advisable to sign this Convention, as some nations outside Europe had signed it 
and are admitted as observers to the council of Europe.
967
 The main objective of the 
Additional Protocol was to achieve effective legal cooperation by ensuring that the Member 
States either make adequate provisions that certain types of racist and xenophobic conduct as 
listed there in be punishable as criminal offences, or to derogate from the principle of double 
criminality in respect of such conducts.
968
 These provisions are meant to realise the 
approximation of laws and regulations of the Member States and foster closer co-operation 
between judicial and other authorities amongst Member States regarding offences involving 
racism and xenophobia.
969
 
 
This Additional Protocol has to be understood in a context where recent instances of ‘cross-
border racism’ illustrate how the prosecution of racism and xenophobia would be facilitated 
                                                 
965
 Additional Protocol to the convention on cybercrime, concerning acts of a racist and xenophobic nature 
committed through Computer Systems is available at 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/189.htm> accessed on 4 December 2012. 
966
 <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=189&CM=4&DF=&CL=ENG> accessed 
on 22 June 2015. 
967
 These nations include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Japan, Mexico, 
Panama, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, and United States of America. 
968
 Yulia A Timofeeva, “Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected-Comparison of Regulations in the United 
States and Germany” (2002) J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y, 12, 253 
<http://archive.law.fsu.edu/Journals/transnational/vol12_2/timofeeva.pdf> accessed on 12 June 2015. 
969
 Kristin Archick, "Cybercrime: The council of Europe convention" (2005) Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress <http://mail.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/crs/10088.pdf> accessed on 12 June 2015. 
215 
 
if comparable legislation existed in the Member States of the European Union.
970
 Article 6, 
Section 1 of the Protocol specifically covers the denial of the Holocaust and other genocides 
recognized as such by other international courts set up since 1945 by relevant international 
legal instruments.
971
 A good example is the Siegfried Verbeke’s case.972 On 28 November 
2008, the Council adopted the Framework Decision on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law to fight against racist and 
xenophobic speech and crime, by means of criminal law.
973
 One of the reasons behind this 
Framework Decision is the need to define a common criminal law approach across the EU to 
racism and xenophobia, so that the same behaviour constitutes an offence in all EU 
countries.
974
 The Framework Decision, in Article 1 (a), requires EU Member States to take 
measures to punish public incitement to violence or hatred directed against a person or 
persons belonging to a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion, descent or 
national or ethnic origin and the commission of such acts by public dissemination or 
distribution of tracts, pictures or other material. It also requires EU Member States to take 
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extremist) who was in August arrested at Schiphol Amsterdam airport. He was one of the leading disseminators 
of publications denying the Holocaust. On his website, he publishes theories to deny the Holocaust in four 
languages. In 1997 the Dutch Supreme Court convicted him to six month suspended imprisonment and a penalty 
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Germany where he was wanted for Holocaust denial and writing internet articles on the subject. He was 
sentenced to 9 months in prison, and released on May 5, 2006. The court took into account his activities, both in 
public settings and on the Internet during the period 1996-2002. On December 15, 2006, he was again arrested 
on the basis of an arrest warrant from the Court of Appeal in Antwerp, issued April 14, 2005, and was 
subsequently incarcerated in Belgium. In June 2008 he was fined €25,000 and sentenced again to a one year 
term, together with for denialism. 
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measures to punish any conduct publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivializing crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, when the conduct is carried out in a 
manner likely to incite to violence or hatred against a person or persons belonging to one of 
the groups listed in Article 1 (a) of the Framework Decision.
975
 For other criminal offences 
motivated by hatred or prejudice, the Framework Decision, in Article 4, gives the legislative 
arm of Member States level two options: “For offences other than those referred to in 
Articles 1 and 2, Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that racist and 
xenophobic motivation is considered an aggravating circumstance, or, alternatively that such 
motivation may be taken into consideration by the courts in the determination of the 
penalties.” 
 
In the UK the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (as amended), came into force on 30 September 
1998 and created a number of specific offences of racially aggravated crime, based on 
offences of wounding, assault, damage, harassment and threatening/abusive behaviour. This 
Act was amended by the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, which came into effect 
on 14 December 2001, and extended the scope of the Crime and Disorder Act by creating 
new specific religiously aggravated offences and applying the same sentencing duty to all 
other offences where there is evidence of religious aggravation.
976
 Now, with the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006, the Schedule to which inserts a new Part 3A (sections 29A to 29 
N) to the Public Order Act 1986, the legislature has enacted a new substantive law, which is 
not related to other offences such as grievous bodily harm or wounding or harassment,
977
 but 
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creates an entirely new offence of stirring up hatred against persons on religious grounds.
978
 
The Act was amended further by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, which came into 
effect on 25 November 2012. This Act creates new specific offences of stalking and the 
racially and religiously aggravated versions of these offences.  
 
For Northern Ireland, the Public Order (Northern Ireland) Order 1987
979
 serves the same 
purpose, while the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006, and more 
recently, the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) 
Act (2012) are applicable to Scotland, which created two new offences; one covers behaviour 
in and around football matches, the other relates to messages sent by post or by electronic 
means.
980
 Sections 29-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has further introduced the 
concept of a ‘racially aggravated offence’, resulting in enhanced penalties where racial 
hostility was an element in the offence committed, for certain specific offences. To prove that 
an offence is racially or religiously aggravated, the prosecution has to prove the “basic” 
offence followed by racial or religious aggravation, as defined in section 28 Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998.
981
 An offence will be racially or religiously aggravated if:  
(a) At the time of the offence (or shortly before or after), the offender demonstrates to the 
victim hostility based on the victim's membership (or presumed membership) of a ra-
cial or religious group; or  
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(b) The offence is motivated wholly or partly by hostility towards members of a racial or 
religious group based on their membership (or presumed membership) of that group. 
A basic offence is motivated by hostility and therefore becomes an aggravated offence if the 
offender committed it because of hostility towards members of a racial or religious group 
based on their membership of that group.
982
 An aggravated offence can be committed in two 
separate ways: The first is to demonstrate hostility towards the victim of a basic offence 
because of the victim’s actual or presumed race or religion.983 The second is to be motivated 
to commit a basic offence by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group because 
of their membership of that group.
984
 Hostility can be demonstrated through words, gestures 
and other behaviour, such as sending emails to the victim, posting songs or racist notes, 
articles or songs on the victim’s social networking page, or a blog inviting people to comment 
on the issues of a racist nature about the victim.
985
 All that matters in this regard is that, in 
doing so, racial or religious hostility was demonstrated towards the victim. It also does not 
matter if the defendant had mistaken about the victim’s actual race or religion.986  
 
The racist and xenophobic nature offences are also provided for in sections 18 to 23 of the 
Public Order Act 1986. Section 19 criminalises acts involving publishing or distribution of 
written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting with the intention to stir up racial 
hatred, or having regard to all the circumstances, that racial hatred is likely to be stirred up by 
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the offender’s act.987 Section 29 of the Act has also defined “written material” to include any 
sign or other visible representation; and in other words, any publication on the websites, 
blogs, discussion forums, chat rooms, instant MMS messaging (like ‘What’s App’) or text 
messages and social network sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, and LinkedIn.
988
 
 
In R. v Sheppard & Whittle,
989
 Mr Whittle (W) had written material which cast doubt on the 
existence of the holocaust and contained derogatory remarks about a number of racial groups. 
Mr Sheppard (S) had edited the material and uploaded it to a website which he had set up for 
the purpose of disseminating it. The website was hosted by a remote server located in 
California. Once posted on the site, the material was available to be viewed and downloaded 
in a number of countries including the United Kingdom. Some of the material was distributed 
in the UK in print form through the post. At trial the prosecution relied upon evidence from a 
police officer who had visited the site and downloaded the documents. The court had 
assumed jurisdiction because a substantial measure of S and W's activities had taken place in 
the UK, and convicted the defendants for possessing, publishing and distributing racially 
inflammatory material contrary to the Public Order Act 1986.
990
 On appeal, the Court of 
Appeal while dismissing the appeal held that in considering whether there was any basis for 
not applying the “substantial measure” principle, section 42 was not a restriction of 
jurisdiction but rather sets out the limitations as to its extent within England and Wales and 
was not determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
991
 Further, the “substantial measure” 
test not only accorded with the purpose of the relevant provisions of the Act, it also reflected 
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the practicalities of the instant case. Almost everything in the instant case related to the UK, 
which was where the material was generated, edited, uploaded and controlled.
992
 The material 
was aimed primarily at the British public. The only foreign element was that the website was 
hosted by a server in California, but the use of the server was merely a stage in the 
transmission of the material. There was abundant material to satisfy the “substantial measure” 
test, as set out in R v. Smith.
993
 The Court further held that section 29 stated that “written 
material includes any sign or other visible representation”. The use of the word “includes” in 
the legislation was plainly intended to widen the scope of the expression and the words were 
sufficiently wide to include articles in electronic form, such as the material disseminated by 
the website in the instant case.
994
 
 
This case also portrays the fact that offences of displaying, distributing or publishing racially 
inflammatory material does not require proof that anybody had actually read or heard the 
material to secure the conviction of an offender;
995
 and could in other words fall into the 
categories of strict liability offences. An offender could be culpable on proof that the 
document was available online. In DPP v Collins
996
, the House of Lords held that the offence 
under section 127(1)(a) of the Communications Act 2003 required proof that a person, who 
had sent a message by means of a public electronic communications network, intended his 
words to be offensive to those to whom they related or be aware that they might be taken to 
be so, but a culpable state of mind would ordinarily be found where a message was couched 
in terms liable to cause gross offence to those to whom it related. It made no difference to 
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criminal liability whether a message was ever actually received or whether the persons who 
received it were offended by it.
997
 What mattered was whether reasonable persons in a multi-
racial society would find the message grossly offensive.
998
 This case also restated that it is 
justifiable under Article 10(2) of the ECHR to prosecute somebody who has used the public 
telecommunications system to leave racist messages.
999
 
 
Section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 also provides that it is an offence for a person to use 
“threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour” or display “any writing, sign or other 
visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting” which causes “that or 
another person harassment, alarm or distress” and which the speaker intends to have that 
effect. Section 4A is just one type of public order law that can apply online.
1000
 In addition, 
the Public Order Act 1986 includes offences where expression is likely to incite hatred on the 
grounds of race,
1001
 religion and sexual orientation.
1002
 The Act provides for six scenarios 
where offences would be committed under the Act, which includes:  
 
(a) Using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or displaying written ma-
terial which is threatening, abusive or insulting;
1003
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(b) Publishing or distributing written material which is threatening, abusive or insult-
ing;
1004
 
(c) Presenting or directing a play in public involving the use of threatening, abusive or 
insulting words or behaviour;
1005
 
(d) Distributing, showing or playing a recording of pictures or sounds which are threaten-
ing, abusive or insulting;
1006
 
(e) Providing, producing or directing a programme (for example, a TV or radio pro-
gramme) where the programme involves threatening, abusive or insulting pictures or 
sounds, or use of threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour
1007
; or 
(f) Possessing written material, or a recording of pictures or sounds, this is threatening, 
abusive or insulting, with a view to it being displayed, published, distributed, shown, 
played or included in a programme.
1008
  
 
Some other EU Member States, like Denmark, Hungary, and Sweden have also included at 
least sexual orientation as an additional category of discrimination in their municipal laws. 
The UK government has since shown that it is dynamic and changing with the dynamic and 
ever changing nature of the racism and xenophobic offences committed through the internet 
further with the enactment of the Equality Act 2010. The Law Commission has issued a 
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Consultation Paper on hate crimes,
1009
 which was followed by the Law Commission’s 
presentation to Parliament in May 2014.
1010
 The government is considering to extend the 
aggravated offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to include where hostility is 
demonstrated towards people on the grounds of disability, sexual orientation or gender 
identity; and the case for extending the stirring up of hatred offences under the Public Order 
Act 1986 to include stirring up of hatred on the grounds of disability or gender identity. 
 
The African Union Convention specifically made extensive provisions in Article 29(3) (1) 
(f)-(h), by urging member states to criminalise all acts of threatening
1011
 or insulting,
1012
 
through a computer system, against a person for the reason that they belong to a group 
distinguished by race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin or religion where such 
membership serves as a pretext for any of these factors, or against a group of persons which 
is distinguished by any of the characteristics. Replicas of these provisions are also contained 
in Articles 21 and 22 of the ECOWAS Directives. The ECOWAS Directive however contains 
an additional provision in Article 20 relating to the possession of racist or xenophobic written 
documents or pictures through a computer system.  
 
Section 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 provides for freedom 
from discrimination on the grounds of ethnic group, origin, gender, religion, circumstances of 
birth, disability, or political opinion.
1013
 The constitution, being the supreme law of the land 
on the basis of which the validity of other laws are determined is therefore the grundnorm of 
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the country’s corpus juris.1014 The right contained therein are enforceable in accordance with 
the provisions of the constitutions. The infringement of these rights could at best be subjected 
to a civil claim under the fundamental rights enforcement procedure.
1015
 For these 
infringements to amount to criminal, an additional legislative requirement is required. Prior to 
the enactment of the Cybercrime Act 2015, there were no provisions in either the Nigerian 
Criminal Code or the Penal Code that specifically criminalises racist and xenophobic acts 
committed against a victim. However, the prosecution had resorted to the use an alternative 
provision in sections 50 and 51 of the Criminal Code Act which provides for sedition 
offences. The provisions of section 50(2) (A) (b)–(d) defines “seditious intention” as an 
intention to incite the citizens or other inhabitants of Nigeria to attempt to procure the 
alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any other matter in Nigeria as by law 
established; or to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the citizens or other inhabitants of 
Nigeria; or to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of the 
population of Nigeria.
1016
 Section 51 further prescribed a two years imprisonment as the 
punishment for the offence of sedition. This situation was however not ideal for acts 
committed in cyberspace.  
 
Taking guidance from both provisions of the AU Convention and the ECOWAS Directive, 
the Nigerian Cybercrime Act makes encompassing provisions in section 26 which includes 
the distribution,
1017
 threatening
1018
 or insulting
1019
 through a computer system or network, 
persons for the reason that they belong to a group, distinguished by race, sex, colour, descent, 
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national or ethnic origin, as well as, religion, if used as a pretext for any of these factors, or a 
group of persons which is distinguished by any of these characteristics. The term “racist, 
gender and xenophobic material” was defined in section 18(2) to mean any written or printed 
material, any image or any other representation of ideas or theories, which advocates, 
promotes or incites hatred, discrimination or violence, against any individual or group of 
individuals, based on race, sex, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well as religion 
if used as a pretext for any of these factors. These provisions are complementary to the 
provisions of the United Kingdom and other EU states, and have also included a provision 
regarding sexual orientation as an additional category of discrimination.  
 
6.4 Identity Theft Offences 
 
Identity theft has grown to be a significant problem for the global economy.
1020
 About 
138,800 victims of identity crimes were reported in the United Kingdom in 2013.
1021
 The 
changing and dynamic nature of these offences has contributed to making their definition a 
much contested term.
1022
 Identity theft could be described as criminal acts where the offender 
fraudulently obtains and uses another person’s identity.1023 There is no single definition of 
identity theft; with the terms ‘identity crime’, ‘identity fraud’ and ‘identity theft’ often being 
used interchangeably.
1024
 There are usually two aspects involved in this type of offence – 
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theft and fraud.
1025
 Identity theft is completed when the victims’ personal details are stolen, 
while the identity fraud occurs when that stolen identity is used in the commission of further 
criminal activities by the offender to obtain goods or services by deception.
1026
 As aptly 
described by the UK Information Commissioner’s Office1027, if your identity is stolen, 
“…your name, address and date of birth provide enough information to create another 
‘you’”. The offenders could use their victim’s stolen identity details to open bank accounts, 
obtain credit cards, loans and state benefits;
1028
 order goods in the victims’ name(s); take over 
their victims’ existing accounts;1029 take out monetary contracts in their victim’s name; obtain 
genuine documents such as passports and driving licences in the name of their victim.
1030
 The 
first time the victims usually become aware that their identity may have been stolen is when 
they receive bills or invoices for goods or services they have not ordered for, or when they 
receive letters from debt collectors for debts which they are not aware of.
1031
 
 
As more and more important aspects of our lives involve the internet and personal data are 
stored in computers and other related networks, there are also hackers and individuals with 
criminal intent that use malicious software and other devices to obtain people’s personal 
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information for their selfish interest often causing loss to their victims.
1032
 Identity fraud in 
itself is when a person knowingly obtains and uses another person’s personal data in some 
way that involves fraud or deception and it is typically for economic gain while 
impersonation might necessarily not be for financial gain but to cause disadvantage or 
discomfort to the person being impersonated or another or for the avoidance of the law.
1033
 
An example of modern day impersonation enhanced by technology is “online 
impersonation”.1034 This can be described as creating a web page, social media network, 
sending an email or an instant message on the internet using the name, domain name or any 
other personal data of another person with the intent to harm, defraud, intimidate or threaten 
another person or persons.
1035
 
 
Phishing has recently risen to be one of the most used technique relied upon by cybercrime 
offenders in order to trick, their victims into revealing their personal and financial 
information, which is later used to defraud third parties while posing as the victims.
1036
 These 
processes could start by the indiscriminate sending of multiple emails to victims purporting to 
be from the victims’ bank, payment system or other regular form of financial transaction 
avenues constantly used by the victims, such as PayPal, Visa, eBay or Amazon.
1037
 Identity 
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theft has also evolved through an increased use of illegal computer spyware installed by the 
offenders to either keep a log of the victim’s keystrokes, including victim’s passwords and 
cyber-footprints, or in most cases, with the sole aim seeking out key financial information 
stored on the relevant computer hard-drives of their victims.
1038
 Once this information are 
obtained and subsequently relayed back, the offender poses as the victims, while committing 
further cybercrime against another third party. Zeus for example, is a slick, professionally 
crafted piece of malware that is distributed by spammed email or after visiting an infected 
website.
1039
 The major characteristics of these malwares are their ability to focus solely on 
collecting banking information which is subsequently sent to a collecting database via 
encrypted communication,
1040
 and their built-in capacity of evading detection, even with the 
best of anti-spywares.
1041
 Another milestone in the computerisation of identity theft has been 
the invention of the botnets.
1042
 This comprises of lists of the internet protocol (IP) addresses 
of ‘zombie’ computers that have been infected by remote administration tools (malwares).1043 
These zombie computers can be controlled remotely to send out messages, and also return 
information about the user.
1044
 Botnets have exponentially increased the power of the 
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criminals and transformed their operational nature of criminal activities in the cyberspace by 
increasing the amount computers infected by malicious software.
1045
 
 
In light of these problems associated with identity theft and impersonation over the internet, it 
is hardly surprising that increasing attention is being paid to alternative forms of identity 
verification, and more particularly the use of biometrics identification.
1046
 Apple and some 
other android mobile telephone applications, for instance, have recently updated their 
network to include the use of biometrics identification as an alternative source of 
identification.
1047
 
 
Under the English law, the provisions regarding deception offences under the Theft Act 1968 
and the very recently the Fraud Act, 2006 are used to prosecute offences and situations 
related to identity theft. A very significant feature of the Fraud Act 2006 is that the act of 
sending phishing emails will in itself give rise to culpability for a criminal offence.
1048
 This 
clearly contradicts some notions which purported to suggest that the preparatory acts to 
appropriation of an identity of itself will not give rise to a criminal offence.
1049
 There is 
therefore no requirement to show that the offender has used the obtained information in the 
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commission of a fraudulence act.
1050
 Like in cases of phishing emails, there is therefore no 
requirement to show that the offender have used the information to access the funds in the 
victim’s account; and the victim need not respond to the phishing email or act on the 
request.
1051
 Chen and Henry have suggested that the offence is completed the moment the 
offender hits the ‘send’ button on the computer.1052 This shows that the law considers the 
conduct of the offenders as the most relevant criminal aspect of the offence as opposed to the 
resultant effect of the conduct. There is no doubt that the Fraud Act 2006, was enacted to 
keep abreast with the emerging technologies, and also to obviate the need for constant 
reactive reform.
1053
 This legislation appears to facilitate the prosecution of phishing, does not 
require any proof of deception or the obtaining or ‘taking’ of any property which were pre-
requisites to conviction under the previous legislations.
1054
  Section 1 of the Act creates a new 
general offence of ‘fraud’, which can be committed in three ways: by false representation;1055 
by failing to disclose information;
1056
 and by abuse of position.
1057
 Section 2 of the Act is the 
relevant legislation which makes provisions for computer related identity theft and 
impersonation, provides as follows: 
“(1) A person is in breach of this section if he—  
(a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and  
(b) intends, by making the representation—  
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(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or  
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.” 
 
Representation is defined in section 2 subsections (2) and (3) respectively, to mean any 
representation as to fact or law, and that a representation may be expressed or implied.
1058
 In 
other words, there is no limitation on the way a representation must be made; and it is 
arguable that this includes written or spoken representation, or where it is posted on a website 
or email.
1059
 It could also be inferred from conduct, of the offender, or by the offender failing 
to deny the existence of the fact which the victim had to the knowledge of the offender 
believed to be in existence. Thus following the postulations of Chen and Henry
1060
 in the 
context of phishing offences, the actus reus of the section 2 offence is deemed to have been 
completed when the offender hits the ‘send’ button at his computer sending the initial email 
requesting the victim recipient to access a given website or a web link.
1061
 In other words, the 
offence is completed even before the email is received and eventually read by the victim. The 
UK Act seem to have removed the need for gain or loss, or even that a property right is 
endangered, by focussing solely on the conduct of the offender.
1062
 The mens rea 
requirements for section 2 of the Act that must be proved by the prosecution in order to 
secure any conviction is that the offender made the representation dishonestly.
1063
 
Unfortunately, the meaning to be given to the word ‘dishonestly’ is not defined by the Act, 
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and but only remains a question of fact for the jury,
1064
 and also depends on the circumstance 
of each case. When the Law Commission Revision Committee published its eighth report 
concerning the proposed Theft Act 1968 that was meant to replace the Larceny Act of 1916, 
it debated the concept of dishonesty which replaced ‘fraudulently’ as a mens rea requirement. 
It said: “Dishonesty’ seems to us a better word than ‘fraudulently’. The question ‘Was this 
dishonest?’ is easier for a jury to answer than ‘Was this fraudulent?’ Dishonesty is 
something which laymen can easily recognise when they see it, whereas ‘fraud’ may seem to 
involve technicalities which have to be explained by a lawyer.”1065 
 
Despite being part of the Theft Act 1968 for nearly 40 years, there is still no satisfactory 
definition of dishonesty in the UK criminal law, and juries are left to depend on the common 
law descriptions as enunciated in the cases of R v. Feely
1066
 and R v. Ghosh
1067
. Interestingly, 
Ghosh’s case relates to deception offences, but the problem faced by the jury in the case did 
not concern the definitional elements of deception, but of dishonesty. Lord Lane CJ gave the 
instruction to the jurors as follows: “There are, sad to say, infinite categories of dishonesty. It 
is for you jurors of the past, and whilst we have criminal law in the future, jurors in the future 
to set the standards of honesty.” 
 
In R v Seward
1068
 the defendant who was acting as the “front man” in the use of stolen credit 
cards and other documents to obtain goods, had telephoned a bank pretending to be the 
victim, a customer of the bank, and asked for a credit card to be sent to a particular branch. 
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Having produced a false driving licence in the victim's name, he collected the card from the 
branch, and withdrew in total £10,000 from two separate bank branches and attempted to 
withdraw £5,000 from a third bank, whereat he was detained. The Court of Appeal 
considered sentencing policy for deception offenses involving ‘identity theft’ and concluded 
that a prison sentence was required. Henriques J. stated at para 14 that: “Identity fraud is a 
particularly pernicious and prevalent form of dishonesty calling for, in our judgment, 
deterrent sentences.” The Court considered the seriousness of the offences in sentencing, and 
held that that there was an urgent need to reflect the ‘public and financial institution’s 
extreme concern about identity fraud offences, and deter others from committing similar 
offences’.1069 
 
The nature and definition of dishonesty under the 'Ghosh test' does not limit this possibility 
as it is left to the discretion of the jury to decide whether an act is dishonest or not. However, 
the Act would have settled the uncertainties surrounding the definition of dishonesty by 
making a working definition in the Act. It will create more confusion where the Jury is asked 
by the court to infer ‘lay’ definitions in individual cases. In its Fraud and Deception 
Consultation Paper (number 155), the Law Commission took issue with conduct being 
characterised as dishonest under Ghosh which did not in fact give rise to civil liability: “In 
general, we believe that the criminal law should take a robust view of what is to be allowed 
in the market place; and in particular we think it wrong that conduct which is not actionable 
should be regarded as a substantive crime of dishonesty.”1070 
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From the forgoing, under the UK provisions regarding identity theft, there are two basic 
requirements which must be met before the offence could be said to have been committed 
under the Act. First, the behaviour of the defendant must be dishonest. Secondly, the offender 
must have the requisite intention to make a gain, or cause a loss to another.
1071
 However, 
there is no longer any need to prove that a gain or loss has been made, or that any victim was 
deceived by the defendant’s behaviour.1072 Although both notions are used interchangeably, 
there is a clear-cut difference between identity theft, and identity fraud. Identity theft is a 
precursor to identity fraud. While identity theft is an act of knowingly obtaining or possessing 
another person’s or entity’s identity information with the intent to deceive or defraud, identity 
fraud on the other hand is the act of completing the already existing mens rea in identity theft, 
which involves using the acquired identity for fraudulent acts.  
 
The position is very clear and unambiguous under the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015. 
Section 22(a) of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act makes express provision for the offence of 
identity theft while section 22(b) makes provisions for the offence of impersonation. Under 
section 22(a) of the Act, it is an offence for any person who in the course of using a 
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computer
1073
 to knowingly obtains or possesses another person’s or entity’s identity 
information with the intention of using the acquired identity to deceive or defraud. This 
provision clarifies the ambiguity surrounding the victim of identity theft offences, which is 
always misinterpreted to be ‘a human person’.1074 This clearly shows that an entity, 
corporation, a company, a descriptive unit or community could be the subject of this 
offence.
1075
 The Supreme Court case of Mike Amadi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria
1076
 was 
decided based on the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code, and Advance Fee Fraud and 
other Fraud Related Offences Act but goes to show that an offender could be convicted for 
stealing the identity of a body corporate. The offender in this case had cloned the official 
website of the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
1077
, and 
registered the website as, www.efccnigeria.com, and another website www.rediff.com, which 
he used to transact fraudulent financial business with several persons. He also sent various 
fake E-mails to the victim that were purportedly sent by Alhaji Nuhu Ribadu
1078
. The suspect 
was later arrested over the fraud of the sum of $125,000 and charged for identity theft and 
impersonation, amongst other offences. He was convicted and sentenced to 16 years 
imprisonment. 
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Section 22(b) on the other hand makes express provision for cyber-impersonation. This 
provision makes it an offence for any person who in the course of using a computer, 
computer system or network to fraudulently impersonate another entity or person, (living or 
dead), with the intention of gaining advantage for himself or another person, obtaining any 
property or an interest in any property, causing disadvantage to the entity or person being 
impersonated or another person or avoiding arrest or prosecution or to obstruct, pervert or 
defeat the course of justice.
1079
 A very distinct characteristic of this provision in comparison 
the identity theft offence in section 22(a) seem to suggest that while the offence of 
impersonation could be committed against a dead person, the offence of identity theft cannot. 
This is as a result of the emphasis by the legislature in using the phrase ‘living or dead’ in 
section 22(b), which is conspicuously absent in the provisions of section 22(a) of the Act. 
Mann seems to question this legislative trend, because according to him, identity theft can 
take place whether the victim is alive or deceased.
1080
 As a matter of fact, there has recently 
emerged a new form of identity theft against a dead person, known as ‘ghosting’. Ghosting is 
a form of identity theft in which someone steals the identity, and sometimes even the role 
within society, of a specific dead person (the "ghost") whose death has not widely been 
publicised.
1081
 Usually, the person who steals this identity (the "ghoster") is roughly the same 
age that the ghost would have been if still alive, so that any documents citing the date of birth 
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of the ghost will not be conspicuously incorrect if appropriated by ‘the ghoster’ now claiming 
to be ‘the ghost’.1082  
 
Another case of identity theft in Nigeria is the case of Federal Republic of Nigeria v. 
Ikonji,
1083
 where the offender, a 5
th
 year student of University of Lagos was sentenced to 45 
years imprisonment for impersonating the former executive chairman of the Nigerian 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to swindle the victim a sum of about 
$750,000. These cases present situations where the existing traditional statutory provisions 
were applied to prosecute cases of identity fraud and impersonation. It must be noted 
however that none of the above cases presented the court with any perplexing technical and 
legal difficulties such as retrieval and preservation of the electronic evidences and their 
admissibility in evidence. The case of Odua v. Federal Republic of Nigeria
1084
 also seem to 
suggest that assuming the identity of a non-existing or unknown person could also suffice to 
be criminalised for the offence of identity theft and/or impersonation. In this case the suspect 
had posed as one Dr Idika, while communication with the victim who resides in Denmark for 
purposes of transferring the sum of $36,561 from the account belonging to ‘The Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)’1085 in Nigeria to Denmark on commission. The 
victim had reported the matter to the Nigerian Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, and was 
asked to play along with the suspect in the deal. ‘Dr Idika’ requested the victim for 
$10,000.00 as ‘gratification’ for Central Bank officials in Nigeria, so as to facilitate the 
transfer to be remitted to his address in Lagos, Nigeria, by the DHL Office. Having notified 
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the Nigerian Embassy in Denmark, as well as the Special Fraud Unit of the Nigerian Police 
Force, of these developments, a parcel purportedly containing the sum of $10,000 was 
despatched as directed by the suspect, ‘Dr Idika’. Surveillance was mounted at the DHL 
office, by the police. The suspect came for the parcel and claimed it for Dr Idika. He was 
apprehended there and then. An ‘identity card’ and a driver's licence, bearing the name of Dr 
Idika, were recovered on him. The appellant later took the police to his residence, and a 
search conducted in the flat, the police recovered from his computer various emails and 
letters addressed to other victims outside Nigeria. He was arraigned and convicted at the 
lower court. He appealed to the Court of appeal challenging his conviction, mostly on 
technicalities regarding the admissibility of the evidence against them. His appeal was 
successful despite the weight of evidence against him; and he was discharged and acquitted. 
This case goes to show the challenges faced by using traditional legislations to prosecute 
cybercrime offences. The traditional provisions on impersonation as contained in the statutes 
are not up to date, and are therefore inadequate to regulate complex cases of identity theft and 
other related economic cybercrime offences.
1086
 In the face of technological advancement, 
prosecuting these offences under the Criminal Code and all other domestic penal legislation 
has proved a difficulty and it is embarrassingly obvious that when these laws were enacted 
there was no recourse to how technology would impact on crime.
1087
  
 
The provision in section 22 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 is similar to the provisions 
contained in Article 14 of the ITU Model Legislative texts; but unfortunately there is no 
specific provision in the Council of Europe’s Convention of Cybercrime related to identity 
theft offences, and this has created a very big lacuna in the adjectival laws of signatories who 
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‘strictly’ used the Convention as their benchmark for cybercrime legislations. There is 
obviously need for the Convention to be revisited with the aim of amending and/or adding the 
offence of identity theft as substantive offences.
1088
 The Council seem to have also realised 
this fact, which necessitated their publication of a Guidance Note on Identity theft and 
phishing in relation to fraud on 5 June 2013.
1089
 Although the Guidance tried to argue that 
different Articles of the Convention apply to identity theft in relation to fraud offences 
involving computer systems, it is however obvious that offences related to identity theft could 
be stand-alone offences which could be committed independent of other computer related 
offences.
1090
 This view is also acknowledged by the EU Directives on attacks against 
information systems,
1091
 which replaced Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, and 
indicated that a new strategy should be developed with the signatories and the Commission, 
taking into account the content of the 2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.
1092
 
Specifically, paragraph 14 of the Preamble to the Council Framework Decision stated that 
setting up effective measures against identity theft and other identity-related offences 
constitutes another important element of an integrated approach against cybercrime, and there 
is urgent need for a joint action by member states to criminalise these types of criminal 
behaviours.
1093
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The same approach taken by the Council of Europe’s Convention of Cybercrime was also 
adopted by the ECOWAS Directives on Cybercrime which makes no single provisions for 
identity theft offences. One would have thought that since this Directive was made about ten 
years after the Budapest Convention, it would have been very mindful of the significant 
loopholes in the adjectival law jurisprudence in the Convention, and would have tried to 
rectify it, by making an express provision on identity theft and other essential offences 
missing on the Convention.  
 
6.5 Cyberstalking Offences 
 
Cyberstalking has been defined as a group of behaviours in which the use of information and 
communications technology is intended to cause emotional distress to another person.
1094
 
Stalking, generally, has been defined as a course of conduct that causes fear and alarm
1095
 
where there was an intention to cause
1096
 or where it ought to have been known to cause fear 
and alarm to another.
1097
 This definition is similar to the definition provided in section 2 of 
the UK Protection from Harassment Act 1997, which was enacted to deal with stalking 
offences. The  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  preventing  and  combating  violence  
against  women  and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention)
1098
, provides a definition of 
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stalking as “repeatedly engaging in threatening conduct directed at another person, causing 
her or him to fear for his or her safety.”1099 
 
Some scholars have suggested that cyberstalking is synonymous with traditional offline 
stalking because of the similarities in content and intent.
1100
 This research does not subscribe 
to these views that seek to synthesise cyberstalking with offline stalking.
1101
 Although there 
are similarities that are pointed to include a desire to exert control over the victim, and, much 
like offline stalking, cyberstalking involves repeated harassing or threatening behaviour, 
which is often a prelude to more serious behaviours. Cyberstalking is completely different 
from offline stalking.
1102
 For instance, cyber stalkers can use the internet for immediate 
harassment of their victims and attract wide audience in the propagation of their harassment 
of their victims, while an offline stalker does not enjoy the same luxury.
1103
 In trying to 
proffer a more descriptive scenario, Pittaro stated that “in offline stalking, although the 
offender may harass the victim by repeatedly telephoning him/her, however every telephone 
call is a single event that requires the stalker’s action and time, and involves only the victim 
and offender”.1104 This is different to the cyberstalking scenario where with a click of the 
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mouse, the victim is stalked before the whole world.
1105
 The evolvement of websites, blogs, 
discussion forums, chat rooms, instant group multimedia messaging (like ‘WhatsApp’) and 
social network sites (such as Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, and LinkedIn) has since 
metamorphosed the already complicated issues surrounding cyberstalking.
1106
 Statistics on 
cyberstalking has suggested that stalking using Social Networking Sites (SNS’s) is 
increasing.
1107
  
 
Cyberstalking involves “the repeated use of the Internet, e-mail, or related digital electronic 
communication devices to annoy, alarm, or threaten a specific individual or group of 
individuals.”1108 Behaviours associated with cyberstalking include making threats, false 
accusations (false-victimization), abusing the victim, attacks on data and equipment, attempts 
to gather information about the victim, impersonating the victim, encouraging others to 
harass the victim, making false accusations about the victim (by contacting victim’s 
employers, family and friends), or arranging to meet the victim and physical assault.
1109
 The 
impact of cyberstalking through the social networking sites on the victim is growing so fast in 
geometric progressions and can range from mild intimidation and loss of privacy to serious 
physical harm and psychological injuries being sustained by the victims.
1110
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The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime did not make any specific and direct 
provisions to criminalise cyberstalking; however the Council of  Europe Convention on  
preventing  and  combating  violence  against  women and domestic violence (Istanbul 
Convention) marks an important step in combating stalking, since it requires the parties to 
establish a criminal offence for stalking.
1111
 As at 18 December 2015, 19 states have ratified 
it, while 39 have signed it.
1112
 The United Kingdom signed the Convention on 08/06/2012, 
but is yet to ratify it.
1113
 In the United Kingdom, there are various laws in place to tackle the 
growing problems of stalking and cyberstalking. Currently these include the Malicious 
Communications Act 1988, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, Offences against the 
Person Act 1861, Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 1994, Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 
Communications Act 2003, and more recently the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. 
 
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was originally introduced to deal with the problem 
of stalking.
1114
 This Act however makes wider provisions than this, covering a range of 
conducts, including harassment motivated by race or religion, some types of anti-social 
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behaviour, and some forms of protest.
1115
 The legislation creates both criminal and civil 
remedies.
1116
 The Act creates two criminal offences. The first is pursuing a course of conduct 
amounting to harassment; which is a summary-only offence under section 2 that deals with 
conduct that amounts to harassment of another person by an offender.
1117
 The second type of 
offence is a more serious offence where the conduct puts the victim in fear of violence. This 
involves an offence that could be tried either-way (i.e., summarily or on indictment), under 
section 4 which covers situations where the victim fears that violence would be used against 
them. For both offences a course of conduct must be proved. Section 7 of the Act provides 
that references to ‘harassment’ include alarming a person or causing the person distress and 
states that a ‘course of conduct’ in the case of conduct in relation to one person must involve 
at least two occasions, or in the case of conduct in relation to two or more persons, conduct 
on at least one occasion in relation to each of those persons, although there are exceptions to 
this.
1118
 The first requirement is that the behaviour in question amounts to a ‘course of 
conduct’, which is defined in s. 7(3) as conduct on at least two occasions.1119 The Courts have 
been fairly generous when it comes to the timings between the incidents.
1120
 This therefore 
seems to suggest that incidents that happen in close succession may not necessarily count as 
separate incidents, and that the further removed in time the second incident is, the less likely 
it is to count as a course of conduct.
1121
 Difficulties can, however, occur in on/off 
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relationships where what would otherwise constitute a course of conduct, is often considered 
a routine aspect of a difficult relationship.
1122
 
 
However, the provisions of sections 111 and 112 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (the 
2012 Act) has now amended the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (the 1997 Act) by 
creating two new offences of stalking and stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm 
and distress, under sections 2A and 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.
1123
 The 
amendments also set out new police powers to enter and search premises (on provision of a 
warrant - section 2B) in relation to the 2A offences.
1124
 Section 2A of the 1997 Act prohibits 
a person from pursuing a course of conduct that amounts to stalking, although stalking is not 
specifically defined in the 2A offence, section 2A (3) lists examples of behaviours associated 
with stalking.
1125
 This can be proved by the pattern of persistent and repeated contact with, or 
attempts to contact, the victim. Under section 2A (1), a person is guilty of an offence if the 
offender pursues a course of conduct in breach of section 1(1) of the 1997 Act (i.e. a course 
of conduct which amounts to harassment); and the course of conduct amounts to stalking. In 
other words, the new legislation provides that the offences under section 2 can now be 
committed where the course of conduct that causes the harassment is ‘associated with 
stalking’; and the Act goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of examples of such 
conduct.
1126
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Similarly section 4 of the 1997 Act is amended so that the course of conduct that gives rise to 
a fear that on at least two occasions violence will be used can be a course of conduct that 
‘amounts to stalking’. In relation to these sections, very little has changed other than the fact 
that the Act now specifically cites ‘stalking’ as a type of behaviour that can give rise to 
conduct that amounts to harassment. The major change in the new legislation can be found in 
section 4A (1) (b) (ii). This creates a brand-new offence under the 1997 Act, albeit still 
sharing some of the same requirements as the original provisions in section 4 of the Act. An 
offence will be committed where the defendant has pursued a course of conduct that has 
caused the victim ‘serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on the 
victim's usual day-to-day activities’ and the defendant knew, or ought to have known, it 
would have the effect.
1127
 This new offence created under the new Act seem to have provided 
a solution to the problem of those repeated incidents of stalking/harassing behaviour that, 
although devastating to the victim, do not cross the original threshold of causing a fear that 
the defendant will use violence as specified in the 1997 Act.
1128
 Whereas previously, such 
behaviour would at best be charged merely as harassment under section 2 and attract at most 
a sentence of six months' imprisonment upon conviction, these incidents would now be 
covered by the new offence created under the new Act and attract a maximum sentence of 
five years' imprisonment. 
 
Cyberstalking offences could also be prosecuted in England and Wales under section 127 of 
the Communications Act 2003, which provides that it is an offence to send a message that is 
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grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character,
1129
 or to cause annoyance 
or needless anxiety to any person
1130
 by use of a public electronic communications network. 
The message will be held to be grossly offensive if it would cause gross offence to the 
recipients or those to whom it relates.
1131
 Also, a message which did not create fear or 
apprehension in those to whom it was communicated, or who might reasonably be expected 
to see it would not amount to cyberstalking.
1132
 
 
In Scotland, the provisions regarding cyber-stalking are different from the above position 
which are only applicable in England and Wales. Prior to 2010, there was no specific crime 
of harassment or stalking in Scotland; instead such conduct would be covered by the common 
law offence of breach of the peace.
1133
 In the case of Smith v Donnelly,
1134
 it was held that for 
conduct to constitute breach of the peace it must be “severe enough to cause alarm to 
ordinary people” and be “genuinely alarming and disturbing, in its context, to any reasonable 
person”.1135 This definition could sufficiently stretch to include acts of harassment or stalking 
in the cyberspace. In HM Advocate v Cook
1136
 the accused was convicted for breach of the 
peace for sending abusive emails. In finding the accused guilty, the court held that, whilst his 
conduct could be regarded as cyberstalking, it simply amounted to breach of the peace. This 
case seemed to suggest the elements of breach of the peace would be sufficient to cover 
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stalking and harassing behaviour in the cyberspace. This position was reversed in Harris v 
HM Advocate,
1137
 where a bench of five judges held that in order for conduct to constitute 
breach of the peace, it is necessary for there to be a public element and for the conduct to 
cause or threaten to cause disturbance to a public place.
1138
 As a result of this decision, it 
could prove difficult to prosecute acts of cyberstalking and cyber-harassment on social 
networking sites, since it may not be sufficiently ‘public’, particularly if the user’s profile is 
private or the behaviour is conducted by the use of private messaging.  
 
The Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010
1139
 made provision for offences of 
"threatening or abusive behaviour"
1140
 and "stalking".
1141
 Following this legislation, in 
February 2012 an offender, Diego Moreno, was sentenced to 120 hours of community service 
and placed on the sex offenders’ register for six months in Scotland as a result of sending 
lewd comments on Facebook to a female whom he had seen in a hospital waiting room.
1142
 
Moreno’s Facebook search for the woman was successful due to a post the woman had made 
whilst at the hospital, which contained location data. Due to the messages causing alarm, this 
behaviour is sufficient to constitute the offence of "threatening or abusive behaviour" under 
the 2010 Act.  
 
Most often the Court will look at other surrounding circumstances, in order to make a finding 
and determine if the act of the offender constitutes stalking. In Behan v Murphy
1143
 the 
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offender (Behan) appealed by stated case against his conviction for a contravention under 
section 39 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 on the basis that the 
sheriff erred in repelling his submission of no case to answer. The offender’s relationship 
with his victim partner had broken down and they had been separated without any contact for 
a period of 14 months, during which time offender was prohibited by a bail condition from 
contacting the victim. Following the termination of the condition, the offender had sent the 
victim two text messages on her private and business mobile telephones which had an 
apparently benign appearance, but which the victim and a police officer gave evidence had 
caused the victim fear and alarm. On appeal, it was held that the sheriff was entitled to take 
into account victim’s evidence that the offender had assaulted her and her child at the end of 
the relationship, and that the separation had been acrimonious with no suggestion of 
reconciliation, as well as evidence about offender’s bail condition, and was entitled to 
conclude, on that evidence, that it is either the offender intended to cause the victim fear or 
alarm, or that he ought to have known that such texts would do so. 
 
In Nigeria, prior to the enactment of the Cybercrime Act in May 2015, there was no specific 
provision dealing with cyberstalking throughout the federation, except for the Lagos State 
Protection against Domestic Violence Law, 2007,
1144
 which made extensive provisions 
criminalising acts of domestic violence against any person in the state. The only stalking 
provision contained in the said law was the provisions of section 18(1)(g)(ix) that defined 
domestic violence to include all acts of stalking. The Law however tried to proffer a 
definition of stalking in section 18(1)(x) as ‘…repeatedly following, pursuing, or accosting 
the victim’. This conspicuous lacuna in the Nigerian law seem to have been cured by the 
provision of section 24 of the Cybercrime Act 2015, which makes express provisions that 
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criminalises all forms of cyberstalking. The elements of these offence are, that the message is 
grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character; and it is sent for the 
purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to another or causes such a 
message to be sent.
1145
 The Act provides the punishment for the offence as fine of not less 
than Two Million Naira or imprisonment for a term of not less than one year, or to both fine 
and imprisonment. According to the provisions of section 58 of the Act, cyberstalking 
includes a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable 
person to feel fear. Hassan, et al, has also suggested that the message may include false 
accusations, monitoring, making threats, identity theft, damage to data or equipment, the 
solicitation of minors for sex, or gathering information in order to harass.
1146
 The acts that 
come within the confines of this offence may also include sending multiple e-mails, often on 
a systematic basis, to annoy, embarrass, intimidate, or threaten a person or to make the person 
fearful that she or a member of her family or household will be harmed.
1147
 
 
Unfortunately, neither the African Union Convention nor the ECOWAS Directives on 
Cybercrime contain any provision on cyberstalking. This is really surprising because the 
Convention was only adopted in 2014, while the Directive was adopted in 2011. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
In Nigeria, the offences related to child pornography committed through cyberspace or 
through a computer network/system is provided for in section 23 of the Cybercrime Act, 
2015. It is mutually agreed by both the Nigerian Cybercrime Act, and the UK Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 that the definition of a minor is every person under the age of 18 years. 
This agreement also extends to the fact that both legislations and their regional instruments, 
describes pornographic material as one, which visually depicts or represents: 
(i) a real child involved or engaged in sexually explicit conduct, including lascivious 
exhibition of genitals or the public area of a child; or 
(ii) a real person appearing to be a child involved or engaged with a real child involved or 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct, including lascivious exhibition of genitals or the 
public area of a child; or 
(iii) realistic images of a non-existent child involved or engaged with a real child involved 
or engaged in sexually explicit conduct, including lascivious exhibition of genitals or 
the public area of a child. 
 
The two provisions have also unanimously  criminalised all acts involving the use of a 
computer network or system in or for producing child pornography for the purpose of its 
distribution; offering or making available child pornography; distributing or transmitting 
child pornography. These provisions in other words criminalise all acts of producing or 
distributing child pornographic material over the computer system or network. 
 
Unfortunately, there are no specific provisions in the Council of Europe’s Convention of 
Cybercrime related to identity theft, cyberstalking and other related offences; and this has 
created a very big lacuna in the adjectival laws of member-states who ‘strictly’ used the 
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Convention as their benchmark for cybercrime legislations; like in the UK which has adopted 
the use of municipal legislation for prosecuting these offences. There is obviously need for 
the Convention to be revisited with the aim of amending and/or adding the offence of identity 
theft, cybersquatting and cyberstalking as substantive offences. Crime is usually an act that 
rightly concerns the State and the person(s) affected by the wrongdoing.
1148
 Societies 
throughout history have exercised this inherent right and have had both written or unwritten 
laws forbidding and punishing acts or omissions considered detrimental to the group or the 
individual.
1149
 In fact, it is argued that the prevention of harm becomes the central reason for 
the criminalization of certain conducts.
1150
 As a method of social control, criminal law sets a 
framework specifying the standards and limitations of acceptable behaviour in society.
1151
 In 
this respect, criminal law therefore serves an important condemnatory function in social 
life.
1152
 Although the Council of Europe had tried to argue that different Articles of the 
Convention apply to these offences in relation to fraud and involving computer systems, it is 
however obvious that these offences can be stand-alone offences which could be committed 
independent of other computer related offences. 
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Chapter Seven: PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This research has in the preceding chapters attempted an analysis of the variety of the types 
of conducts that may adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
computer data and systems, along with the adjectival law provisions in the comparative 
jurisdictions. It is one thing to make legislative enactments of criminal offences to address 
conduct committed through the cyberspace; but it is a more difficult task not only to make 
laws for procedural enforcement of the adjectival laws,
1153
 but also to ensure that the already 
enacted substantive laws are enforceable.
1154
  This has over the years proved to be a 
ubiquitous task, especially to assert jurisdiction over offenders who may be located anywhere 
in the world.
1155
 
 
The advanced nature of interconnectivity between numerous forms of communication and 
services over the sharing of collective transmission media has altered the scope of global 
criminal law and criminal procedure.
1156
 These open new doors for diverse and novel 
criminal activities in the cyberspace for both traditional offences and new technological 
crimes.
1157
 It is therefore imperative not only for the adjectival criminal laws to keep abreast 
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of these diverse and novel criminal activities, but also for criminal procedural law and 
investigative techniques to be so compliant.
1158
 
 
As stated in the Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime: 
“One of the major challenges in combating crime in the networked environment is the 
difficulty in identifying the perpetrator and assessing the extent and impact of the criminal 
act. A further problem is caused by the volatility of electronic data, which may be altered, 
moved or deleted in seconds. For example, a user who is in control of the data may use the 
computer system to erase the data that is the subject of a criminal investigation, thereby 
destroying the evidence. Speed and, sometimes, secrecy are often vital for the success of an 
investigation.”1159 
 
The Council of Europe’s Convention on cybercrime contains comprehensive provisions 
relating to procedural issues involved with the investigation and prosecution of computer 
related offences. The United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organised Crime 
and its Protocols
1160
 also made some specific procedural provisions; like provisions urging 
member states on measures to be adopted for the prosecution of offenders,
1161
 and for the 
confiscation and seizure of the proceeds of such crimes.
1162
 Also, the establishment of 
Europol
1163
 has since provided a concrete platform for co-operation between the law 
enforcement agencies of member states. The EU Directive on Attacks against Information 
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Systems
1164
 also aims to facilitate the prevention of cybercrime by improving co-operation 
between member states. The African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Personal Data 
Protection also covers quite extensive range of procedural issues and international co-
operation among member states. The ECOWAS Directives on cybercrime also contains some 
procedural provisions; and so does the Nigeria Cybercrime Act 2015 which seeks to ratify the 
African Union Convention and the ECOWAS Directive. 
 
This chapter will critically set forth and analyse these procedural issues and challenges to the 
enforcement of cybercrime legislations, as applicable in Nigeria in comparison with the UK 
jurisdiction, while also making essential references to their relevant regional legislative 
enactments as might be applicable in the circumstance. 
 
7.2 Jurisdictional Issues 
 
The Law UK Commission recognised that the nature of computer misuse offences often 
transcend national boundaries: “A hacker, with or without dishonest intentions, may for 
instance sit in London and, through an international telephone system, enter or try to enter a 
computer in New York or vice versa. More complex ‘chains’, involving computer systems in a 
number of countries before the ‘target’ computer is accessed are entirely possible.”1165 
 
Jurisdiction is the legal capacity of a court to hear and determine judicial proceedings. It is 
the power to adjudicate concerning the subject matter of the controversy.
1166
 A court of law 
can only exercise judicial powers when it has jurisdiction.
1167
 Jurisdiction is a threshold 
matter that is very fundamental to a case, and often transcends to the competence of the Court 
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to hear and determine a case.
1168
 Where a court does not have jurisdiction to hear a case, the 
entire proceedings no matter how well conducted and decided would amount to a nullity.
1169
 
It is thus mandatory that courts decide the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding to consider 
any other matter.
1170
 The jurisdiction has been described variously as the backbone, spinal 
cord, and the life-wire of a Court.
1171
 Thus the nature and importance of jurisdiction has been 
underscored and lucidly stated by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Afro Continental (Nig) Ltd 
& Anor Co-Operative Association of Professionals Inc.,
1172
 per KALGO, JSC as follows: “It 
is well settled that jurisdiction is the body and soul of every judicial proceeding before any 
Court or tribunal and without it all subsequent proceedings are fruitless, futile and a nullity 
because the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental to the proper hearing of a case.” The position 
was recently reemphasized by the Supreme Court in the case of Mbah v. The State,
1173
 where 
T. MUHAMMED, JSC, stated as follows: “Jurisdiction, it is said, my Lords, is the life wire of 
litigation. It is the authority which a Court has to decide matters before it or to take 
cognizance of matters presented before it for decision.”1174  
 
The determination of jurisdiction in respect of cyber-related offences could be cumbersome 
and mostly difficult for the courts to determine.
1175
 The virtual world seems to be a borderless 
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journey to the wonderland.
1176
 This has continued to cause confusions and misapplication of 
legal principles for the enforcement of cybercrime adjectival laws. For instance, in the case of 
R v. Governor of Brixton Prison and Anor, Ex-Parte Levin,
1177
 where one of the issues for 
determination was whether the appropriation in respect of Citibank’s accounts occurred in St 
Petersburg, Russia, where the computer instructions were sent, or in Citibank’s computers in 
Parsippany, New Jersey in United States. The Court held that given the virtually 
instantaneous nature of electronic transactions, it was ‘artificial’ to regard the offence as 
having occurred in one place or the other.
1178
 Could it then have been right to say that 
cybercrime offences lack any locus delicti; or could the offences be said to have multiple 
locus delicti? Since cybercrime offences are usually cross-border offences involving multiple 
jurisdictions; which state could rightly assume jurisdiction? These questions have 
necessitated the need for various states to include provisions conferring their national courts 
with extraterritorial jurisdictions.
1179
 One of the primary concerns in relation to the assertion 
of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, or even the basic use and application of the old 
‘Territorial Principle’, is that it may give rise to competing jurisdictional claims by various 
nations.
1180
 This is because the offender, the victim, the web hosting and the Internet Service 
Provider might all be located in different countries, with each laying valid claims for 
jurisdiction.
1181
 This position is aptly summarised by the United States Supreme Court as 
follows: “If a publisher chooses to send its material into a particular community, this Court’s 
jurisprudence teaches that it is the publisher’s responsibility to abide by that community’s 
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standards. The publisher’s burden does not change simply because it decides to distribute its 
material to every community in the Nation.”1182 
 
The competing jurisdictional claims by various nations was clearly evident in the case of La 
Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme v Yahoo! Inc.,
1183
 where in an action filed in 
France by the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism and the Union of 
Jewish Students against Yahoo. The unquestionably offensive items were never posted on 
Yahoo.fr's auction room because the company was aware that this would breach French anti-
hate laws. The French court nevertheless ordered the items removed from the American site, 
arguing that French restrictions on free speech applied to any website viewable in France. In 
a separate action brought by Yahoo!, and often cited as Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le 
Racisme et L’Antisemitisme1184 the Californian Court, ruled that France cannot force the 
internet portal to remove Nazi memorabilia such as medals and uniforms from its US website 
Yahoo.com. According to the Judge: “Although France has the sovereign right to regulate 
what speech is permissible in France, the court may not enforce a foreign order that violates 
the protections of the United States Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs 
simultaneously within our borders.” Although this decision was later reversed on appeal to 
the full Ninth Circuit
1185
 which declined to assume jurisdiction on the matter, it nevertheless 
exposes the existing tension amongst diverse nations in their quest to assume jurisdiction in 
multijurisdictional cyber-related cases.
1186
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The challenge is therefore most often left to the Courts to determine if and when they could 
rightly assume jurisdiction over activities conducted via the cyberspace.
1187
 This challenge 
would have been easier, if the internet were confined to a single geographical area, or if it 
were neatly divisible along territorial precincts into distinct local networks and national 
boundaries.
1188
 The internet by its nature transcends local boundaries and national 
jurisdictions, hence the arduous challenge for the Courts to interpret the existing legislations 
to determine its jurisdictions to try these offence sprawling across local, national, and 
international boundaries.
1189
 It therefore follows that any decision made by a Court without or 
in excess of jurisdiction would have been an exercise in futility.
1190
 
 
This research will analyse of the issues of jurisdiction under two distinct concepts of 
territorial jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction.  
 
7.2i Territorial Jurisdiction 
 
The pertinent question that calls to mind whenever the territorial issues of jurisdiction are 
raised is: Does the state have legislative power over the offence? The internet by its nature 
transcends both local and national boundaries.
1191
 Article 3(2) of the United Nations 
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Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
 1192
 provides that an offence is 
‘transnational in nature’ if:  
(a) It is committed in more than one State; 
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, 
direction or control takes place in another State; 
(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in 
criminal activities in more than one State; or 
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State. 
 
Where one or more of these elements occurs in, or produces substantial effects within
1193
 
another territorial jurisdiction, a ‘transnational dimension’ will be held to exist, and the Court 
as a matter of law may conduct a finding to determine if the state have legislative power over 
the offence.
1194
 
 
In the United Kingdom, the basis for any court to claim jurisdiction in respect of cybercrime 
offences, is the existence of “at least one significant link with the domestic jurisdiction.”  
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7.2ia ‘Significant Link’ Requirement 
 
The exercise of territorial jurisdictions by the Courts in the United Kingdom is governed by 
proof of the existence of “at least one significant link with the domestic jurisdiction.”1195 The 
Court of Appeal had restated this in the case of R. v Waddon
1196
 which involved offences 
related to the publication of obscene articles on the internet, that the images published on a 
website abroad were further published when downloaded in the UK, thereby conferring the 
requisite jurisdiction to the court in the United Kingdom. In this case the accused person had 
designed pornographic websites which could be accessed by subscribers through the internet. 
A police officer accessed one of the websites, situated in the United States, and printed out 
images. The accused pleaded guilty to a number of offences contrary to section 2 of the 
Obscene Publications Act 1959, after a ruling by the trial judge in relation to issues of 
jurisdiction and compliance with section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
One of the issues for determination at the appeal was, ‘whether there was publication in the 
United Kingdom so as to afford the Courts jurisdiction’. The offender contended that 
although there was publication on the website, there was no publication in the UK for the 
purposes of the 1959 Act. He contended that there could only be a single publication, as there 
could be publication on a website abroad when images were uploaded and further publication 
when the images were downloaded elsewhere. In dismissing the Appeal the court held that as 
the defendant conceded he was involved both in the transmission of material to the website 
and its transmission back to the UK when the officer gained access to the website, and he 
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could not contend that publication did not take place in the UK. This was therefore enough to 
establish a significant link to the UK.
1197
 
 
In R. v Smith,
1198
 the Court of Appeal adopted a new nomenclature of ‘substantial measure’ 
test and held that the court would have jurisdiction to try an offence of obtaining services by 
deception where the obtaining had taken place abroad but a ‘substantial part’ of the 
deception had occurred in England. This decision was also followed in R. v Sheppard & 
Whittle,
1199
 Mr Whittle (W) had written material which casted doubt on the existence of the 
holocaust and contained derogatory remarks about a number of racial groups. Mr Sheppard 
(S) had edited the material and uploaded it to a website which he had set up for the purpose 
of disseminating it. The website was hosted by a remote server located in California. Once 
posted on the site, the material was available to be viewed and downloaded in a number of 
countries including the United Kingdom. Some of the material was distributed in the UK in 
print form through the post. At trial the prosecution relied upon evidence from a police 
officer who had visited the site and downloaded the documents. The court had assumed 
jurisdiction because a substantial measure of S and W's activities had taken place in the UK, 
and convicted the defendants for possessing, publishing and distributing racially 
inflammatory material contrary to the Public Order Act 1986. On appeal, the Court of Appeal 
while dismissing the appeal held that in considering whether there was any basis for not 
applying the “substantial measure” principle, section 42 was not a restriction of jurisdiction to 
England and Wales, rather, it set out the limitations as to its extent within England and Wales 
and was not determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. Further, the “substantial measure” 
test not only accorded with the purpose of the relevant provisions of the Act, it also reflected 
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the practicalities of the instant case. Almost everything in the instant case related to the UK, 
which was where the material was generated, edited, uploaded and controlled. The material 
was aimed primarily at the British public. The only foreign element was that the website was 
hosted by a server in California, but the use of the server was merely a stage in the 
transmission of the material. There was abundant material to satisfy the “substantial measure” 
test, as set out in R v. Smith.
1200
 The Court further held that section 29 stated that “written 
material includes any sign or other visible representation”. The use of the word “includes” in 
the legislation was plainly intended to widen the scope of the expression,
1201
 and the words 
were sufficiently wide to include articles in electronic form, such as the material disseminated 
by the website in the instant case.
1202
 
 
Section 4 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, covers the territorial scope of offences under 
sections 1 and 3 of the Act, and establishes that for offences under sections 1 or 3, it is 
immaterial whether any act or other event occurred in the home country concerned or 
whether the accused was in the home country concerned at the time of any such act or 
event.
1203
 This section also establishes that at least one significant link with domestic 
jurisdiction must exist in the circumstances of the case for the Courts in the United Kingdom 
to assume jurisdiction.
1204
 Section 5 sets out the criteria for establishing a significant link 
with domestic jurisdiction; which is, either the accused was in the home country at the time 
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of the offence or the affected/intended affected computer was in the home country at the time 
of the offence.
1205
  
 
Article 12 of the EU Directive on Attacks against Information Systems covers jurisdiction 
and requires member states to establish their jurisdiction with regards to cybercrimes being 
committed by one of their nationals. In order to implement the EU Directive on Attacks 
against Information Systems
1206
 and assist in addressing constant advances in technology, 
there was need for the UK government to extend the territorial coverage of the existing 
offences in the Computer Misuse Act.  The existing extra territorial jurisdiction provisions 
covered under the Act do not include section 3A, but only cover offences under sections 1 
and 3, and requires the prosecution to show a significant link to the UK. This means that if an 
offender commits a Computer Misuse Act section 1 or 3 offence, in order to exercise extra 
territorial jurisdiction and pursue a Computer Misuse Act prosecution in the UK, either the 
individual or the affected/intended affected computer needs to be present in the UK at the 
time of the offence, and the offender cannot also be extradited on the basis of their nationality 
alone.
1207
 In addition, section 3A which was added in 2006, did not contain any provisions for 
extra territorial jurisdiction of UK courts. This means that an individual committing a section 
3A offence whilst physically outside the UK could not have been easily extradited under the 
existing Computer Misuse Act provisions to face justice in the UK. This necessitated the 
enactment of the Serious Crime Act, 2015. 
 
Section 43 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 extends the extra-territorial jurisdiction of the 
offences so that Computer Misuse Act offences committed outside the United Kingdom can 
be prosecuted in the UK, including Scotland, where there is a significant link with domestic 
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jurisdiction.
1208
 This clause amends section 5 of the Computer Misuse Act, which sets out 
what the significant links with domestic jurisdiction are. It extends these to provide for a link 
if an accused was a UK national at that time of the act constituting the offence, and the act 
constituted an offence under the law of the country in which it occurred.
1209
 Previously, 
before the enactment of the Serious Crime Act, extra-territorial jurisdiction could only be 
exercised where a significant link to the United Kingdom can be shown i.e. that the accused, 
or the affected computer, was in the UK at the time of the offence. The current position by 
virtue of the direct application of the provisions of the section 43 of the Serious Crime Act 
now is that, crimes committed outside the UK by a UK national will be able to be prosecuted 
in the UK even where the offence itself did not have any impact on the UK.
1210
 This 
provision therefore seeks to ratify the ‘Nationality Principle’ as propounded in Article 
22(1)(d) of the Council of Europe’s Convention, which in other words requires parties to 
establish jurisdiction where the offence is committed by one of its nationals, irrespective of 
where it occurs in the world.
1211
 
 
Section 35 of the Police and Justice Act 2006, amended Section 1 of the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990, and converted the summary offence of "unauthorised access to computer material" 
into an offence triable either summarily or on indictment. This amendment renders this 
offence extraditable and therefore more easily enforced extra-territorially, thereby subverting 
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the preliminary objection issues of jurisdiction mostly raised by the defence at pre-trial 
proceedings.
1212
 
 
Regarding sexual offences committed against a child through the cyberspace, section 7 of the 
Sex Offenders Act 1997
1213
 extended the jurisdiction of the courts of England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. It was repealed and replaced by section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
on 1 May 2004, which in turn was amended by section 72 of the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008.
1214
 If a person commits an act outside the UK, which is an offence in 
that country or territory, that person can be prosecuted in the UK for the offence, if it is a 
sexual offence listed in Schedule 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
1215
 A distinction is made 
between UK nationals and UK residents. A national can be prosecuted for an act committed 
outside the UK, which is a Schedule 2 listed sexual offence if done in England, Wales or 
Northern Ireland, while a resident can be prosecuted for an act committed outside the UK, if 
the act constitutes an offence under the law in force in that country and the act would be a 
Schedule 2 listed sexual offence if done in England, Wales or Northern Ireland.
1216
 
 
The Nigerian Court of Appeal in the case of Iyanda v. Laniba II,
1217
 per ONALAJA, 
J.C.A
1218
 gave a vivid description of territorial jurisdiction as follows: 
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“1. Jurisdiction over cases arising in or involving persons residing within a defined 
territory; 
2.  Territory over which a governance, one of its courts or one of its sub-divisions has 
jurisdiction.” 
 
The joint application of sections 2 and 50 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 provide for 
the territorial jurisdiction in respect of cyber-offences committed under the Act. Section 2 
provides that the provisions of the Act applies throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
while section 50 goes extra miles to empower the Nigerian Court with jurisdiction to try 
offences under the Act if the offences are committed in Nigeria, or on a ship or aircraft 
registered in Nigeria, by a Nigerian outside Nigeria if the person’s conduct would also 
constitute an offence under a law of the country where the offence was committed. This 
provisions is similar to the provisions contained in section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act 
2003, and section 42 Serious Crime Act, 2015 as applicable in the United Kingdom. 
 
7.2ii Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
 
The most important question that calls to mind at the mention of subject-matter jurisdiction 
is: Does the court before whom the matter is brought have power to hear the particular 
matter?
1219
 This no doubt leaves both the Court and the prosecution in a very critical situation 
to ensure that the court before who the case is before has competent jurisdiction to adjudicate 
on the matter and/or make any consequential orders thereto.
1220
 Section 35 of the Police and 
                                                 
1219
 Benedetta Ubertazzi, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Exclusive (Subject Matter) Jurisdiction: Between 
Private and Public International Law’ (2011) Marq Intell Prop L Rev 15, 357.; See also Tukur v. Government of 
Gongola State (1989) 4 N.W.L.R. (pt. 117) 517 
1220
 The United States case of United States v. Ivanov 175 F. Supp. 2d 36, makes an apt description of the 
concepts of subject-matter jurisdiction for computer crimes performed by an offender through the cyberspace 
268 
 
Justice Act 2006, amended Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, in order to convert 
the summary offence of "unauthorised access to computer material" into an offence triable 
either summarily or on indictment.
1221
 Section 43 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 amends 
section 13 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, to make provision for the Sheriff court’s 
jurisdiction in Scotland in respect of the new offence introduced by section 41, and the 
section 3A offence as amended by section 42, and any Computer Misuse Act offence 
committed outside Scotland.
1222
 It is however commendable that these offences are made 
triable either way offences, which gives the Magistrates Courts (in England) or the Sheriffs 
Courts (in Scotland) the requisite jurisdiction to try these offences. 
 
In Nigeria, the combined application of sections 251 and 272 of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution, show that the powers and jurisdiction of the state high courts are subject to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
outside his country against an American businesses and infrastructure. The offender was indicted at the trial for 
conspiracy, computer fraud, extortion, and possession of illegal access devices; all crimes committed against the 
Online Information Bureau (OIB) whose business and infrastructure were based in Vernon, Connecticut, United 
States. The offender had attracted FBI attention in the Fall of 1999, when internet service provider (ISP) 
‘Speakeasy’ discovered that their network had been compromised and informed the Seattle branch of the FBI. In 
early 2000, OIB also detected an attack and notified the FBI in Connecticut. Between late 1999 and early 2000, 
other large Internet corporations including CD Universe, Yahoo, and EBay also experienced similar attacks to 
Speakeasy and OIB. Computer forensics determined the Internet traffic for all attacks originated from the same 
machine in Russia. After linking his online alias “subbsta” and his resume, the FBI determined the offender’s 
identity and initiated a sting operation to lure him to the United States for arrest. The FBI constructed a false 
computer security company, “Invita”, through which they invited the offender to interview for a position in the 
United States. His interview involved hacking an FBI controlled honeypot. While he was hacking the FBI 
honeypot, all keystrokes and network traffic were recorded as potential evidence, and in addition, the FBI made 
video and audio recordings of the entire interview process. He was arrested after he successfully gained access 
to the FBI honeypot, and the FBI used the recorded keystrokes and network traffic log to access the 
intermediary computers he used in Russia. When the FBI accessed Ivanov’s machines, they found folders with 
data corresponding to the companies he had remotely attacked. Over 2.3 GB of data was recovered from his 
machines, including the tools used to gain illegal access and scripts that referenced companies that had been 
attacked. At the trial, he applied to dismiss the indictment, claiming that the court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction, arguing that because he was physically located in Russia when the offenses were committed, he 
cannot be charged with violations of United States law. The court denied his application; first, because the 
intended and actual detrimental effects of his actions in Russia occurred within the United States, and secondly, 
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apply extraterritorially. 
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express provision and jurisdiction of the Federal High Courts. The State High Courts derive 
their jurisdiction from section 272(1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution,
1223
 while the Federal 
High Courts derive their jurisdiction from section 251(1) of the same legislation.
1224
  By 
virtue of the express provisions of the Constitution, section 272(1) is made subject to the 
provisions of section 251(1) of the said statute. Any matter within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Federal High Court shall be outside the jurisdiction of either the High Court of a State 
or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
1225
 These provisions also have 
unique semblance with the provisions of section 31 of the Telecommunication and Postal 
Offences Act, 1995, and section 138 of the Nigerian Communications Act 2003, which also 
confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to try offences committed under their 
various enabling statutes.  
 
It is therefore obvious that the operation of section 272(1) of the 1999 Constitution is 
governed by the provisions of section 251(1) of the same Constitution.  In other words, 
section 272(1) is subordinate, subservient, and subject to and governed by the provisions of 
section 251(1) of the constitution. The clear and unambiguous language of Section 251(1)(s) 
gives the National Assembly a plenitude of authority to expand the statutory jurisdiction of 
the Federal High Court through other subsequent Acts of the said legislature.
1226
  The above 
is supported by the phrases “…and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred 
upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise 
jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil cases and matter…” 
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“(S) such other jurisdiction civil or criminal and whether to the exclusion of any other court 
or not as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly”.1227 
 
It is however notable that the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 is one of the subsequent laws 
enacted by the National Assembly, contemplated by the provisions of section 251(1) of the 
1999 Nigerian Constitution, and in which the Federal High Court has been given such other 
additional jurisdiction by the National Assembly, as prescribed by section 251(1) of the 1999 
Constitution. In attending to a similar situation, the Court of Appeal had variously held that 
the Federal High Court has limited jurisdiction conferred upon it expressly by existing laws, 
“as well as such other jurisdictions as may be conferred on it by future laws.”1228 Section 50 
of the Cybercrime Act 2015 and the combined application of section 251 of the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution provide for the subject-matter jurisdiction for cyber-related offences. 
Section 50 goes extra miles to empower the Federal High Court to try offences under the Act 
if the offences are committed in Nigeria, or on a ship or aircraft registered in Nigeria, by a 
Nigerian outside Nigeria if the person’s conduct would also constitute an offence under a law 
of the country where the offence was committed. This provision seem to suggest that any 
case arising in whatever way on any subject affecting the Cybercrime Act, falls within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
1229
 
 
The case of United States v. Ivanov
1230
 goes to show the extent the authorities and the Courts 
are ready to go in order to ensure that they assume the requisite jurisdiction. The issue of 
jurisdiction is therefore very important and could be key to the success or failure of any 
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cybercrime investigation and/or trial.
1231
 The jurisdiction by their nature cannot be inferred 
only from the circumstance of the case, but are usually vested on the court by the statute 
creating the offence.
1232
 In the case of Gafar v. Government of Kwara State,
1233
 ONNOGHEN 
J.S.C, held that: “It is settled law that courts are creatures of statutes, based on the 
constitution with their jurisdiction stated or prescribed therein. That being the case, it is 
obvious that no court assumes jurisdiction except it is statutorily prescribed, as jurisdiction 
cannot be implied nor can it be conferred by agreement of parties.”1234 In other words, except 
jurisdiction is expressly conferred on the court by the enabling statute, courts are always 
reluctant to assume jurisdiction. 
 
7.3 Evidential Issues 
 
Evidence is the means by which facts relevant to the guilt or innocence of an accused person 
are established at the trial.
1235
 Loss or contamination of evidence in the course of cybercrime 
investigation is a very common and also an obvious problem which may affect the veracity to 
be attached to the piece of evidence, or even jeopardise the entire criminal proceedings.
1236
 
Further collection of data outside the physical territorial boundaries have also proven to be 
one of the most important issues that could also paralyse cybercrime investigations and any 
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consequential prosecutions,
1237
 while digitization and the emerging use of information 
technology has a great impact on procedures related to the collection of evidence and its use 
in court.
1238
 
 
The weight to be attached to computer evidence and the extent to which computer evidence 
might be admitted in criminal cases has been somewhat contentious issues.
1239
 This is 
because in the conduct and determination of the case, the rule of evidence usually applied by 
the Courts is what determines which facts and evidence in support thereof are legally 
admissible and the ones that are inadmissible.
1240
 The emergence of the internet and the 
growing versatility of acts which could be committed therefrom have provoked fundamental 
evidential issues especially in relation to the proof of the offences committed through the 
cyberspace.
1241
 The reliability of computer-generated and computer-stored evidence has also 
been led to interlocutory objections in courts, mostly on the basis of the likelihood of the 
security vulnerabilities in their operating systems and programs that could give rise to the 
threats to the integrity of the said digital evidence.
1242
 The susceptibility of digital 
information to manipulation has been considered by courts when introducing electronic 
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evidence, with emphasis on ‘the need to show the accuracy of the computer in the retention 
and retrieval of the information at issue.’1243  
 
The Nigerian Supreme Court has restated in the case of Egbirika v The State
1244
 that “…the 
position of the law is that the legal burden of proving its case against the accused person 
beyond reasonable doubt rests squarely on the prosecution and never shifts.”1245 The basis 
upon which the prosecution’s case could be said to have been established depends on the 
quantum of the evidence against the offender.
1246
 The law of evidence is a rather complex and 
wide range of the legal system, which is often compounded with issues of admissibility, 
reliability and weight to be attached to a piece of evidence.
1247
 This also comes with further 
classifications into primary and secondary evidence; direct and indirect evidence. The rapid 
advancement in computer technology therefore comes also with the need for special 
provisions to regulate computer evidence, and their admissibility as evidence.
1248
 
 
In the United Kingdom, the position surrounding the admissibility of otherwise of computer 
generated evidence is still undefined, and continues to be contentious.
1249
 In 1972 as a result 
of the growing use of computers in everyday business life the Criminal Law Revision 
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Committee in their Eleventh Report,
1250
 recommended that, in line with section 5 of the Civil 
Evidence Act 1968, a specific provision should be enacted ensuring that only computer 
evidence which has satisfied stringent reliability requirements be admitted in criminal cases. 
Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was thereafter passed for this 
purpose. Section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, prior to its abolition, 
governed the admissibility of computer evidence in criminal proceedings and provided that: 
(1) In any proceedings, a statement in a document produced by a computer shall not be 
admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein unless it is shown— 
(a) that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the statement is inaccurate 
because of improper use of the computer; 
(b) that at all material times the computer was operating properly, or if not, that any 
respect in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation was not 
such as to affect the production of the document or the accuracy of its contents. 
 
Although the provisions of section 69 ex-facie appeared to be clear and unambiguous, it in 
fact created more confusion than clarity.
1251
 This is because in criminal proceedings a 
statement in a document produced by a computer would not be admissible as evidence of any 
fact stated within that document unless the court was satisfied that the requirements in 
subsections (a)-(c) of the provision are met.
1252
 In order to solve the evidential issues of 
accuracy and reliability to be attached to the data contained in a machine, this provision 
placed the onus of proof on the prosecution to establish that the computer was operating 
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properly.
1253
 This onus of proof is always a very difficult burden to discharge as it may be 
impossible to replicate the combination of hardware, software and user input that caused the 
problem.
1254
 One of the greatest problems encountered in the interpretation of section 69 
concerned the contentious issue of whether its provision applied to all computer-generated 
evidence or merely some types of computer-generated evidence.
1255
 The provision even 
became more problematic when Smith
1256
 propounded a further theory of admissibility of 
computer evidence, and distinguished between two types of computer evidence: direct 
computer evidence and hearsay computer evidence. He described direct evidence as computer 
generated evidence of information ‘recorded by mechanical means without the intervention 
of a human mind’,1257 such as a computer printout which shows the automatic recording of 
products and prices on a till roll.
1258
 Computer hearsay evidence like all hearsay evidence, 
‘invariably relates to information which has passed through a human mind’,1259 such as a 
computer printout which contains information inputted by a computer operator.
1260
 All these 
postulations seem to have led the Law Commission to conclude that the provisions of section 
69 actual served ‘no useful purpose’,1261 prompting the repeal of the provision by section 60 
of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
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This now leaves us with the pre-existing situation before the enactment of section 69 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and further raises the issues of when a computer 
evidence could be said to be hearsay or when it could be direct.
1262
 There have since been 
various conflicting decisions of this issue
1263
 without a headway on the position of the 
admissibility of computer generated evidence.
1264
 In R. v Skinner
1265
 it was held on appeal 
that the lower court had been wrong to admit screen shots from a computer into evidence as 
the technical details of the manner in which they were obtained should have been considered 
in a public interest immunity hearing. However, in the context of the overall trial the 
evidence had been of limited influence and the convictions were therefore upheld. 
 
This issue of computer evidence and hearsay seem to have finally been clarified by the House 
of Lords in R v Shephard
1266
 where the House of Lords seem to have reduced the standard of 
the evidential requirements and held that the requirements of section 69 had to be satisfied in 
relation to any statement in a document produced by a computer tendered ‘as evidence of any 
fact stated therein’, irrespective of whether the document contained hearsay or not.1267 The 
Court in effect held that the evidence can be given by someone who was familiar with the 
function that the computer was required to perform and could indicate that there was nothing 
in the nature of the particular output that could cast any doubt to its accuracy. Although 
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where such computer evidence contained hearsay the evidence would have been required to 
fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule in addition to fulfilling the conditions 
stipulated in section 69.
1268
  
 
The current position on the admissibility or otherwise of these computer evidence in the 
United Kingdom is rather more confusing as could be seen from the decision in R. v 
Governor of Brixton Prison Ex p. Levin
1269
 where the accused person in an application for a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus, following his committal to prison to await extradition to the US on 
forgery and false accounting charges, and of gaining unauthorised access to a US bank and 
diverting funds into his own account. During the extradition proceedings computer printouts 
of records of instructions and transfers were admitted as evidence under section 69 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, but he contended that such evidence was hearsay 
and therefore inadmissible as section 69 did not apply to extradition proceedings because 
they were not criminal proceedings pursuant to section 72 of the Act. He further submitted 
that the computer printout should not be admitted as it had been obtained as the result of 
improper use and contrary to section 69. The Court in dismissing his application, held that for 
the purposes of section 72, extradition proceedings were criminal proceedings and therefore 
the computer printout evidence would be admissible under section 69. Also, his submission 
that the printouts were not admissible because they did not comply with the requirements of 
section 69(1) was rejected, as it would be absurd to hold that evidence obtained as the result 
of an unauthorised access to a computer could not be admitted. 
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Smith has suggested that these two decisions although they seem robust, but might lead to 
grave and far-reaching situation of ‘anything goes’.1270 Does it mean that any computer 
evidence obtained in the process of investigation could be accepted as admissible? Of course 
these evidence should only be accepted only when they fulfil the conditions set-out in section 
69.
1271
 It is however still unclear what is direct or hearsay evidence, and the situation seem to 
have been left at the discretion of the judges to accept which evidence is direct, and which 
one is hearsay.
1272
 
 
The ECOWAS Directive also makes express provision in Article 32 to the effect that 
‘electronic evidence shall be accepted as proof to establish an offence’. The second limb of 
the provisions of Article 32 went further to provide for two different conditions for accepting 
these pieces of evidence, and these are that: firstly, in situations if where “they emanate can 
be identified”, and secondly, that “they are kept in such conditions as to guarantee their 
integrity”. These are very weighty conditions that could be interpreted in various manners by 
each party, depending on the circumstance of each case. These conditions have not been 
qualified by the Directive in any way whatsoever. Who are or should be the proper custodians 
of this evidence? When should evidence be said to have emanated from proper custody? The 
use of the phrase, ‘such conditions’ have not been qualified as well. Under what conditions 
should these evidence be kept that could guarantee their integrity? It is a further finding of 
this research that except for the general provision in Article 32 of the ECOWAS Directive for 
the admissibility of ‘electronic evidence’, this provision has not in any way been helpful. The 
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African Union Convention on the other hand contains no provisions whatsoever on the 
admissibility of computer evidence. 
 
In comparison, the position of the admissibility of computer evidence in Nigerian 
jurisprudence has a close resemblance to what is obtainable in the United Kingdom. In 
Nigeria, the Evidence Act 2011
1273
 is the legislation that contains the rules that deal with the 
admissibility of evidence in all Nigerian Courts,
1274
 and seem to have been transplanted from 
section 69 of the UK Act. Prior to the enactment of the 2011 Evidence Act, the admissibility 
of computer generated evidence generated a lot of controversies,
1275
 with various 
contradicting decisions which sought to endorse the admissibility of computer generated 
evidence,
1276
 while the others held these evidence as inadmissible and unknown to law,
1277
 
and some other decisions insisted on the amendment of the Evidence Act as a condition for 
such admissibility.
1278
 The position got worse to the extent that at some point the Court of 
Appeal held that that it is desirable to call the makers of the said documents to give the 
evidence as direct evidence.
1279
 The question then is: who is the actual maker of the computer 
evidence? The Court of Appeal in Ogolo v IMB
1280
 almost compounded the confusion when it 
held that computer printouts could be admitted by way of judicial notice as “products of 
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science”. In the case of UBA Plc v S.A.F.P.U1281 the court held that the provisions of section 
97(1)(b) and (2)(c) of the old Evidence Act did not cover the admissibility of computer 
printout even if they are duly certified and relevant to the fact in issue. Although the court 
allowed the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the fact that the accused person had 
opened the bank accounts (which were the fact in issue in the case), the Court later made an 
automatic turn-around barring the same prosecution from proving how the accounts were 
operated or how the money were laundered by the accused though the same accounts, by 
rejecting the computerized statement of said bank accounts on the ground that the Evidence 
Act did not recognize same. The Court then concluded as follows: “I must also express the 
view that there is the urgent need for an amendment of the Evidence law to cover 
admissibility of document made by means of computer printout since it is clear that those 
technological method of producing document now form part of the day to day business 
transactions and particularly, in banking circle.”1282 
 
One of the most important impacts of the Nigerian Evidence Act of 2011 is that it introduced 
provisions for the first time in the history of the Nigeria law of evidence that gave a 
comprehensive definition of a “computer”, and expanded the scope of the definition of a 
document to connote computer evidence.
1283
 Section 258(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, 
defines a computer as, “any device for storing and processing information, and any reference 
to information being derived from other information is a reference to its being derived from it 
by calculation, comparison or any other process.” This definition seem to be rather restrictive 
in nature, when compared to the definition of a ‘computer system’ provided in section 50 of 
the Cybercrime Act 2015, which defined a computer system as any device or a group of 
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interconnected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a program, performs 
automatic processing of data.
1284
 The definition in section 258(1) above did not did not 
consider devices, which although are incapable of their own to process and store information, 
but will only be reliant on other groups or interconnection of systems to do so.
1285
 It also 
limits the interpretation of computers to only devices that can store and process information. 
It is not only silent about computer accessories such as printers, scanners and other output 
devices capable of data processing while in interconnectivity with other computer systems or 
networks.
1286
 However, section 258(1)(d) of the Evidence Act, expanded the scope of the 
definition of a document to include ‘any device by means of which information is recorded, 
stored or retrievable including computer output’. Section 84(1) permits the admissibility of a 
statement contained in a document produced by a computer once the four conditions 
precedent for it admissibility stated in Section 84(2) of the Evidence Act of 2011 are met; 
which includes: 
(a) that the document containing the statement was produced by the computer during a 
period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for 
the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period, whether for profit 
or not, by anybody, whether corporate or not, or by any individual; 
(b) that over that period there was regularly supplied to the computer in the ordinary 
course of those activities information of the kind contained in the statement or of the 
kind from which the information so contained is derived; 
(c) that throughout the material part of that period the computer was operating properly 
or, if not, that in any respect in which it was not operating properly or was out of 
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operation during that part of that period was not such as to affect the production of the 
document or the accuracy of its contents; and 
(d) that the information contained in the statement reproduces or is derived from 
information supplied to the computer in the ordinary course of those activities. 
 
These above four requirements which are conditio-precedent for admissibility of a statement 
contained in a document produced by a computer
1287
 were considered by the Supreme Court 
in the recent case of Kubor v. Dickson
1288
, where the Supreme Court expounded  that the 
above conditions precedent were the pre-conditions laid down by the law  and consequently, 
held that, the  two computer generated documents in issue were not admissible in evidence on 
the ground that, the said four conditions precedent were not satisfied by the Appellant. This 
case would have been a perfect locus classicus of this novel law principle in the Nigerian 
jurisprudence. The documents sought to be tendered were held to be inadmissible due to the 
failure of the Party to adhere to the four preconditions for its admissibility as stated in Section 
84(2) of the Evidence Act of 2011, despite the Court agreeing that the relevancy of the 
documents sought to be tendered is what determines the issue of admissibility. The Supreme 
Court while considering the two computer-generated documents or e-documents downloaded 
from the internet which were printouts from the websites of newspapers, noted that it may be 
argued that they were not public documents whose secondary evidence are admissible only 
by certified true copies and that their admissibility is governed by the provisions of Section 
84 of the Evidence Act, 2011. The Court further held that as such print-outs could at best be 
considered secondary evidence of public documents which if certified as such, would 
circumvent the requirements of section 84 and will be admissible. In this case, no witness 
testified before tendering the documents and so there was no opportunity to lay the necessary 
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foundations for their admission as e-documents under Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 
2011.
1289
 
 
The Court held as follows:
1290
 “Granted, for the purpose of argument, that Exhibits "D" and 
"L" being computer generated documents or e-documents down loaded from the internet are 
not public documents whose secondary evidence are admissible only by certified true copies 
then it means that their admissibility is governed by the provisions of section 84 of the 
Evidence Act, 2011… There is no evidence on record to show that appellants in tendering 
Exhibits "D" and "L" satisfied any of the above conditions. In fact they did not as the 
documents were tendered and admitted from the bar. No witness testified before tendering the 
documents so there was no opportunity to lay the necessary foundations for their admission 
as e-documents under Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011. No wonder therefore that the 
lower court held, at page 838 of the record thus: - "A party that seeks to tender in evidence a 
computer generated document needs to do more than just tendering same from the bar. 
Evidence in relation to the use of the computer must be called to establish the conditions set 
out under Section 84(2) of the Evidence Act, 2011. I agree entirely with the above conclusion. 
Since appellants never fulfilled the pre-conditions laid down by law, Exhibits “D" and “L” 
were inadmissible as computer generated evidence/documents.” 
 
Section 84(4) of the Evidence Act 2011, further provides that where a party intends to tender 
any computer evidence, there is an additional requirement for a certificate identifying the 
document containing the statement and describing the manner in which the document was 
produced, with the particulars of any device involved in the production of the document, 
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‘signed by a person occupying a responsible position in relation to the operation of the 
electronic device’, shall be primary and sufficient evidence of the matters stated in the 
certificate.
1291
 The provisions of this section 84(4) has not yet been tested by any superior 
court of records to determine who actually qualifies to certify the computer evidence sought 
to be tendered under section 84(2).
1292
 Some writers have questioned if it is the person who 
has proper custody of the document/data; or the person who processes the document/data; or 
the owner of the document/data; or the person who controls the computer system, that should 
provide the certification as provided in section 104 of the Evidence Act?
1293
 
 
These conditions precedent provided in section in section 84(2) of the Evidence Act are 
surely a direct transplant of the provisions section 69 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 as applicable in the United Kingdom and as restated in the case of R v Shephard,
1294
 
which therefore applies mutatis mutandis, with the only exceptional difference being the 
additional certification requirement in section 84(4) of the Nigerian Evidence Act 2011, 
before the document could be admissible as evidence. 
 
This research have so much tried to avoid the temptation of delving into the convolutions of 
the theory and laws of evidence to focus on the admissibility or otherwise of computer 
evidence, which is one of the questions sought to be answered by this research. It is quite 
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clear that the admissibility of computer evidence in prosecuting cybercrime offences have 
continued to be a difficult.
1295
 The advancement in the information technology has made it so 
easy to manipulate or tamper with information through the computer system or network 
without the knowledge of the author.
1296
 It is also of common knowledge that computer 
evidence may be edited and improved to suit the required needs of the offender,
1297
 and this 
has resulted in the Court’s reluctance to accept the admissibility of computer evidence; and 
when they do, with utmost suspicion. The fact that computer systems may be easily 
compromised and hacked by criminal who may secure unlawful access to confidential and 
sensitive information stored therein has also not helped to the weight attached by the courts to 
computer evidence.
1298
 
 
7.4 Extradition and International Co-operation 
 
Extradition is the formal procedure for requesting the surrender of persons from one territory 
to another for the following purposes prosecuting the offender, to sentence the offender for an 
offence for which the person has already been convicted, or to carry out of a sentence that has 
already been imposed against the offender.
1299
 Generally, extradition happens between two 
states or countries, and is mostly a matter of international commitment rather than an 
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obligation under international law.
1300
 Extradition is usually supported by bilateral treaties 
amongst the participating parties, and as enshrined in the domestic legislations of each 
state.
1301
 
 
All requests for extradition are subject to the conditions provided for by the law of the 
requested state party or by applicable extradition treaties.
1302
 The COE Convention also 
allows a state party to refuse a request for the extradition of a cybercrime offender in its 
territory on the basis of his or her nationality, provided that the state has adopted necessary 
measures to establish jurisdiction over cybercrime offences established under the 
Convention.
1303
 In situations where a state party has refused the extradition of an offender on 
the basis of his or her nationality, the requested state party is only obliged to submit the case 
to its competent authorities for prosecution at the request of the requesting state party.
1304
 
Such authorities will then conduct the prosecution in the same manner as for any other 
offence of a comparable nature under the law of that state party.
1305
 The effect of these 
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provisions also allows every member state to maintain its sovereignty where an extradition 
request is incompatible with the law of the requested state party.
1306
 
 
The relevant primary legislation in the UK is the Extradition Act 2003, while the provisions 
of Section 51 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 provide that cybercrime offences 
necessitating extradition shall be extraditable offences under the Nigerian Extradition Act, 
2004.
1307
 There are three main parties in an extradition: the country which has made the 
extradition request (the ‘requesting’ State); the country which has been asked to extradite a 
person on their territory (the ‘requested’ State); and the person whose extradition is sought 
(the ‘subject’).1308 
 
Nigeria has no general obligation to surrender a person who is within its territory, unless it 
had signed bilateral (between two countries)
1309
 or a multilateral
1310
 (between several 
countries) extradition treaties agreeing to transfer ‘fugitive offenders’ in certain 
circumstances.
1311
 The nature of cybercrime offences makes them one of the exceptional 
cases where the fugitive criminal could commit the offence while still physically present in 
the territory of the extraditing country. The cases of R. v Governor of Brixton Prison Ex p. 
Levin
1312
, and R. v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p. United States 
(No.2)
1313
 has shown that extradition orders the Courts could make are not restricted to any 
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form or specified offences, as long as the offence was an offence under the English law and is 
extraditable, the necessary criteria were held to have been satisfied. 
 
7.4i Doctrine of Dual Criminality 
 
 
The basic foundation for extradition is usually predicated on the condition of ‘dual 
criminality’ between the requesting party and the country where the person is located.1314 The 
difficulties presented by this requirement are well illustrated by the case of the ‘Love Bug’ 
virus.
1315
 The virus destroyed many files, stole passwords and then spread rapidly throughout 
the world, and forced the shutdown of computers at large corporations such as Ford Motor 
Company and Dow Chemical Company, as well as the computer system at the House of 
Lords.
1316
 It was estimated to have affected over 45 million users in more than twenty 
countries, causing billions of dollars in damage.
1317
 Although investigators were able to 
determine that the person responsible was a former computer-science student in the 
Philippines, as the Philippines had no applicable law punishing such conduct, he could not be 
extradited to the United States due to the lack of dual criminality, as there was no cybercrime 
laws existing in Philippines as at the time.
1318
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The principle of ‘dual criminality’ was also restated in the case of Ahzaz v United States1319, 
the accused (a Pakistan national) had challenged the decision of a British District Judge 
referring his case to the Secretary of State for the Home Department to consider extraditing 
him to the United States. Prior to his arrest he was residing in Pakistan. It was alleged that he 
had obtained control of over 100,000 protected computers without the knowledge or 
authorisation of their owners, by infecting them with what he knew and believed to be 
malicious software provided by an undercover FBI agent who had paid him to do so. 
Approximately 800 of the computers were located in the United States. It was not disputed 
that his conduct would, if proved, have constituted an offence under US law punishable by up 
to 12 months' imprisonment. The district judge held that his conduct, had it occurred in the 
United Kingdom, would, if proved, have constituted an offence under the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990 section 1 or section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act, and thus an extraditable offence. 
It was evident that his conduct would if proved, constitute an offence under sections 1 and 3 
of the Computer Misuse Act. The court had held that, on the facts alleged he had had control 
of the computers in question without the knowledge or authorisation of their owners. He, for 
reward, agreed to install and did install the software that he believed to be malicious on those 
computers. It was not disputed that his actions were, to his knowledge unauthorized. 
 
7.4ii General Principles for International Co-Operation 
 
Cybercrime offences by their nature are of transnational character and traverses territorial 
boundaries and geographical restrictions, and therefore requires international co-operation 
between nations to ensure successful investigation and eventual prosecution.
1320
 The general 
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principles for international co-operation regarding cybercrime investigation and prosecutions 
are provided in Article 23 of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, and in 
Article 28(4) of the African Union Convention. The provisions of Article 23 of the COE 
Convention establish three principles for international co-operation amongst member states. 
The Convention urges member states to co-operate with each other to the widest extent 
possible for the purposes of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences 
related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a 
criminal offence.
1321
 
 
This general provision in the COE Convention is more extensive than the provision in Article 
28(4) of the African Union Convention and also Article 33 of the ECOWAS Directive
1322
 that 
merely urge member states to “make use of existing means for international cooperation with 
a view to responding to cyber threats, improving cyber security and stimulating dialogue 
between stakeholders”.1323 These means, according to the AU Convention, may be 
international, intergovernmental or regional, or based on private and public partnerships.
1324
 
The AU Convention is meant to be a regional unifying convention for member states, and 
should have made specific provisions for terms and means of co-operation, and if possible 
stipulate sanctions in case of failure or neglect by member states to co-operate.
1325
 By only 
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making reference to other ‘international, intergovernmental or regional, or based on private 
and public partnerships’ as the means of co-operation not only weakens the purpose of the 
Convention, but also makes the Convention to lose that binding and compelling force 
amongst member states.
1326
 By so doing, it also likens cybercrime offences to other 
traditional offences.  
 
Cybercrime offences are profoundly different in nature from traditional crimes, and therefore 
their investigations and other procedural modus are expected to require high-level technical 
expertise and efficient cross-jurisdictional investigations.
1327
 It would have been desirable for 
the Convention to set the standard platform and infrastructure to encourage efficient law 
enforcement resources with cross-jurisdictional and cross-sectorial collaboration required to 
effectively combat threats and enhance digital security amongst member states.
1328
 The level 
of international co-operation amongst member states in respect of cybercrime offences should 
be fast and should never be derailed by any administrative bottlenecks by any member 
state.
1329
 This is because the chances of apprehending the offender always diminishes by 
every second delayed.
1330
 Effective combating of crimes committed by use of computer 
systems, and effective collection of evidence in electronic form requires very rapid 
response.
1331
 Moreover, with a few keystrokes, action may be taken in one part of the world 
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that instantly has consequences many thousands of kilometres and many time zones away.
1332
 
For this and other procedural reasons, existing police co-operation and mutual assistance 
modalities require supplemental channels to address the challenges of the computer age 
effectively.
1333
 
 
Section 52(1) of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act provides that the Attorney-General of the 
Federation or designated competent authority may request or receive assistance from any 
agency or authority of a foreign State in the investigation or prosecution of offences under the 
Act; and may authorize or participate in any joint investigation or cooperation carried out for 
the purpose of detecting, preventing, responding and prosecuting cybercrime offences. The 
Act also extended the powers and provisions contained in section 52(1) in section 52(2) by 
making further provisions to the effect that the provisions for international co-operation as 
contained in subsection (1) may be carried out whether or not any bilateral or multilateral 
agreements exist between Nigeria and the requested or requesting country. This provisions 
therefore removes the usual administrative and legislative bottlenecks that are always 
encountered in cybercrime prosecution to ensure that that an offender could still be 
prosecuted despite the fact that Nigeria does not have any bilateral agreement with the other 
country.
1334
 This position was reconfirmed by the additional provision in section 52(3) which 
provides that Attorney-General of the Federation may, without prior request, forward to a 
competent authority of a foreign State, information obtained in the course of investigation if 
such information will assist in the apprehension of an offender or investigation of any cyber-
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related offence. One of the major purpose of section 52(3) of the Act seem to be the 
amendment of the provisions of section 1 of the Extradition Act, which portends that Nigeria 
have no general obligation to surrender a person who is within its territory, unless it had 
signed bilateral or a multilateral extradition treaties agreeing to transfer ‘fugitive offenders’ in 
certain circumstances.
1335
 
 
The provisions of section 52 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act seem to be more encompassing 
and far-reaching than the procedures set down both in the COE Convention and the AU 
Convention; none of which envisaged that other extraneous issues and circumstances like 
‘dual criminality principle’ in extradition proceedings would tend to hinder international co-
operation in respect of cybercrime offences. Firstly both amongst the members of the Council 
of Europe and their counterparts in the African Union, there are bound to be communication 
difficulties.
1336
 The member states speak different languages, and due to the nature of these 
offences, any delay would hinder their investigation.
1337
 For instance, Nigeria as a country 
has about 250 different ethnic groups with their own diverse languages, and so does other 
countries. There is no doubt that there are bound to be communication gaps or words/phrases 
being lost or misinterpreted during translation.
1338
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Secondly, in the developing countries, like Nigeria, there is the lack of counterpart capacity 
(both in human resource and technical capabilities).
1339
 Computer systems and computer 
networks work on diverse operating systems that in turn are composed of millions of codes 
that requires outstanding technical know-how to configure how these systems work and the 
level of their interconnections to the various networks.
1340
 Investigations into these area 
requires extensive investment in the requisite human resources, which are often far beyond 
the budget of the developing nations where these cybercriminals thrive.
1341
 There is therefore 
no doubt that the cybercriminals take advantage of these lacunas in the legislations in 
perpetuating their nefarious acts against the computer systems. It is not enough to make an 
umbrella provision on international co-operation, without going through the nitty-gritties of 
how those should be achieved. One wonders of what use are legislations which lack the basic 
capabilities of enforcement.  
 
Thirdly, the member states operate on different legal systems. For instance, Nigeria run 
multiple pluralist legal system founded in customary law, Islamic/sharia law, while the 
Criminal Code Act is applicable in the Southern Nigeria and the Penal Code applicable in the 
Northern Nigeria.
1342
 The procedural enforcements of laws in these regions are also different. 
For instance, the procedure for the search, seizure and arrest of an offender in the northern 
part of the country will obviously be different for the procedure to be followed for an 
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offender in the south.
1343
 It even makes it more difficult for international investigators to 
obtain information or investigate an offender within these regions if specific recourse is not 
taken for the applicable method of procedural enforcement within the region.  
 
Additionally, because of the cross border nature of these offences, there are limited extents 
that the law enforcement officers would take to locate evidence abroad, not to mention the 
suspects.
1344
 Sovereignty and jurisdiction are always jealously guided by individual law 
enforcement officer, thereby making it difficult for the other agencies to investigate beyond 
their own boundaries. The case of US v. Gorshov
1345
 and Yahoo Inc. v. LICRA
1346
 as 
previously discussed, all raise controversy about a country's jurisdiction to enforce its law 
regarding offences committed in the cyberspace. This could lead to mistrusts amongst the 
relevant authorities of the member states, which will no doubt have a far reaching effect on 
the investigation and prosecution.
1347
 
 
Finally, a state party may also refuse another state party's request for the expedited disclosure 
of preserved traffic data where it considers that the execution of the request will likely 
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prejudice its sovereignty, security, public order or other essential interests.
1348
 None of these 
two regional conventions had set out procedural guidelines to be followed by the member 
states in order to help them achieve the provisions regarding international co-operation. 
Baron
1349
 had also contended that there are no laid down principles by the COE Convention 
to be followed by law enforcement agencies. The implication is that there is definitely going 
to be conflict of laws while investigating and/or prosecuting cyber-crime, especially if it 
involves two member states;
1350
 and could be worse when it involves states with no bilateral 
agreements. 
 
7.5 Searches and Seizures 
 
Search and seizure are one of the most significant mechanisms in cybercrime 
investigation.
1351
 The importance of search and seizure in criminal investigations and 
eventual prosecutions cannot be overly emphasized, as most evidences which often form the 
foundations of criminal convictions are products of searches and seizures.
1352
 The COE 
Convention on cybercrime has made extensive provision in Article 19 of the Convention. The 
provisions of Article 19(1) urges member states to adopt such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to empower their competent authorities to search in its territory a 
computer system or part of it and computer data stored therein; and a computer-data storage 
medium in which computer data may be stored. The computer search power in the 
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convention is designed to ensure that data can be accessed and searched by the relevant 
competent authorities;
1353
 and the search may concern data contained either within a 
computer system or part of it
1354
, or on an independent data storage medium
1355
. A replica of 
the provision is contained in the African Union Convention,
1356
 but unfortunately the 
provisions as contained in the AU Convention might be ineffective if one considers the 
capability of their practical enforcement. Firstly, the provisions of Article 31(3)(a) provides 
that “…the court applied to may carry out a search to access all or part of a computer system 
through another computer system, where the said data are accessible from or available to the 
initial system.” This provision seems to impose the procedural duties of the search of 
computer system on the Court? The duty of the court is to interpret laws made by the 
legislature, and not the enforcement of it.
1357
 What then are duties and functions of the Police 
and the other law enforcement agencies? These provisions therefore seem to fail the laid 
down criteria in Article 19(2) of the COE Convention which urged member states to adopt 
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that where its authorities 
search or similarly access a specific computer system or part of it, and have grounds to 
believe that the data sought is stored in another computer system or part of it… the authorities 
shall be able to expeditiously extend the search or similar accessing to the other system. 
 
In Nigeria, Section 45 of the Cybercrime Act provides that a duly authorized law 
enforcement officer may apply ex-parte to the court for the issuance of a warrant for the 
purposes of a cybercrime or computer related crime investigation. Section 50 of the Act 
                                                 
1353
 Orin S Kerr, O. S. ‘Searches and seizures in a digital world’ (2005) Harvard Law Review, 531-585, 
<http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1020905.files/SearchandSeizureDigital.pdf> accessed on 20 June 
2015. 
1354
 Art 19(1)(a). Such as the computer hard drive 
1355
 Art 19(1)(b). Such as a CD-ROM, diskette, computer USB flash drives or other removable disks or storage 
system 
1356
 Article 31(3) (a) and (b) of the AU Convention 
1357
 General Sanni Abacha v. Chief Gani Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt.660) 228. 2 
298 
 
however bestows on the Federal High Court, the exclusive jurisdiction on offences relating to 
the Act. This could also be inferred as exclusive jurisdiction to grant ex-parte orders on the 
application of a designated law enforcement officer. Although not provided for in the Act, a 
search warrant may be issued and executed on any day including a Sunday or Public 
holidays;
1358
 and under section 111 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a search warrant shall be 
executed between the hours of 5am – 8pm except the issuing court in its discretion authorizes 
the execution of the warrant at any other time. However, issuing Judge may authorize that a 
search warrant may be executed at any other time other than 5am – 8pm, either at the time the 
search warrant was issued or at any time before the search warrant is executed.
1359
 Under 
section 109(1) of Criminal Procedure Act (CPA),
1360
 a search warrant shall be under the hand 
(signature) of the Magistrate/Judge issuing the same; while section 109(2) of CPA provides 
that a search warrant once issued remains valid and in force until it is executed or cancelled 
by the issuing authority.
1361
 
 
Under the Cybercrime Act,
1362
 the court may issue a warrant under these three conditions; 
authorizing a law enforcement officer to: 
(a) Enter the premises or conveyance specified or described in the warrant;  
(b) Search the premises or conveyance and any person found therein; and 
(c) Seize and retain any computer or electronic device and relevant material found 
therein. 
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This provision as contained in section 45(2) of the Act seem to have invariably provided for 
search of premises, search of persons, and search/seizure of things. A warrant will only be 
issued by a Judge when he is satisfied by a Motion Ex-Parte supported by an affidavit sworn 
by the Law Enforcement Officer that there is reasonable ground for believing that the warrant 
is sought to prevent the commission of an offence under the Act or to prevent the interference 
with investigative process under the Act; or for the purpose of investigating cybercrime, 
cybersecurity breach or computer related offences; or that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that the person or material on the premises or conveyance may be relevant to the 
cybercrime or computer related offences under investigation; and that the person named in 
the warrant is preparing to commit an offence under the Act.
1363
 The procedure for 
conducting the search and seizure are not provided in the Cybercrime Act, and therefore 
recourse will always be sought from the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act and the 
Criminal Procedure Code. Under section 79 of Criminal Procedure Code (CPC)
1364
, if any 
place to be searched is an apartment in the actual occupation of a woman, who is not the 
person to be searched, but who according to custom, does not appear in public, the person 
making the search shall, before entering the apartment, give notice to such woman that she is 
at liberty to withdraw and shall afford her every reasonable facility for withdrawing, and may 
then enter the apartment.
1365
 This is intended to protect the privacy of women of the Muslim 
faith. However section 45(3) of the Cybercrime Act provides that where search warrant is to 
be executed on a woman, the search must be by another woman irrespective of her culture or 
religion.
1366
 
 
                                                 
1363
 Section 27(3) 
1364
 Applicable only in the Northern part of Nigeria; See also, Ahmed Abdullahi, ‘Search and Seizure in Nigeria 
Law with particular reference to the Northern states’ (1985) Doctoral Dissertation, Ahmadu Bello University, 
Zaria. 
1365
 Adefunmilayo v. Oduntan (1958) NNLR 32 
1366
 Section 6(2) of CPA and section 44(3) of CPC. See also Section 32 National Drug Law Enforcement 
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The problem with the provisions of section 45 of the Nigerian Act is that, it seems to suggest 
that the computer evidence are tangible in nature. These are intangible evidence,
1367
 and there 
should have been further provisions in the Act for situations where the information sought are 
contained outside the computer system or network sought to be searched. Another relevant 
question is whether an order of court must first be sought and obtained before any search is 
made? This question is answered by the provisions of section 45 of the Cybercrime Act. 
Section 45(1) of the Act makes express provisions for powers of a law enforcement officer to 
conduct investigations, including a search, without or pending the execution of a search 
warrant. This provision states that: “Where in a case of verifiable urgency, a cybercrime or 
computer related offences is threatened, or there is the urgent need to prevent the 
commission of an offence provided under this Act, and an application to the court or to a 
Judge in Chambers to obtain a warrant would cause delay that may be prejudicial to the 
maintenance of public safety or order, an authorized law enforcement officer may without 
prejudice to the provisions of section 27 of this Act or any other law; with the assistance of 
such other authorized officers as may be necessary and while search warrant is being sought 
for…” enter and search any premises or place if he has reason to suspect that, within those 
premises, place: cybercrime is being committed or likely to be committed; or there is 
evidence of the commission of an offence under this Act; or there is an urgent need to prevent 
the commission of an offence under this Act .  
 
This power of search without a warrant is also extended to search of any person or 
conveyance found on any premises
1368
 or place which such authorized officers who are 
                                                 
1367
 Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin M. Hitt, and Shinkyu Yang, ‘Intangible assets: Computers and organizational 
capital’ (2002) Brookings papers on economic activity, (1), 137-198; See also Bruce H Nearon, ‘Foundations in 
auditing and digital evidence’ (2005) The CPA Journal, 75(1), 32-34. 
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empowered to enter and search without warrant.
1369
 It also includes the power to without 
warrant, seize, remove and detain anything which is, or contains or appears to the law officer 
to be or to contain evidence of the commission of a cybercrime offence.
1370
 This power also 
extends to use or cause to use a computer or any device to search any data contained in or 
available to any computer system or computer network;
1371
 use any technology to decode or 
decrypt any coded or encrypted data contained in a computer into readable text or 
comprehensible format;
1372
 and more importantly, also includes the power to arrest, search 
and detain any person whom the officer reasonably suspects of having committed or likely to 
commit a cybercrime offence.
1373
 Invariably, the provision of section 28 empowers the law 
enforcement officer to search and seize any computer evidence or data without warrant. 
 
The situation is slightly different in the United Kingdom, where the Computer Misuse Act 
provides for the procedures to be followed for the grant of search warrants in cases of 
cybercrime offences relating to unauthorised access under section 1 is suspected to have been 
committed. Section 14 of the Act provides that a search warrant might be issued by a circuit 
judge where there are ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ that a section 1 offence under the 
Computer Misuse Act, has been or is about to be committed in the premises identified in the 
application. The position is slightly different in Scotland where the application lies to the 
Sheriff. The general provisions relating to the applications and grant of search warrants are 
contained in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (as amended by the Criminal Justice 
and Police Act 2001). The offences under section 2 and 3 of the Computer Misuse Act are 
                                                 
1369
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1370
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1371
 Section 45(1) (e); Orin S. Keer, ‘Search warrants in an era of digital evidence’ (2005) Mississippi Law 
Journal 75, 85. 
1372
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identified as ‘serious arrestable offences’ by virtue of section 116 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, as amended by section 47 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. In these cases, 
an application may be made to a justice of the peace, who may issue a search warrant, if 
satisfied that a ‘serious arrestable offence’ has been committed, and that there is likelihood of 
that the evidence for the proof of such offence will be found therein.
1374
 
 
The practice of using internet servers to store data is becoming very common; and very often 
referred to as cloud computing. The joint provisions of Article 19(1)(b) and (2) of the Council 
of Europe Convention are meant to address this problem. This provision is meant to enable 
the investigators to extend their search to the external systems or serves, if at any time during 
their investigation they discover that the required information or evidence is stored in another 
computer system or network.
1375
 One of the problems that are usually envisaged is that the 
investigators may be liable to actions against third parties in cases where the required 
information are being held in custody of an external server that is jointly shared by others.
1376
 
This is because it might be difficult in such cases to decipher the actual information relevant 
to the case and the suspect in question. Can they legally seize an entire server in such 
circumstance?
1377
 This is rather a difficult question to answer, more so when the provisions of 
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1375
 Josiah Dykstra, ‘Seizing electronic evidence from cloud computing environments’ (2013) 
<http://www.csee.umbc.edu/~dykstra/Seizing-Electronic-Evidence-from-Cloud-Computing-Environments.pdf> 
accessed on 7 July 2015. 
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 Jaydip Sen, ‘Security and privacy issues in cloud computing’ (2013) Architectures and Protocols for Secure 
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service cloud computing” (2012) Rich. JL & Tech., 19, 1, <http://jolt.richmond.edu/index.php/forensic-
collection-of-electronic-evidence-from-infrastructure-as-a-service-cloud-computing/> accessed on 22 June 2015 
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 R. v. Cole [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34 (Canadian Supreme Court) where a high-school teacher, was charged with 
possession of child pornography and unauthorized use of a computer.  He was permitted to use his work-issued 
laptop computer for incidental personal purposes which he did.  While performing maintenance activities, a 
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disc.  The laptop and both discs were handed over to the police, who without a warrant reviewed their contents 
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Article 19(3) seem to extend the investigators’ power to include the power to: seize or 
similarly secure a computer system or part of it or a computer-data storage medium; make 
and retain a copy of those computer data; maintain the integrity of the relevant stored 
computer data; and to render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed 
computer system. 
 
This additional power to seize stored computer data in Article 19(3) enables the investigators 
to seize or similarly secure computer data that has been searched or similarly accessed under 
the search power in Articles 19(1) and (2). This includes the power of seizure of computer 
hardware and any other relevant computer data storage media. In certain cases, for instance 
when data is stored in unique operating systems such that it cannot be copied, it is 
unavoidable that the data carrier as a whole has to be seized. Since this mostly refers to 
intangible data, the Convention have therefore set-out additional measures that will be 
required to secure the data, e.g., “maintain the integrity of the data”1378 or “render 
inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer system”.1379  
 
There is therefore no doubt that the introduction of cloud computing raises very serious 
challenges to the enforcement of the powers of searches and seizures of computer evidence 
relating to cybercrime cases, and will most often collide with the citizens’ privacy rights.1380 
Should the scope of the warrant therefore extend to all materials in the computer system or 
network? What happens if it is a shared network? In R v Chesterfield Justices and Others, ex 
                                                                                                                                                        
conviction appeal court reversed the decision, finding that there was no s. 8 breach.  The Court of Appeal for 
Ontario set aside that decision and excluded the disc containing the temporary Internet files, the laptop and the 
mirror image of its hard drive.  The disc containing the photographs of the student was found to be legally 
obtained and therefore admissible.  As the trial judge had wrongly excluded this evidence, the Court of Appeal 
ordered a new trial. 
1378
 Article 19(3)(c) 
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 Article 19 (3)(d) 
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 Josiah Dykstra ‘Seizing electronic evidence from cloud computing environments’ (2013) 
<http://www.csee.umbc.edu/~dykstra/Seizing-Electronic-Evidence-from-Cloud-Computing-Environments.pdf> 
accessed on 22 June 2015. 
304 
 
p Barmley
1381
 the Court held that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 did not contain 
a defence to an action for trespass to goods in respect of items subject to legal privilege being 
seized during the execution of a search warrant. This decision no doubt placed the law 
enforcement agencies in a difficult position, which makes it not feasible to search and sift the 
data at the premises of the suspect, and at the same time, makes them culpable to liability if 
the data is entirely removed subject to subsequent screening and examination. This position 
was later clarified in H v Commissioner for Inland Revenue
1382
 to extend only to situations 
involving legal privileged material, and not every situation where irrelevant material is seized 
in the course of taking a computer as evidence. The potential liability of law enforcement 
agencies as created by the decision in Bramley
1383
 seemed to be one of the underlining 
reasoning behind the enactment of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, which granted 
the law enforcement agencies the right to remove materials, including material potentially 
outside the scope of a warrant, where it is ‘not reasonably practicable’ to separate it.1384 
Despite this provision, the scope of ‘privacy’ rights under the international law is quite 
expansive
1385
 and quite a number of judicial decisions have made it clear that the intrusive 
nature of criminal investigations could trigger a cause of action on privacy-based rights,
1386
 
including where a suspect is unaware that information is being collected,
1387
 and even where 
the mere existence of legislation providing for investigative powers entails such a threat.
1388
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7.6 Conclusion 
 
This research has so far analysed the provisions relating to the enforcement aspects of 
cybercrime investigations, the problems, and the shortfalls thereof from a range of 
perspectives, including legal powers for investigatory measures, subject privacy safeguards, 
investigation challenges and good practices, interactions between law enforcement and the 
private sector; and law enforcement training and capacity. These procedural issues have 
continued to stifle the enforcement of cybercrime laws, and demonstrate the complexities of 
cybercrime investigations and the need for effective legal frameworks, combined with law 
enforcement resources and skills in practice. An effective investigation of crime is not 
possible without adequate legal framework which is the foundation of the investigative 
powers.
1389
 The nature and diversity of cybercrime offences makes it imperative that such 
measures must be regulated by law and accompanied by adequate safeguards. While some 
investigative actions can be achieved with traditional powers, many procedural provisions do 
not translate well from a spatial, object-oriented approach to one involving electronic data 
storage and real-time data flows.
1390
 Specialized legislations are therefore required, to ensure 
that the methods of procedural issues of cybercrime enforcements such as for the gathering of 
electronically stored and communicated computer content, for the identification and 
localisation of computer devices and communications are globally unified. 
 
The issue of determining the actual court with the relevant jurisdiction has always proved an 
arduous task. There is no doubt that the issue of Jurisdiction is of utmost important on im-
plementation of any piece of legislation. Most often, the issues of jurisdiction are solved by a 
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critical review of the legislation describing the particular offence, and could not be far from 
confirmation of the actual offence committed, the locus delicti, or the physical or geographic 
location of the offence. The general principle of international criminal law has always re-
mained that a crime committed within a state’s territory may be tried there.1391 This principle 
had developed under the English common law to where the actus reus was completed. This 
general principle of jurisdiction has recently been held by the courts to be when ‘the last act 
took place in England or a substantial part of the crime was committed here’.1392 However the 
Computer Misuse Act had inserted the ‘significant link’ concept under section 5(2), as was 
decided in R. v Waddon,
1393
 although the Courts seem to have reverted back to the ‘substan-
tial part’ requirement in R. v Smith1394 and R v Sheppard & Whittle,1395 and the legal uncer-
tainty about where the act could be held to have occurred in computer misuse offences con-
tinues to linger. Confirming the locus delicti in cyber-related offences could mostly be im-
possible because the cyberspace is an amorphous space that does not occupy a set physical or 
geographical location.
1396
 
 
One of the major problems is that the International statutes have always made the grievous 
mistakes of usage of domestic laws instead of international laws/statutes as measure for 
determining jurisdiction.
1397
 One would have thought that these International 
Conventions/Directives would have tried a rather innovative method of determination of 
jurisdictions. They have instead resorted to the long existing and traditional methods of 
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determination of jurisdictions for traditional offences. For instance, Article 22 of the Council 
of Europe Convention states as follows: Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over any offence ...when the offence is 
committed in its territory...
1398
 by one of its nationals, if the offence is punishable under 
criminal law where it was committed or if the offence is committed outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of any State.”1399 Unfortunately, the same could not be said about the African 
Union Convention, which made no provision regarding jurisdiction. This is rather a grave 
error by the drafters of the said Convention. It is a finding of this research that cybercrime 
offences are transnational in nature, and there is no doubt that the use of domestic or 
municipal laws to determine the applicable jurisdiction in cybercrime cases will always foist 
a fait accompli on the trial Court. 
 
Stephens
1400
 has identified three weaknesses associated with the Convention’s imposition of 
the usage of domestic laws instead of an international measure: 
1. The Convention relies so much on the current international system of potentially 
conflicting domestic criminal laws in trying to establish the Court with relevant 
jurisdiction. Most nations in trying to exact its sovereignty and protect their political 
and economic interests have always tried to assume jurisdictions in most cases.   
2.  Most of these domestic laws carry jurisdictional limitations on their extraterritorial 
application in the international sphere; and 
3.  Because of sovereign immunity, most municipal criminal laws cannot reach the acts 
of foreign officials in exercise of their vested jurisdictions. Of important note is 
Article 27 (4) (a) which provides for the right of parties to refuse extradition in 
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situations where the crime in question involves a political offence or is likely to 
prejudice national interest. One would have expected that the convention sets out 
what actually constitutes political offence.
1401
   
 
Another important issues in the determination of jurisdiction given the diverse and extra-
territorial nature of cybercrime, is that it would have been superficial to those drafting the 
legislation that conduct may have an effect in another jurisdiction. For instance in Nigeria, 
where homosexuality is a criminal offence, would it be possible for an offender to be charged 
in the United States offences relating to xenophobic activities on the internet? This research 
poses this question taking into consideration a statement from the US Department of Justice 
in 2003 which stated as follows: ‘With the continually expanding global information 
infrastructure, with numerous instances of international hacking, and with the growing 
possibility of increased global industrial espionage, it is important that the United States have 
jurisdiction over international computer crime cases.’1402 
 
Another serious jurisdictional problem which have been overlooked by both the Council of 
Europe’s and the African Union Conventions is the “reluctant” nature of these Conventions 
to identify who should be the “mediator” in case of an overlapping of jurisdiction between 
member states. The Council of Europe’s Convention states: “When more than one Party 
claims jurisdiction over an alleged offence established in accordance with this Convention, 
the Parties involved shall, where appropriate, consult with a view to determining the most 
appropriate jurisdiction or prosecution.”1403 
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Member states are presumed by the Convention to agree to accept who should assume 
jurisdiction. What if they fail to agree? The Convention being an international instrument 
could have set out the factors that will vest jurisdiction on a particular state in different 
circumstances of the each case. The growing vulnerability of victims attributed from crimes 
committed against computer systems and networks is a menace which ought to be addressed 
comprehensively. The task of preventing these illegal conducts in the cyberspace has always 
fallen on the courts of individual nations. However, this first question usually asked by the 
Court to itself is whether it has the relevant jurisdiction to entertain the case. Unfortunately, 
the answer to the question is still at large. 
 
Regarding the provisions relating to international co-operations, this research has so far 
revealed that the procedures set down both in the COE Convention and the AU Convention 
did not envisage other extraneous issues and circumstances that would tend to hinder 
international co-operation in respect of cybercrime offences. Consequential to provisions 
regarding jurisdictional limitations, the law enforcement officers of the investigating state are 
obliged to pay adequate attention to the legality of any extra-territorial evidence obtained 
during the course of their investigations. This is because any unlawfully obtained evidence 
from a foreign state may be inadmissible in evidence, either as an ‘abuse of court process’1404 
or through the exercise of statutory discretion.
1405
 These issues should be considered taking 
into consideration that the law does not apply in isolation of the community where it should 
be enforced; therefore those issues should be considered by individual member states while 
making their municipal legislations; not to mention the challenge of capacity and resources, 
the extent to which proactive cybercrime investigations can be undertaken by law 
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1405
 Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. In any proceedings that court may reject an 
evidence as inadmissible if it appears to the court that, having regarding to all the circumstances of the case, 
especially how the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on 
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enforcement may also be affected by underlying differences between the diverse criminal law 
systems regarding prosecutorial and judicial oversight over the initial stages of an 
investigation, as well as the extent to which intrusive investigative measures can be 
authorized in intelligence-based or prospective investigations amongst member states. 
 
The provisions of AU Convention regarding search and seizures has also been identified as 
ineffective and difficult to adapt with the current trends of time and technological 
advancement. The Police powers of search and arrest are also not unlimited and could often 
be at head-on collision with individual privacy rights. Both the COE and the AU Conventions 
seem to have been drafted under the illusion that computer data can be covered by 
‘traditional’ powers of search and seizure of ‘anything’ believed to be relevant to an offence, 
without consideration of the fact that traditional procedural laws might not be capable of 
being interpreted to include intangible data or IP-based communications, and might be left at 
a situation of fait accompli due to some critical challenges such as the volatile nature of 
electronic evidence, and use of obfuscation techniques by perpetrators, which includes the 
use of encryption, proxies, cloud computing service, botnets involving ‘innocent’ computer 
systems infected with malware, and multiple routing of internet connections. 
 
The provisions regarding procedural enforcements in the United Kingdom (except for the 
issues raised above) are on entire different plane with the applicable position in Nigeria 
which have recently adopted sui generis offences in the Cybercrime Act 2015. Both the 
courts and the prosecutors have always struggled to understand the nature of these 
cybercrime offences and the admissibility or otherwise of the e-evidence; and these 
perpetrators of cybercrime offences have continued to exploit these weaknesses in the 
system.  
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Chapter Eight: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Specific designation of the components of critical infrastructures 
 
This research has so far identified that cybercrime acts show a broad distribution across 
financial-driven acts, computer-content related acts, as well as acts against the confidentiality, 
integrity and accessibility of computer systems. These acts no doubt amount to significant 
risk and threat to Governments and businesses. Both the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 and 
the United Kingdom’s provisions in the Serious Crime Act 2015, have the same legislative 
resemblance regarding the specification of the computers, computer systems, networks, 
programs, and data that are part of these critical national infrastructures. While the Nigerian 
Cybercrime Act
1406
 left it at the discretion of the office of the Presidency to keep making 
efforts to identify the core services that need to be protected from cyber-attacks so that their 
services are secured in a way that is proportional to the perceived threat by their inclusion as 
components of the Critical National Information Infrastructure; the United Kingdom’s 
Serious Crime Act did not specifically designate the areas of the national computers, 
computer systems, and/or networks as part of the critical national infrastructure. The Act 
seems to have left this at the discretion of the courts for interpretation on the individual cases 
subject to the provisions of section 41 of the Act, which defines the essential element 
involved for the commission of this offence. This element as already discussed includes the 
section 1 offence of unauthorised access under the Computer Misuse Act, and the quantum of 
the eventual magnitude of the offence committed by the offender.  
 
Although the reason for this legislative technique could be arguably buoyed by the dynamic 
nature of cybercrime offences and modus operandi, it could still be flawed under the 
fundamental rights principle of ‘no punishment without law’, which had since been 
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established by the Latin maxim of ‘nulla poenna sine lege’.1407 It is an old age principle of 
legality that the statutory definitions of crimes should be sufficiently clear and precise so as 
to enable the subjects of the legislation to understand the conducts that are prohibited by the 
statutes and the ones that are not.
1408
 It is also a further requirement that an offender cannot 
be retroactively punished for a conduct.
1409
 There is also an identical provision in Article 7 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, as ratified by the UK Human Rights Act 1998. 
This generally entails that the law must be adequately accessible to every individual; in the 
sense that an individual must have an indication of the legal rules applicable in a given case 
and the ‘offender’ must be able to foresee the consequences of his actions, in particular to be 
able to avoid incurring the sanction of the criminal law.
1410
 Both the Nigerian Cybercrime 
Act and the UK Serious Crime Act both seem to have created another lacuna while trying to 
fill one. 
 
8.2 Contradiction with section 319 of the Criminal Code Act 
 
 
Section 5(2) of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act provides for a more specific situation where 
death occurs as a direct result of the offender’s act, or as a result of the cybercrime offence. 
This section does not also leave the court with a discretionary power of making an alternative 
order for a fine in the event of the offender’s conviction, but has instead provided for a 
sentence of life imprisonment for such offences. This research has identified that this 
provision contradicts the provisions of section 319(1) of the Criminal Code, which provides 
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that, ‘…any person who commits the offence of murder shall be sentenced to death.’ Under 
Nigerian criminal law the offence of murder is punishable by death across the entire 
federation by the direct provisions of Section 319 of the Criminal Code Act 2004, and section 
220 of the Penal Law, 1963; and the court or judge has no discretion in the matter. Where the 
death sentence is specified for an offence in Nigeria, it is mandatory and not merely a 
permitted punishment upon a finding of guilt.
1411
  The only sentence open to the court to 
impose is one of death. The provisions of section 319 of the Criminal Code therefore do not 
leave the court with any discretion to punish an offender for a lesser offence upon proof of 
homicide. When a person is convicted of murder, the trial court must sentence him to death 
and direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead.   
 
Although it could however be argued that section 5(3) of the Cybercrime Act might have 
impliedly repealed the provisions of section 319 of the Criminal Code Act and section 220 of 
the Penal Code 1963 regarding capital punishment for cyber-offences by virtue of the 
doctrine of implied repeal;
1412
 repeal by implication is however not always favoured by 
Courts, who are always unwilling to imply repeal,
1413
 unless there exists clear proof to the 
contrary.
1414
 Such an interpretation is adopted only when it is unavoidable.
1415
 Statutes are 
not repealed by inference or implication but by direct provision of the law.
1416
 This research, 
however identifies that a rule of doctrine cannot override express provisions of the law.
1417
 
Section 6(1) of the Interpretation Act provides for the survival of pending proceedings where 
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there are no specific provisions for abatement of such pending proceedings.
1418
 It must be 
noted that the Interpretation Act is a constitutional provision. Section 318(4) of the 1999 
Constitution provides that the Interpretation Act shall apply for the purposes of interpreting 
the provisions of the constitution. The rationale in OHMB v. Garba
1419
 (amongst other cases) 
was that an abatement provision must not be implied unless expressly provided for. One of 
the canons of interpretation is that effect should be given to ordinary plain meaning of words 
when they are unambiguous and clear without resulting to external aid or importing words 
into the statute.
1420
 It must be borne in mind that one of the tenets of interpretation of statute 
is the need not to impute an intention to contravene the constitution to lawmakers and to 
adopt a construction which avoids inconsistency with the constitution.
1421
  
 
The situation now seem to leave it at the discretion of the Courts to decide if there has been 
implied repeal of the provisions of section 319 of the Criminal Code Act and section 220 of 
the Penal Code 1963 regarding capital punishment by section 5(3) of the Cybercrime Act. It 
is unfathomable that despite the fact that the shortfalls and long-term consequences of this 
provision had been raised to the legislative committee, who reconsidered this provisional part 
of the Bill during the hearing at the ‘Committee Stage’ of the Bill,1422 but still chose to go 
ahead to ratify the provisions of the Act. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1418
 Interpretation Act, Chapter 192, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, available at <http://www.nigeria-
law.org/Interpretation%20Act.htm> accessed on 12 December 2015; See also Aqua v. Ondo S.S.C (1988) 4 
NWLR (Pt 91) 622 at 631; Osadebaey v. Attorney General Bendel State (1991) 1 nwlr (pt 169) 525. 
1419
 (2002) 14 NWLR Pt. 788 P.538. 
1420
 See Chief Okotie-Eboh v. Chief James Ebiowo Manager & Ors (2004) 12 SCNJ 139 
1421
 See Chief L.U. Okeahialam & Anor v. Nze J. U. Nwamara & Ors (2003) 7 SCNJ 132 (Pp. 36-38, paras. F-
B) 
1422
 The Researcher’s Memo to the Nigeria Senate Committee on Cybercrime, titled: ‘Section 5(2) of the 
Cybercrime Bill – A Head-on Collision with Section 319 of the Criminal Code Act (31/10/2014). 
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It is however undisputable that section 5(3) of the Act has created some kind of confusion 
and have no doubt contradicted with the provisions of Section 319 of the Criminal Code Act 
2004 and section 220 of the Penal Law of Northern Nigeria 1963. It is now left to the courts 
to determine if an implied repeal was intended by the legislature. 
 
8.3 Lack of universal definition of cybercrime and cyberterrorism 
 
 
This research has identified that there is no unanimously agreed definition of this term.
1423
 
Another issue that has made the global definition of cybercrime so difficult has been the 
constantly changing and evolving scope of computer-related crimes; more so as definitions of 
cybercrime continue to experimentally evolve.
1424
 Some scholars have argued that defining 
the term either too broadly or too narrowly creates unintended problem with the risk of 
creating a threat that never appears, or missing the real problem when it comes.
1425
 Other 
legal scholars have argued that a broad definition of the term is necessary because of their 
diversity and rapid emergence of new technology-specific criminal behaviors.
1426
 This 
research identifies the need for a universal definition of the acts that come within the confines 
of cyber offences; and it is imperative that regional legislation is amended to ensure that 
member-states revise their municipal laws to reflect these amendments. 
 
Section 18 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act has made a specific provision for cyberterrorism 
and defined it as an act of accessing or causing to be accessed any computer or computer 
                                                 
1423
 See for example: International Telecommunication Union, ‘Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for 
Developing Countries’ (2011); Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, ETS No. 
185; Fausto Pocar, ‘New challenges for international rules against cyber-crime’ (2004) European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research, 10(1): 27-37; David S. Wall, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the 
Information Age, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007). 
1424
 Gordon, S., & Ford, R. ‘On the definition and classification of cybercrime’ (2006) Journal of Computer 
Virology, 2, 13-20. 
1425
 Carl J. Franklin, The Investigator’s Guide to Computer Crime, (Charles C. Thomas-Publisher Ltd. Illinois, 
U.S.A., 2006) 7. 
1426
 Rizgar Mohammed Kadir, ‘The Scope and the Nature of Computer Crime Statutes: A Comparative Study’ 
(2010) German L.J., Vol. 11 No.06, 614. 
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system or network for purposes of terrorism. However, like the UK provision, the Nigerian 
Act has also used the term ‘terrorism’ to define cyberterrorism; and states that cyberterrorism 
involves the act of accessing or causing to be accessed any computer or computer system or 
network for purposes of terrorism. Section 18(2) of the Act provides that ‘terrorism’ shall 
have the same meaning under the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011, as amended. Section 
1(2) of the Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 lists acts and activities that constitute 
acts of terrorism. 
 
Regarding the computer-related offences, and the other offences militating against the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and/or systems, a cursory look at 
section 6(1) of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act, reveals that the problem caused by the lacuna in 
section 1 of the UK Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the decision in Bignell’s case has been 
purely considered by the legislature who addressed this by using the language “accessed a 
computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access”. In respect of the hacking 
offences, section 6(3) of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act has created a rather unique and novel 
offence which is different from other jurisdictions and countries that had previously enacted 
their individual municipal cybercrime laws. Although the provision of section 6(3) of the 
Nigerian Act is not contained both in the Budapest Convention, and the UK’s Computer 
Misuse Act, this anomaly seem to have been rectified in the UK by the provisions of section 
42 of the Serious Crime Act of 2015. This section punishes situations where the offender had 
in committing any of the offences related to illegal access, illegal system interference, illegal 
data interference and illegal interception, use any device to avoid detection or otherwise 
prevent identification. 
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8.4 Conflict and supremacy 
 
 
Regarding the cyber-fraud offences, the provisions of section 14(2) of the Nigerian 
Cybercrime Act, seem to be a replication of the provisions of section 1 of the Nigeria 
Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006.  One striking importance of 
the provision of the Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006 is the 
provision of section 1(1) which started with the phrase: ‘Notwithstanding anything contained 
in any other enactment or law’. This phrase is not contained in section 14 of the Cybercrime 
Act, and seems to give a subtle suggestion that the provisions contained in Advance Fee 
Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act 2006, supersedes every other provision related 
to Fraud and other related activities. This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that section 
1(3) of the Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act prescribes stricter 
punishment of imprisonment for a term of not more than 20 years and not less than seven 
years without the option of a fine, for offenders convicted for any of the fraud-related 
offences.  This creates a situation where the prosecution are given options to pick and choose 
which legislation to use, and leaves no room for consistency. Although section 58 of the 
Cybercrime Act defines “data” as representations of information or of concepts that are being 
prepared or have been prepared in a form suitable for use in a computer, there is however no 
definition of what constitutes a ‘document’ was also proffered in the Act. There is no doubt 
that this is a very big legislative lacuna, and the legal principle of ‘expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius’ could easily be arguable to the fact that the express mention of one or more 
things of a particular class may be regarded as impliedly excluding others.  
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8.5 New wine in old wine skin – Intellectual Property Offences 
 
The Nigerian situation in respect of copyrights and trademarks offences is still the use of the 
traditional trademarks and copyright infringement provisions. There are no specific 
provisions existing (except the mere mention of the term ‘computer software’ in section 51 of 
the Nigeria Copyright Act,) in any law in Nigeria, even in the Cybercrime Act, 2015. This is 
rather an unfortunate situation, and it would have been thought that the legislatures would 
have utilised this opportunity to set the records straight by establishing a legal framework 
upon for copyright issues regarding computer programmes and software. Despite the fact that 
the Nigerian Copyrights Commission had since 2012 issued a notice to revise the provisions 
of the Copyright Act, surprisingly this step to revise the provisions of the Act had only 
remained at the issuance of the said notice, and nothing has come out of it since then. The 
Legislatures ought to have used the provisions in the Cybercrime Act 2015 to correct these 
anomalies and the obvious lacunas in the Nigerian Trademarks and Copyrights Act regarding 
offences and acts committed through the cyberspace. This is really one of the situations 
where a transplant of the provisions in the UK could be applied. This research has from the 
foregoing identified that by virtue of being a British colony, English Law became a source of 
the Nigerian criminal law and thus applicable in the country through the mechanism of local 
legislation. The English laws so received in the country consist of: the Common Law of 
England, the doctrines of Equity, and the statutes of general application in force in England 
on the 1st of January 1890. Also, section 363 of the Nigeria Criminal Procedure Act permits 
reliance on or voyage to English rules of practice and procedure, in any event of a lacuna in 
adjectival Nigerian law until this is rectified by the legislature. 
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8.6 Identity related offences: Revision of the regional legislations 
 
This research has so far identified that there are no specific provisions in the Council of 
Europe’s Convention and the African Union Convention for cybercrime offences related to 
identity theft offences; and this has created a very big lacuna in the adjectival laws of 
member-states who ‘strictly’ used these Conventions as their benchmark for cybercrime 
legislations. For instance, the UK has adopted the use of municipal legislation for prosecuting 
these offences. There is obviously need for these Conventions to be revisited with the aim of 
amending and/or adding the offence of identity theft, cybersquatting and cyberstalking as 
substantive offences.  Although the Council of Europe had tried to argue that different 
Articles of the Convention apply to these offences in relation to fraud and involving computer 
systems, it is however obvious that these offences are be stand-alone offences which could be 
committed independent of other computer related offences. 
 
Regarding the substantive cybercrime offences, a critical examination of these regional 
legislation
1427
 show that although they seem to contain provisions that tackle some of the 
basic computer misuse offences, the dynamic nature of cybercrime offences have now shown 
that they are outdated. They are no more in sync with the dynamic nature the emerging cyber-
offences. Recent cybercrime phenomena such as cyber-attacks on critical national 
infrastructures and cyberterrorism; denial of service attacks; phishing and pharming; identity 
theft and use of cyber-techniques like botnets in cyber-related offences are not adequately 
provided in these legislations. The regional legislation only focus on cyber-specific offences, 
and seem to ignore the more comprehensive aspect of cyber security including technical 
prevention, organizational aspects and mediums of the public-private partnerships in cyber 
law enforcement. 
                                                 
1427
 These include the Council of Europe Convention, The African Union Convention and the ECOWAS 
Directives on Cybercrime. 
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8.7 Jurisdictional problems in cyberspace 
 
The procedural issues relating to the enforcement of cybercrime adjectival legislations 
demonstrates the complexities of cybercrime investigations and the need for effective legal 
frameworks, combined with law enforcement resources and skills in practice. This research 
has so far identified that while some investigative actions can be achieved with traditional 
powers, many procedural provisions do not translate well from a spatial, object-oriented 
approach to one involving electronic data storage and real-time data flows. Specialized 
legislation is therefore required to ensure that the methods of procedural issues of cybercrime 
enforcement such as for the gathering of electronically stored and communicated computer 
content, for the identification and localisation of computer devices and communications are 
globally unified. The growing vulnerability of victims from crimes committed against 
computer systems and networks is a menace which ought to be addressed comprehensively. 
The task of adjudicating on illegal conducts in cyberspace has always fallen on the courts of 
individual nations. However, this first question usually asked by the Court to itself is whether 
it has the relevant jurisdiction to entertain the case. Unfortunately, the answer to the question 
is still at large. Although, the provisions regarding the procedural enforcements in the United 
Kingdom seem to be on different plane with the applicable position in Nigeria which have 
recently adopted sui generis offences in the Cybercrime Act 2015, both the courts and the 
prosecutors have always struggled to understand the nature of these cybercrime offences and 
the admissibility or otherwise of the e-evidence; and these perpetrators of cybercrime 
offences have continued to exploit these weaknesses in the system. 
 
The joint application of sections 2 and 50 of the Nigerian Cybercrime Act 2015 provide for 
territorial jurisdiction in the Nigerian Cybercrime Act. While section 2 provides that the 
provisions of the Act shall apply throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria, section 50 goes 
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the extra miles to empower the Nigerian Court with jurisdiction to try offences under the Act 
if the offences are committed in Nigeria, or on a ship or aircraft registered in Nigeria, or by a 
Nigerian outside Nigeria if the person’s conduct would also constitute an offence under a law 
of the country where the offence was committed. This provisions is similar to the provisions 
contained in section 72 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and section 42 Serious Crime Act, 
2015 as applicable in the United Kingdom. Regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the 
combined application of section 50 of the Act and section 251 of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution provide for the subject-matter jurisdiction, and empowers the Federal High 
Court with exclusive jurisdiction for cybercrime offences. These provisions seem to settle the 
conflict of jurisdiction between the High Court of the states and the Federal High Courts. 
 
There is no doubt that the continuous revolution in information technologies has brought 
enormous and fundamental changes to our society and will probably continue to do so in the 
foreseeable future. These changes are inclusive of our entire way of life, and have made our 
daily tasks and businesses so easier to handle. The continued advancement in information 
technology has therefore transfused almost every aspect of our hominoid activities. 
 
8.8 A case for an interim legal transplant 
 
In the final analysis, this research has identified that the provisions for cyber-offences related 
to trademarks and copyrights are not covered in the Cybercrime Act 2015. This research 
argues that the mode of legal transplant of the cybercrime adjectival laws as applicable in the 
United Kingdom in the Nigerian legal structure constitutes the most important determinant of 
their effectiveness and procedural enforcement. Thus the research proposes a temporary 
workable formula for the transplanting, adaptations and applications of the cybercrime 
provisions relating to copyrights and trademarks as applicable in the United Kingdom. 
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Section 363 of the Nigerian Criminal Procedure Act, provides that in any event of a lacuna in 
the Nigerian adjectival law, reliance on or voyage to English rules of practice and 
procedure
1428
 could be made. The provision of section 363 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
states as follows: “The Practice and procedure for the time being in force of the High Court 
of Justice in England
1429
 in criminal trials shall apply to trials in the High Court in so far as 
this Act has not specifically made provisions thereof.” 
 
In Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corporation v NNPC,
1430
 the Nigerian Supreme Court 
held that legal transplantation from the United Kingdom is not alien to the Nigerian legal 
system. Legislative borrowing from the English legal system has always been and continues 
to be a common form of legal change and legislative development of the Nigerian 
jurisprudence. Although decisions of the superior courts of records in the United Kingdom 
are not binding on Nigerian courts, they are of persuasive authority,
1431
 and applies to novel 
cases and situations in Nigeria where there is no comparable local legislation or customary 
law that applies to such situations.
1432
 Decisions of English Courts that addresses peculiar 
issues which, in no way bear any resemblance to the already existing legislative status-quo in 
                                                 
1428
 For instance, the Criminal Procedure Act did not provide for the procedure to be followed for an application 
for bail to the High Court after its refusal by the lower court. It is only by the importation of the English 
procedure pursuant to section 363 of C.P.A. that it can now be made by way of summons. Thus, application by 
motion was dismissed by the court in Simidele v. Commissioner of Police (1966) N.M.L.R., 116. 
1429
 Criminal cases in England and Wales are tried in Magistrates’ Courts or Crown Courts. Magistrate courts 
normally handle cases known as ‘summary offences’ (e.g. most motoring offences, minor criminal damage, 
being drunk and disorderly). The Crown Court on the other hand, carries out four principal types of activity: 
appeals from decisions of magistrates; sentencing of defendants committed from magistrates' courts, jury trials, 
and the sentencing of those who are convicted in the Crown Court, either after trial or on pleading guilty. The 
Crown Court deal with the most serious (indictable) offences. It is however arguable that the applicable practice 
and procedure applicable to the Crown Courts in England and Wales will be transplantable. 
1430
 Caribbean Trading and Fidelity Corporation v NNPC (2002) 5 SC (pt1) 21 @ 30 
1431
 See Dada v. The State (1977) NCLR 135; Elioclin Nig. Ltd v. Mbadiwe (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 47; 
National Supply Co. Ltd, v. Alhaji Hamajoda Sabana Co. Ltd (1938) 5 NWLR (Pt.40) 2005; Senator Adesanya 
v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1982) 2 NCLR 358. 
1432
 See Ude v. Nwara (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) p. 647 
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Nigeria will no doubt be compulsively persuasive.
1433
 In the words of Nikki Tobi JSC, in the 
case of Adetoun Oladeji (Nig) Ltd v. Nigerian Breweries Plc
1434
 ‘Although this court is not 
bound by the decision in Hadley v. Baxendale,
1435
 I will persuade myself any day to use the 
beautiful principle stated therein.’ The Court further held that “where Nigerian courts have 
followed a particular principle adopted from a foreign decision over the years … it would be 
totally erroneous to hold that such principle still remains foreign in nature.”1436 Also, in 
Jimoh Amoo and Ors v R
1437
 it had already been suggested by way of obiter dictum that the 
common law be applied in certain cases where the provisions of the municipal laws are silent 
on the subject. This position was also restated in Onyeanwusi v Okpukpara
1438
 where the 
Court reiterated that where the provisions of the law are silent, the common law position that 
applies in the High court of England should be applied. 
 
These foreign decisions are usually handy to expand the frontiers of the Nigerian 
jurisprudence, and will no doubt be very significant in the determination of cybercrime 
offences where there are no specific laws or rules defining these offences. This research 
agrees with the views of Roscoe Pound, that since society is forward looking, law as an 
instrument of social change must be progressive. According to him, “new values ought to be 
infused into the law for social advancement provided it does not hamper efficacy of the law, 
expressive of the people’s general will and be such that will enhance the achievement of new 
aspirations;”1439 and as such, legal transplant which may offer a temporary solution to the 
Nigerian legal and scientific developmental challenges posed by intellectual property 
cybercriminal activities related to copyrights and trademarks, until such a time the Nigerian 
                                                 
1433
 A.G Federation v. A. G Abia and Ors (2002) FWLR (Pt 102) 1 @ 213 
1434
 (2007) 1 SCNJ 375 
1435
 (1854) 9 Exch 341 
1436
 Adetoun Oladeji (Nig) Ltd v. Nigerian Breweries Plc (supra) at 378 
1437
 (1959) 4 FSC 113 
1438
 (1953) 14 WACA 311 
1439
 Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law  (Yale University Press, 1922) 
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Cybercrime Act 2015 is properly amended. This view was resounded by the Supreme Court, 
Per ACHOLONU, JSC, in Buhari & ors v Obasanjo & ors,
1440
 when he stated that “…the 
beauty of the law in a civilized society is that it should be progressive and act as a catalyst to 
social engineering. Where it relies on mere technicality or out-modelled or incomprehensible 
procedures and immerses itself in a jacket of hotchpotch legalism that is not in tune with the 
times, it becomes anachronistic and it destroys or desecrates the temple of justice it stand on”. 
 
8.9 Limitations of the research and future work 
 
For future works, the framework of cybercrime offences can be effectively validated and 
assessed by encompassing both qualitative and quantitative research techniques in future. 
Quantitative methods can be used to quantify the data with applied statistical methods being 
used to test the dynamic relationships between the components of cybercrime and affiliated 
framework.
1441
 This ‘knowledge base’ should also include the establishment of ‘data 
systems.'
1442
 The collection of data for planning interventions to prevent and reduce 
cybercrime offences is as important for cybercrime as it is for other crime types. 
Measurement of cybercrime can be used to inform crime reduction initiatives; to enhance 
local, national, regional and international responses; to identify gaps in the responses; to 
provide intelligence and risk assessment; and to educate and inform the public.
1443
 This 
method will also adopt an appropriate measurement approach to the measurement of new 
                                                 
1440
 (2004) NWLR pt. 191,1487, 1532 B-C 
1441
 Charlene A.Yauch and Harold J. Steudel, ‘Complementary Use of Qualitative and Quantitative Cultural 
Assessment Methods’ (2003) Organizational Research Methods, Vol. 6, No. 4, 465-481 
<http://www.eresearchcollaboratory.com/AOMComplementaryQualQuant.pdf> accessed on 28 June 2015. See 
also José Molina Azorin and Roslyn Cameron, ‘The Application of Mixed Methods in Organisational Research: 
A Literature Review’ (2010) Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods, Vol. 8, No. 2, 95-105 
<http://www.ejbrm.com/issue/download.html?idArticle=250&a=bi&pagenumber=1&w=100> accessed on 28 
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 Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, annex to United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 
2002/13 on Action to promote effective crime prevention, 24 July 2002. 
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 Stefan Fafinski, William H. Dutton, and Helen Zerlina Margetts, “Mapping and Measuring Cybercrime” 
(2010) Oxford Internet Institute Forum Discussion Paper No. 18 
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forms and dimensions of crime, including cybercrime, aimed to characterize ‘who’ (and how 
many) are involved in ‘what’ (and how much).1444 
 
Additionally, future research from this study could be used to improve and proffer a 
universally accepted definition of the concept of cybercrime and its adoption in a holistic 
manner. Continued research in this area can be conducted and this may lead to the 
development of a strategic and technological framework to counter cybercrime activities. 
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that there is no common agreement on the concept of 
cybercrime internationally and among researchers. While there are many definitions and 
individual conceptions of cybercrime, these suggest a trend that requires further analyses.
1445
 
This is evident as the study of this concept has been the focus of many countries, policy-
makers and scholars; but their perspectives vary. Due to the multidimensional structures and 
components of cybercrime offences, it can be said that the concept and perceptions of 
cybercrime is a contested concept whose interpretation varies from party to party and country 
to country.
1446
 The context of cybercrime connotes different understandings and 
interpretations and therefore, an accurate knowledge of the context of cybercrime enhances 
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 European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations (HEUNI), (2011) 
Data Collection on [New] Forms and Manifestations of Crime. In: Joutsen, M. (ed.) New Types of Crime, 
Proceedings of the International Seminar held in Connection with HEUNI’s Thirtieth Anniversary, 20 October 
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Threat Assessment” (2010) <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf> accessed 28 June 2015. 
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Informáticos 2001; Vietnam, Law on Information Technology, 2007; Serbia, Law on Organization and 
Competence of Government Authorities for Combating High-Tech Crime 2010;  Marc D. Goodman & Susan 
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Information Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
1446
 Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis, and Anna-Maria Talihärm, “Estonia after the 2007 Cyber Attacks: Legal, 
Strategic and Organisational Changes in Cyber Security,” (2011) International Journal of Cyber Warfare and 
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clarity of intent. Thus, there is a need for a future structured approach to help in 
understanding the various components of cybercrime. 
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